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 Foreword
Over the past few years, many books have heralded a ‘data revolution’ that 
will change the way we live, work, think and make money (Kitchin 2014; 
Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 2013). Dataf ication – transforming all things 
under the sun into a data format and thus quantifying them – is at the heart 
of the networked world. Data are also at the centre of our media practices: 
data feed the many applications we use on a variety of platforms, they flow 
from users and devices to services and platforms, making connections and 
scaling audiences at an unprecedented rate. Networked connectivity runs 
on data – the new oil of the information economy. Just as electricity changed 
industrial processes and domestic practices in the nineteenth century, 
a data-driven paradigm will constitute the core of twenty-f irst-century 
processes and practices.
It is therefore no surprise that data have moved to the centre of media 
research and have become protagonists in media narratives. Some scholars 
have heralded Big Data as the engine of unprecedented technological and 
social progress; for others, this framing marks yet another myth in the 
history of media technologies. In a society where many aspects of language, 
discourse and culture have been dataf ied, it is imperative to scrutinize the 
conditions and contexts from which they emanate. Researchers from the 
humanities and social sciences increasingly realize they have to valorise 
data originating from Web platforms, devices and repositories as significant 
cultural research objects. Data have become ontological and epistemologi-
cal objects of research – manifestations of social interaction and cultural 
production. The Datafied Society: Studying Culture through Data approaches 
dataf ication as a process of mediatisation, and provides a theoretical and 
methodological toolkit for those wanting to study culture through data.
In developing new research skills, academics not only expand their own 
corpora of research objects; they also signif icantly change – and boost – 
their own role in society. As data are increasingly considered to be at the 
heart of the knowledge economies, data-savvy scholars from the humanities 
and arts (often in collaboration with information and computer scientists) 
have ignited critical public debates. Their perspectives on data science are 
important in that they bring the question of responsibility to the fore. Ques-
tions of responsible data production and use, but also questions of meaning 
attribution, ethics, privacy, data power and transparency of data handling 
now constitute the core of this new paradigm. As much as scholars need 
to tackle the challenges for research ethics standards when working with 
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big data, they also need to critically revisit their own position as experts 
who can influence public debates, policymaking and commercial activities.
For humanities scholars and students, the transformation towards a 
dataf ied society means they have to be able to deploy new research skills 
and methods that come along with this paradigm shift. Signif icantly, 
students need to be educated to become critical data practitioners who 
are both capable of working with data and of critically questioning the big 
myths that frame the dataf ied society. It also means they have to leave the 
academic ivory tower and enter the new world of ‘data practices’ to witness 
how they transform institutions, shape business models, and lead to new 
forms of governance or civic participation.
The Datafied Society: Studying Culture through Data provides students 
from the humanities in general (and media studies in particular) with a 
comprehensive overview of data practices relevant to media researchers. The 
book contains a broad overview of methods available, most prominently so-
called Cultural Analytics and digital methods. A number of well-respected 
contributors show how specif ic social interactions and cultural practices in 
a data-fuelled society can be thoroughly studied and analysed, not only by 
exploring new analytical tools but also by critically assessing the various 
approaches, encouraging readers to develop a balanced understanding 
of how the dataf ied society works and how it can be looked upon from 
different angles. Several engaging case studies show the rich potential of 
what the analysis of data practices has to offer to media studies scholars. In 
the best tradition of this young f ield, critical reflection goes hand in hand 
with exploring new theoretical venues.
As our world gets increasingly connected and mediatised, input and 
expertise from the humanities and social sciences becomes essential to 
understanding the dynamics, ethics and pragmatics of a dataf ied society. 
This book is an important contribution towards meeting the challenges of 
the platform-driven, data-fuelled world in which we have all come to live.
José van Dijck
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Optimistic reporting about ‘big data’ has made it easy to forget that data-
driven practices have been part of the emerging information society since 
the nineteenth century (Beniger 1989; Porter 1996; Campbell-Kelly 2003). 
In lieu of an illustrative metaphor, the label ‘big data’ is used to describe 
a set of practices involving the collection, processing and analysis of large 
data sets. The term enables members of the general public to engage in 
debates, albeit often uninformed, on the ongoing transformation of our 
knowledge economy, but it disguises more than it reveals. Nevertheless, 
despite its vagueness, the term captures something of signif icance about 
contemporary Western societies, where economic value is generated 
through the processing of information and the monetization of knowledge. 
To develop a critical understanding of this current situation and its societal 
consequences, it is important to debunk the exceptionalism inherent in the 
‘big data’ paradigm. For starters, we must stop feeding the hype about it and 
lay out what we know: the phenomenon we are dealing with is not ‘big data’, 
but ‘the computational turn’ (Berry 2012; Braidotti 2013). This turn began 
in the 1950s with the introduction of electronic computers and continues 
unabated today. It concerns the dataf ication of everything: all aspects of 
life are now transformed into quantif iable data (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier 2013). As the social is extensively mined, its data are used to predict 
human behaviour and automate decision-making processes. As José van 
Dijck claims, ‘dataf ication as a legitimate means to access, understand 
and monitor people’s behaviour is becoming a leading principle, not just 
amongst techno-adepts, but also amongst scholars who see dataf ication 
as a revolutionary research opportunity to investigate human conduct’ 
(2014: 198). Data analysis promises an ‘objective’ way to grasp the complex 
and dynamic reality we live in. Visualized via colourful dashboards, info-
graphics and charts, it puts forth, persuasively and seductively, a seemingly 
accurate and unbiased assessment of reality. However, the translation of 
the social into data involves a process of abstraction that compels certain 
compromises to be made as the data are generated, collected, selected and 
analysed (Langlois et al. 2015).
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The New Empirical
Because datafication is taking place at the core of our culture and social 
organization, it is crucial that humanities scholars tackle questions about 
how this process affects our understanding and documentation of history, 
forms of social interaction and organization, political developments, and our 
understanding of democracy. That datafication is a phenomenon that urgently 
demands investigation was acknowledged in sociology more than a decade 
ago, but this recognition did not necessarily lead to the adoption of novel data 
practices or the reassessment of existing research agendas. In a programmatic 
article, Andrew Abbott (2000) pointed out the challenges for researchers when 
confronted with new data resources available on an unprecedented scale:
There is little question that a gradual revolution in the nature of knowledge 
is taking place: a slow eclipsing of print by visual representation, a move to-
ward knowledge that is more experimental and even aleatory, an extensive 
commodification of important parts of previously esoteric knowledge. (298)
This forecast has been borne out by the developments of the past decade and a 
half, and these processes of change have indeed intensified. The Google search 
engine and commercial social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube and Instagram continually generate data from the interactions of 
millions of users. Access to data/tools is sold to marketeers and is employed 
to target, predict and manage these platforms’ users. So-called application 
programming interfaces (APIs) make parts of vast databases accessible to 
third parties, including researchers. Concurrently, an industry has emerged 
whose companies collect, sell, combine and analyse data sets for all kinds of 
purposes, ranging from targeted advertising and market research to credit 
ratings, risk assessments and mass surveillance. The collection of data from 
massive data sets also yields a glimpse of a future when certain sorts of busi-
nesses will thrive on the exploitation of vast amounts of stored information.
The large corpus of empirical data and available tools for data collection 
and analysis is changing the ways knowledge is produced (Weinberger 
2013; Meyer & Schroeder 2015). For the humanities, this transformation 
requires not only that we critically inquire into how technology affects our 
understanding of knowledge and how it alters our epistemic processes, but 
that we also employ the new data resources and technologies in new ways 
of scholarly investigation. Although data sets can provide new insights that 
offer opportunities for f ine-grained detail previously not available, their 
possibilities are frequently overestimated (e.g. Anderson 2008; Schmidt & 
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Cohen 2014). Within academia, the blind trust in models, methods and data 
has been consistently criticized; recent big data enthusiasm has motivated 
a cohort of critical scholars to raise the alarm yet again (e.g. Couldry 2014; 
Gitelman 2013; boyd & Crawford 2011; Pasquale 2015). In this light, Rob 
Kitchin in The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures 
and Their Consequences (2014) identif ies four fallacies sustaining big data 
empiricism:
1. Big Data can capture the whole of a domain and provide full resolution;
2. there is no need for a priori theory, models or hypotheses;
3. data can speak for themselves free of human bias or framing;
4. meaning transcends context or domain-specif ic knowledge. (133-137)
The unquestionable allure of new forms of empiricism makes it important 
for us to continue to acknowledge that humanities scholars’ epistemological 
assumptions are different from those of their counterparts in the hard sci-
ences. The purpose of humanities data research is not empirical validation 
and hypothesis testing, but the development of questions and the discovery 
of insights (Ramsay 2003: 173). Rather than import questions and methods 
from the hard sciences, we must develop our own approaches and sensitivi-
ties in working with data that will reflect the humanities’ traditions.
The Humanities Scholar Revisited
There has been a tendency in academia to classify the emerging research 
practices of the digital humanities as a new specialism, a new f ield that can 
be neatly contained, whether within a department, an academic minor or 
research group. This position is troubling: computer-aided methods and 
data practices are not some new object like f ilms or games once were. 
‘Digital humanities’ is merely the nom de guerre of the computational turn 
in the humanities. Dataf ication and computerization will come to affect 
all research agendas and inform the skill sets of students and scholars 
alike. We predict that the term ‘digital humanities’ will sound increasingly 
pleonastic and will eventually disappear – it will lead not to the replacement 
of established methods in the humanities, but rather to an expansion in 
the curricula we study and the methods we use.
Widely associated with computational methods, the digital humani-
ties have been criticized from within the humanities as a whole. In “The 
Dark Side of the Digital Humanities” (2014), Richard Grusin discusses the 
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tensions between scholars of the traditional humanities and those engaged 
in digital humanities, which have been based on the idea that the latter 
‘make things’. In this assertion he sees a devaluation of critique (or other 
modes of humanistic inquiry). The current focus on the digital humanities’ 
ability to ‘build’ or to ‘make’ things rather than to critically comment on 
issues is misleading (not least because critique takes many forms, including 
making, building and application). At the core of this debate – though 
often it is not made explicit – is the question of how to approach the object 
of research. It has frequently been claimed that studying culture through 
data would necessitate thorough training in programming so as to allow 
researchers the wherewithal to ‘look’ into the ‘black box’ of the technology 
they are using, but such an emphasis misses the mark. Since the emerg-
ing algorithmic culture is characterized by the translation of rules and 
procedures into software, we need to develop an understanding of the 
mathematical concepts and models driving these programmes not in order 
to fully master them but rather to understand them suff iciently enough 
to approach new research objects from a critical perspective. We endorse 
Nick Montfort’s understanding of programming as a means to develop 
intellectual capabilities that help us grasp how procedures of everyday life 
are translated into machine-readable language (Montfort 2016).
With regard to Grusin’s call for humanities scholars to engage in critical 
inquiry, we are aware of the pressures brought on by academia’s relentless 
corporatization and the overall neoliberal trend in society. Fields in the hu-
manities are increasingly confronted with the demand that they justify their 
research activities. In such a climate it is tempting to employ computer-aided 
methods and quantitative analysis to feign a more ‘scientif ic’ appearance. 
Employing popular but meaningless terms such as ‘big data’ is symptomatic 
in this regard. However, the computational turn offers the humanities an 
incredibly important opportunity to study the contemporary transforma-
tion of society. We believe that access to large-scale empirical evidence 
and to analytic tools enables humanities scholars not only to describe this 
transformation empirically, but also to develop conceptual frameworks 
for understanding its impact. Understanding the ‘digital humanities’ as 
something instrumental, merely covering ways of doing research instead of 
conceiving of it as a more encompassing scholarly reaction to an increasingly 
datafied society, would simply mean following the folly of policymakers who 
believe that technological advancement will solve social problems.
As humanities scholars, we engage with ‘the situated, partial, and 
constitutive character of knowledge production’ (Drucker 2011: n.p.). The 
increasing translation of aspects of everyday life into machine-readable 
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information can be seen as yet another process of mediatisation that media 
scholars in particular are well suited to scrutinize. This does not mean 
that they can sit back and rely on their distinct methods and skills. On 
the contrary: the data revolution (Kitchin 2014) raises issues concerning 
research questions, methods and ethics. It calls for new literacies and 
the development of codes of conduct that make transparent the role of 
computational methods, that tackle ethical issues in data collection and 
sharing, and that address the role of humanities scholars in public debate 
and interdisciplinary cooperation.
To become ‘experts’ in data practices and simultaneously investigate how 
dataf ication affects institutions in our society, we need to work directly in 
the very f ields where transformation through these practices manifests 
itself; whether as embedded researchers, activists or active participants ap-
plying scholarly expertise in the diverse contexts afforded by various social 
institutions. Here application and making are not only critical practices 
but also constitute learning acts. In response to the new demands of our 
times, we founded the Utrecht Data School at Utrecht University in the 
Netherlands. This research and education platform allows us to conduct 
data research with our students in areas that are rapidly changing through 
the advancing information processing technologies commissioned by com-
panies, governments and non-profit organizations. But we are not a mere 
service provider: by initiating debates among stakeholders and policymak-
ers, we can inform opinion-making processes and express critique as much 
in the application of data practices as in public debate. Unlike preaching 
from the pulpit of the academic lecture hall, our engagement in the f ield 
is risky. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the humanities have much to 
offer in societal debates about data through their profound understanding of 
cultural complexity and their critical inquiry into knowledge technologies.
Investigating the Datafied Society
This book is a collection of scholarly investigations into computer-aided 
methods and practices. While several contributors offer essays represent-
ing their skills, methods and exemplary research projects, others reflect 
on the sensibilities and competencies that scholars need to develop in 
order to study contemporary culture through data. This includes an expert 
understanding of the specif ic role of data analysis tools and data visualiza-
tion in the process of knowledge production. In academic research, but 
also in many sectors of business and other areas of society at large, data 
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analysis unfolds via computer interfaces that display results that users 
often mistakenly regard as objective assessments. Such environments need 
knowledge workers who can grasp the processes of knowledge generation, 
from data collection through the various stages of analysis to visualization. 
These experts should be positioned to question the data sets as well as the 
mathematical models which determine the analysis.
In their historical investigation, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison (2007) 
show that objectivity emerges as a symptom of epistemological fear: ‘fear 
that the world is too labyrinthine to be threaded by reason; fear that the 
senses are too feeble and the intellect too frail; fear that memory fades, 
even between adjacent steps of a mathematical demonstration; fear that 
authority and convention is blind [...] Objectivity fears subjectivity, the 
core self ’ (373-74). The emergence of objectivity in scientif ic discourse 
also shaped a distinct self-understanding of the scientist. Delegating 
image creation to machines, the twentieth-century scientist became the 
expert reader of images whose ‘trained judgement’ afforded an accurate 
analysis and an alteration of the image for the depiction of patterns, the 
categorization of families of objects and so forth.1 Daston and Galison note 
that contemporary scientif ic images are changing, both in quality and 
functionality. ‘The image-as-tool seems to enter the scene inseparably from 
the creation of a new kind of scientif ic self – a hybrid f igure, who very 
often works toward scientif ic goals, but with an attitude to the work that 
borrows a great deal from engineering, industrial application, and even 
artistic-aesthetic ambition’ (2007: 413). One might add that over the past 
two decades of internet culture, open-source software development and 
online collaboration have also affected academic inquiry, which unfolds 
at the crossroads of universities and maker labs, hackathons or start-ups. 
Our current enthusiasm for computer-aided methods and data parallels 
the technology-induced crisis in representation and objectivity analysed 
by Daston and Galison. Their concerns must be taken into account in order 
to critically reflect upon the purported objectivity of computer-calculated 
results and visualizations.
The persuasive power of such claims to objectivity works on all levels 
of management and policymaking and requires that the scientif ic self 
be an eager advocate for critical inquiry into the working mechanisms 
of computer-aided and data-driven analysis. The media philosopher 
Vilém Flusser warned of the inscribed promise of scientif ic accuracy and 
objectivity in ‘techno-images’ (1997). The unbalanced enthusiasm for 
1 See, for example, Daston and Galison (2007: 371).
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data practices as processes for the development of accurate and ‘neutral’ 
(hence objective) results might prove just as problematic. As has been 
eloquently pointed out by David Gelernter, in discussing the uncritical 
reading of a map of potential ash distribution following the eruption 
of the Icelandic volcano Eyjaf jallajökull in 2010, uncritical acceptance 
of computer-calculated results might have dangerous consequences: 
‘Firstly we’ll be covered in an ash cloud of anti-knowledge and secondly 
a moral and intellectual passivity will emerge that won’t doubt or argue 
against the images’ (Gelernter 2010). This does not mean that we should 
reject those practices, but rather that we should employ them while being 
informed about their limitations, questioning their social impact and 
grasping their role in the epistemic process. The task ahead is to inform 
users, policymakers and the general public about the many factors that 
make up a data set, shape analysis and generate visualizations – and the 
many ways to read these digital analytics.
Although primarily directed at upper graduate students and researchers 
in the media studies, The Datafied Society is a useful collection of essays for 
anyone interested in studying culture during the era of the computational 
turn. The edited volume has been structured into four parts: (1) Studying 
Culture through Data; (2) Practices; (3) Concerns; and (4) Key Ideas in Big 
Data Research.
Part 1, ‘Studying Culture through Data’, covers different research meth-
ods. In her contribution, Eef Masson explores how two sets of epistemic 
traditions that used to be relevant to more or less distinct groups of scholars 
– hermeneutic and empirical – encounter each other in humanistic data 
research. She discusses how recent literature that reflects on the current 
state of the digital humanities tends to focus either on returning to the 
core, interpretative tasks of humanists or on bridging the two epistemic 
traditions. The tension between these traditions is also addressed in the 
contribution by Christian Gosvig Olesen, who argues that Cinemetrics, 
Cultural Analytics and ACTION, which quantify and visualize stylistic 
patterns in f ilms and other cultural products, promote an inductive, 
exploratory form of analysis, and thus challenge the perception that cin-
emetric methodology is primarily a scientistic mode. These tools possess 
the potential to make cinemetrics more compelling to f ilm scholars, who 
have been sceptical of its approach due to its association with a positivist 
epistemology.
The focus then shifts to Cultural Analytics, with Lev Manovich’s proposed 
alternative to the distinct traditions carved out by Social Computing and 
Digital Humanities. Manovich successfully avoids taking sides between 
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the goals and methods of the humanities and of the sciences and instead 
explores how to toggle between the two disciplinary paradigms in order to 
pursue opportunities missed by both. He discusses the project he heads up, 
On Broadway, as an exemplary use of Cultural Analytics. The project uses 
data and images from various sources such as Twitter and Instagram posts, 
New York City taxi trips and data of economic indicators to create a novel 
view of city life.
The next two contributions focus on digital methods. First, Richard Rog-
ers investigates the role of query design in digital methods, discussing how 
digital methods repurpose mediums and outputs for social (and medium) 
research. He explores how Google can be employed as an epistemological 
machine in research and discusses query design as a distinct analytical 
approach. Then, Natalia Sánchez-Querubín examines issue networks as part 
of the digital methods initiative to ‘follow the medium’. She explores how 
streams of hashtags rather than hyperlinks can provide a way for redoing 
issue network analysis for social media.
Part 2 is dedicated to data practices in digital data analysis. It considers 
how researchers can engage with the dataf ied society. In his contribution, 
William Uricchio explores how algorithms paired with big data redefine 
long-held subject-object relations, raising important epistemological 
questions. He makes suggestions as to how the humanities agenda can be 
revised so that the new order’s implications can be properly understood. 
In the following chapter, Bernhard Rieder and Theo Röhle discuss what 
they regard as the f ive main challenges of digital methods and explore 
the concept of the ‘digital Bildung’ (Berry 2011) as a means of facing these 
challenges. Taking up three examples, they demonstrate that the tools we 
have come to use mobilize a wide array of knowledge. The singular focus 
on code as a form of knowledge that is required when working with data 
distracts from considering what is actually coded. The ‘content’ of software 
is not code per se but rather a procedure expressed in code; and knowledge 
about these procedures is what needs to be developed.
The next contribution zooms in on the tools used in digital data analysis, 
as Johannes Paßmann and Asher Boersma consider an approach to algorith-
mic black boxes. They develop a concept of transparency that outlines the 
skills necessary for researchers to deal with the parts of the box that remain 
‘black’ or opaque. Next, Cornelius Puschmann and Julian Ausserhofer show 
us different aspects of APIs from the perspective of social scientists us-
ing them for data collection. They describe the origin of APIs in software 
development, conduct a survey of popular Web APIs by type, and discuss 
issues with regard to the reliability, validity and representativeness of data 
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retrieved from APIs before offering speculation about future developments 
in this area. Tommaso Venturini et al. then reflect on a particular way of 
analysing data through the visualization of networks. They illustrate the 
narrative and storytelling potential of networks by examining the Iliad’s 
network of characters, thus moving away from a discussion of the math-
ematical properties of networks to a reflection on how networks mediate 
and structure the phenomena they represent. Lastly, Karin van Es, Nicolás 
López Coombs and Thomas Boeschoten advocate for reflexive data analysis. 
They provide a series of questions about the various stages involved in doing 
digital data research that underscores how data and data visualizations are 
constructed by researchers and the tools they use.
Part 3 is dedicated to ethics, encompassing concerns ranging from moral 
issues that need to be tackled when embarking on research to reflections 
on how big data discriminates. Gerwin van Schie, Irene Westra and Mirko 
Tobias Schäfer discuss research ethics in light of their own experience in 
scraping patient data from an online platform. They reflect on the strained 
relationship between existing ethical guidelines and big data research, 
particularly in relation to the idea of informed consent. They propose a 
research structure that allows big data research to be conducted in an 
ethical manner. Taking a broader view, Annette Markham and Elizabeth 
Buchanan consider their previous work to provide a cohesive framework 
for assisting internet researchers, review boards, students and ethicists in 
ethically navigating the murky waters of internet research. Concluding 
this section, Koen Leurs and Tamara Shepherd explore the social biases of 
data sets and discuss the extent to which inequality, racism and prejudice 
are reflected in data sets.
Part 4, ‘Key Ideas in Big Data Research’, comprises a series of four short 
interviews exploring two topics; f irst, with Nick Couldry and Carolin Gerlitz 
on the challenges in researching the datafied society. Couldry specif ically 
tackles the ‘myth of big data’ and Gerlitz the problems of making data points 
countable and comparable. With Evgeny Morozov and Mercedes Bunz, we 
then consider how algorithms affect everyday life. Morozov opposes the 
exceptionalism of algorithms; Bunz stresses the need to engage in dialogue 
with technology and to learn how to understand ‘algorithmic thought’.
The chapters in this book can be read separately, but, taken together, they 
make a contribution that will stimulate and engage humanities scholars via 
their perspectives on debates and reflections on the theory and practices of 
digital data research. In addition to enhancing understanding of the f ield 
itself, they provide some hands-on guidelines to help direct research in an 
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ethical and transparent manner, promoting awareness of how researchers 
and their tools affect knowledge production.
References
Abbott, Andrew. 2000. “Reflections on the Future of Sociology.” Contemporary Sociology ‒ Journal 
of Reviews. 29 (2) (March): 296-300.
Berry, David M. 2012. “Introduction: Understanding the Digital Humanities.” In Understanding 
Digital Humanities, ed. David M. Berry, 1-20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
boyd, danah, & Crawford, Kate. 2012. “Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, 
Technological, And Scholarly Phenomenon.” Information, Communication & Society 15 (5): 
662-679.
Braidotti, Rosi. 2013. The Posthuman. Cambridge: John Wiley & Sons.
Couldry, Nick. 2014. “Inaugural: A necessary disenchantment: myth, agency and injustice in a 
digital world.” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-954X.12158/abstract.
Daston, Lorraine & Peter Galison. 2007. Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Dijck, José van. 2014. “Dataf ication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientif ic 
paradigm and ideology.” Surveillance & Society 12 (2): 197-208.
Drucker, Johanna. “Humanities Approaches to Graphical Display.” Digital Humanities Quarterly 5 (1).
Flusser, Vilém. 1997. Medienkultur. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.
Gelernter, David. 2010. “Gefahren der Softwaregläubigkeit: Die Aschewolke aus Antiwissen.” 
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Section 1
Studying Culture through Data

1. Humanistic Data Research
An Encounter between Epistemic Traditions
Eef Masson
The majority of information graphics […] are shaped by the disciplines 
from which they have sprung: statistics, empirical sciences, and 
business. Can these languages serve humanistic fields where 
interpretation, ambiguity, inference, and qualitative judgment take 
priority over quantitative statements and presentations of ‘facts’?
‒ Johanna Drucker1
Introduction
Humanities scholars, in many cases, do not seek to establish unassailable, 
objective truths. Unlike their colleagues in the natural sciences, historians, 
literary scholars or media scholars often do not proceed by measuring or 
testing observable phenomena in order to conclusively demonstrate tenden-
cies or relations between them (although there are certainly some who do).2 
Instead, they approach their objects of study from interpretive and critical 
perspectives, acting in the assumption that in doing so they necessarily also 
preconstitute them. However, with the introduction of digital research tools, 
and tools for data research specif ically, humanistic scholarship seems to 
get increasingly indebted to positivist traditions. For one, this is because 
those tools, more often than not, are borrowed from disciplines centred on 
the analysis of empirical, usually quantitative data. Inevitably, then, they 
incorporate the epistemic traditions they derive from.3 Another reason 
1 Drucker 2014: 6-7.
2 For evidence of the latter, see for instance Bod 2013, which traces empirical tendencies in 
humanities scholarship from Antiquity to the present. Bod argues that there is an ‘apparently 
unbroken strand in the humanities that can be identif ied as the quest for patterns in humanistic 
material on the basis of methodical principles’ (7) – a strand which, in his view, contemporary 
philosophy of the humanities tends to ignore (7, 10). Arguably, this pattern-seeking tendency is 
more central to some disciplines (for instance, linguistics) than to others (e.g. literary studies).
3 Knorr Cetina provides an in-depth analysis of the operation of what she terms epistemic 
‘cultures’ (1999). I prefer to use another noun here, because I consider much more basic concep-
tions as to how knowledge is or can be produced. (Knorr Cetina, indeed, is interested in the 
minute ontological and methodological differences between, very specif ically, the natural 
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is that data research in the humanities is necessarily interdisciplinary: it 
involves collaborations between scholars with backgrounds in different 
f ields – and therefore, different views on how knowledge takes shape.
Over the past decades, this encounter between scholarly traditions has 
led to a number of frictions. While some humanists have adopted digital 
tools in the hopes of making their results more verif iable, others have 
questioned the underlying assumptions, arguing that they threaten to 
undermine the very project of the humanities. By succumbing to the lure 
of scientism, those commentators fear, humanists run the risk of forgetting 
what they excel at – critical interpretation – and by the same token, of 
impoverishing their practice. At the same time, debates emerging from 
the encounter between research traditions have also engendered a series 
of profound developments in terms of how data research is performed. 
In the past 20 years, the use of digital tools in humanities projects has 
become increasingly widespread.4 In the early years, those tools were seen 
as mere aids: technical devices that could support the actual scholarly work, 
as performed by human researchers (Berry 2012: 3). At the time, the practice 
was most often referred to as ‘humanities computing’. In the late 1990s, 
the denominator ‘digital humanities’ became more common. According 
to N. Katherine Hayles, this change in name ‘was meant to signal that the 
f ield had emerged from the low-prestige status of a support device into 
a genuinely intellectual endeavour with its own professional practices, 
rigorous standards, and exciting theoretical explorations’ (2012: 43).5 
Although generalizations on the topic are contested, many agree that 
this shift in function was accompanied by a series of transformations in 
the nature and focus of the scholarship conducted. Early adopters, in many 
cases, were interested in the computer’s capabilities for encoding, searching 
and retrieving large amounts of text, and for automating their analysis. 
Their research was focused predominantly on the detection of patterns 
and structures in an abundance of empirical data and geared towards 
sciences; see pp. 3-4 of her introduction.) By using the term ‘traditions’ I seek to highlight the 
relation between attitudes towards data research, and assumptions and practices that long 
predate the use of computers in humanities scholarship.
4 The ‘origins’ of this practice are often traced to the 1940s, but the use of digital tools has 
grown more popular with the introduction of the World Wide Web (in the early 1990s). See for 
instance Hayles 2012: 42. 
5 For a more profound analysis of the (then-recent) lexical shift from ‘humanities computing’ 
to ‘digital humanities’, see Svensson 2009. The author here examines ‘how [the f ield’s] nam-
ing is related to shifts in institutional, disciplinary, and social organization’ (n.p.). Matthew 
Kirschenbaum for his part has highlighted on several occasions the tactical impulse behind 
this change in name (e.g. Kirschenbaum 2012).
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generating quantitative results (Evans & Rees 2012: 23; Hayles 2012: 43).6 
Towards the end of the last decade, projects with a qualitative slant also 
became more common, and practitioners increasingly sought to answer 
interpretive questions. In the 2009 version of their ‘Digital Humanities 
Manifesto’, Jeffrey Schnapp, Todd Presner and Peter Lunenfeld observe that 
digital humanists, at the time, not only began to tackle a broader range of 
research objects than previously – advancing from digitized printed text to 
media forms and practices in the widest sense, including born-digital ones 
– but harnessed ‘digital toolkits in the service of the Humanities’ core [...] 
strengths: attention to complexity, medium specif icity, historical context, 
analytical depth, critique and interpretation’ (2). Inevitably, this entailed an 
interest also in matters of methodology: practitioners increasingly engaged 
in ref lection on the underpinnings of computational approaches, both 
technical and epistemological. 
As these trends continue, the role of information technologies for hu-
manities research is being thoroughly reimagined. Computers, software 
and data are increasingly seen as generative: they are taken to afford new 
forms of scholarship, centring on questions that so far have lain outside 
the scope of academic endeavours. By the same token, humanities research 
and digital methods or tools are more often thought of as inextricably 
intertwined. Leighton Evans and Sian Rees, in their contribution to the 
introductory volume Understanding Digital Humanities (2012), claim that 
we are currently beginning to see the emergence of a ‘f ield influenced by 
computation as a way of accessing, interpreting, and reporting the world’ (29; 
emphasis added). For David M. Berry, editor of the volume, ‘computational 
technology has become the very condition of possibility required in order 
to think about many of the questions raised in the humanities today’ (3). 
These days, the most ambitious of digital humanities practitioners see 
computation as an opportunity to profoundly transform cultural criticism, 
and humanities research more broadly.
6 Such research, of course, is still being conducted today. The following URLs provide access 
to some examples of recent projects in quantitative data research, in the f ields of history, literary 
studies, and linguistics respectively: http://www.herts.ac.uk/digital-history/cliodynamics-lab 
(the webpage of the Cliodynamics Lab at the Digital History Research Centre of the University 
of Hertfortshire, UK; cliodynamics uses mathematical modeling techniques to study historical 
dynamics in the social, cultural, and/or economic domain); http://novel-tm.ca/ (the website of 
NovelTM, a North-American inter-university initiative devoted to mining patterns in novels); 
http://research.dbvis.de/text/research-areas/digital-humanities/linguistic/ (the webpage for 
the Linguistic Data Analysis research area of the Data Analysis and Visualization Group at the 
University of Konstanz, Germany).
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In this chapter I discuss in an exploratory manner how, over the course of 
the past two decades, humanistic data research has served as the backdrop 
to an encounter between two sets of epistemic traditions – hermeneutic 
and empirical – that had previously wielded their influence in more or less 
distinct areas of academic practice.7 First, I identify some of the sites for this 
encounter, touching successively upon the tools scholars work with, the meth-
odological underpinnings for those tools, and practices of cross-disciplinary 
collaboration. Next, I consider the frictions this encounter entailed, zooming 
in on some major points of critique directed at practitioners (most of them, 
indeed, concerning the status of interpretation in data research). Finally, 
I briefly contemplate how this criticism eventually helped shape develop-
ments in the digital humanities at large (as briefly outlined above).8 As I shall 
argue, efforts to set new agendas for digital research are motivated in part 
by a wish to reclaim some of the core tasks of humanists – tasks often seen 
as interpretive in nature – but also, in some cases, to bridge the gap between 
disparate epistemic traditions.9 While this chapter considers the humanities 
more broadly, I take my examples primarily, though not exclusively, from 
the study of media, and in particular f ilm (historical), research.
7 I should stress, here, that ‘areas of practice’ does not mean ‘disciplines’. Both traditions, 
indeed, co-exist within the same academic departments – although in those cases, they are 
often relevant to different groups of practitioners. Compare also Bod 2013: 351.
8 It might be useful to explicate here that the denominator ‘digital humanities’ is commonly 
used to refer to a broader category of practices than the ‘humanistic data research’ mentioned 
in my chapter title. For instance, the term is often also used by those involved in the creation 
or curation of online collections, or to refer to alternative (i.e. non-print) forms of knowledge 
production and dissemination. I shall use the terms alternately, depending on which category 
my claims are more relevant to.
The website of the Alliance of Digital Humanities Organizations (ADHO, an umbrella organisa-
tion for national and international associations of digital humanists) gives a useful overview 
of information on and resources for digital humanities research; see especially the sections 
‘publications’ (http://adho.org/publications) and ‘resources’ (http://adho.org/resources, which 
lists key conferences and platforms, such as blogs). The City University of New York’s Digital 
Humanities Resource Guide (http://commons.gc.cuny.edu/wiki/index.php/The_CUNY_Digi-
tal_Humanities_Resource_Guide) also references publications, events and tools, and provides 
links to leading centres for digital humanities research. The website of centerNet, a network of 
digital humanities centres, provides a more inclusive listing of research initiatives worldwide 
(http://dhcenternet.org/centers).
9 Christian Gosvig Olesen’s chapter in this volume, which can be read as a companion piece 
to this text, demonstrates that in spite of such attempts, projects in humanistic data research 
still vary greatly in terms of how they deal with the empiricist underpinnings of the tools they 
work with.
huManiSTic DaTa reSearch 29
Tools, Methods, Cooperations
In the epigraph to this chapter, Johanna Drucker points out that tools for 
information visualization are inevitably indebted to the disciplines from 
which they derive. The same, one might add, applies to tools for data scrap-
ing, and for the cleaning, sorting or otherwise processing of collected data. 
For digital humanists, this is particularly relevant, as the tools they use are 
rarely purpose-produced (or if they are, then they tend to refashion tools 
that were designed to serve the needs of other disciplines). For example, the 
Cultural Analytics toolkit developed by Lev Manovich’s Software Studies 
Initiative, featured in this book, includes among others the application 
ImagePlot. This tool is an extension of the open-source image-analysis 
program ImageJ (previously known as ‘NIH Image’) that was originally 
developed for use in medical research (among others for the viewing of 
tomography scans and X-rays, but later also in biological microscopy; see 
Schneider, Rasband & Eliceiri 2012). Other examples are software initially 
designed for use in the geosciences (mapping tools for instance), to perform 
statistical operations in the study of economics, or even, to serve as aids in 
the business and management sectors. 
At the most basic level, the indebtedness Drucker speaks of can be under-
stood as a set of built-in presuppositions about how knowledge is obtained. 
In this context, it is important to consider not only the assumptions of the 
practitioners for whom the tools were designed (in the above examples: 
health or geoscientists, or economists) but also those of the software engi-
neers who conceived them. In their contribution to Understanding Digital 
Humanities, summarized in their chapter for this book, Bernhard Rieder 
and Theo Röhle point out that the ‘digital helpers’ humanists use ‘rely on 
sets of assumptions, models, and strategies’ that determine how ‘units of 
analysis, algorithms, and visualisation procedures’ are def ined (2012: 70). 
These models and strategies derive in turn from such f ields as statistics, 
information or computer science, or mathematics: disciplines that even the 
most experienced digital humanists can be only minimally familiar with. In 
the tools themselves, moreover, they necessarily take on a technical form, 
which means that they are not easily ‘readable’, even for experts (75-76). 
In spite of this, the conceptual underpinnings of one’s methods and tools 
profoundly affect the results of the data processing done, and how these 
should be interpreted (see also Drucker 2012).
In the absence of readily legible clues as to their epistemic foundations, 
computational research tools are often assigned such values as reliability 
and transparency (Kitchin 2014: 130). As Rieder and Röhle observe, the 
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automated processing of empirical data that they enable seems to suggest 
a neutral perspective on reality, unaffected by human subjectivity (2012: 
72). Drucker, a specialist in the history of graphics, makes a similar point, 
focusing more closely on practices of data visualization. She argues that 
the tools used for this purpose are often treated as if the representations 
they render provide direct access to ‘what is’. This way, the distinction 
between scientif ic observation (‘the act of creating a statistical, empirical, 
or subjective account or image’) and the phenomena observed is being 
collapsed (Drucker 2014: 125; see also Drucker 2012: 86).
Considering the association of digital methods and tools with such 
profoundly positivist ideals, it is hardly surprising that initially, it was 
primarily humanists already inclined towards empirical work who elected 
to use them. Computational methods were attractive to them because these 
promised more reliable, accurate or ‘scientif ic’ answers to their research 
questions than they had previously been able to obtain. In his contribution 
to a volume on computation in literary studies, Stephen Ramsay detects 
such motivations in projects since the 1980s, and even earlier (2008). Recent 
examples from media studies that seem similarly inspired are f ilm historian 
Yuri Tsivian’s efforts to automate quantitative approaches to the analysis 
of silent f ilm style (dealt with at some length in Christian Gosvig Olesen’s 
chapter in this volume) or the work of such practitioners of New Cinema 
History as John Sedgwick, who attempts to measure the historical popular-
ity of f ilms (2009; 2011).10 However, as the use of digital methods gets more 
pervasive, the promise of mechanically obtained objectivity and transpar-
ency seems to entice even those humanists who traditionally premised their 
scholarship on constructivist, rather than positivist, principles. As I discuss 
further on, this has provoked a good deal of criticism.11
  Aside from the chosen methods and tools, cooperation is also an important 
factor in the encounter between epistemic traditions in humanistic data 
research. As many authors have argued, collaboration in digital projects 
between scholars in different f ields is the rule rather than the exception (e.g. 
Hayles 2012: 51). One reason for this is that using digital tools, and in some 
cases also their development or f ine-tuning, requires different sets of skills 
than most humanities researchers have. In addition, digital projects tend 
to be increasingly large-scale and take ever more complex forms; as such, 
they require a broad range of specialist (disciplinary) expertise. As Schnapp, 
Presner and Lunenfeld point out, such projects are about the building of 
10 For an introduction to the concerns of New Cinema History, see Maltby 2011.
11 For a critique of the statistical analysis of f ilm (style) specif ically, see Gunning 2014. 
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‘bigger pictures’ (2009: 4) and therefore require combinations of perspectives, 
some of those not even humanistic at all. Regardless of the participants’ 
motivation to succeed, this inevitably means that they have to negotiate 
the terms of their cooperation and, in particular, f ind ways to reconcile 
their disparate epistemic positions. Experience shows that even explicating 
those positions and communicating about them to others – whether these 
‘others’ are software developers and computer scientists, or colleagues in 
other academic fields, in or outside the humanities – is not self-evident (e.g. 
Heftberger 2012: n.p.; Sculley & Pasanek 2008: 409-410; Van Zundert et al. 2012).
Resistance and Critique
As they engage in data research, humanists not only have to explain their 
ways to collaborators with different scholarly backgrounds. Over the years, 
they have had to justify themselves also to colleagues in their own specialist 
f ields. For as long as humanities scholars have made use of digital tools, they 
have met with critique from fellow practitioners. At its most fundamental, 
this critique stems from the perception that the projects conducted do not 
do justice to the critical-interpretive legacy of much humanities research.12 
Roughly speaking, critics here divide into two groups. On the one hand, there 
are the sceptics, who are convinced that there is nothing to gain from the use 
of digital tools in the disciplines they engage in. Usually, these commentators 
have not tried their hands at digital research themselves, but voice their 
apprehension in reaction to work done by peers.13 On the other, there are those 
scholars who, although recognizing the potential of computational approaches 
for addressing humanities concerns, make a case for a more critical engage-
ment with the tools, methods, questions and results that are used or obtained, 
and especially their positivist underpinnings. Some of them even argue for a 
radically different approach to data research: one that could ultimately meet 
the hermeneutic standards of much ‘traditional’ humanities work. 
At least two sets of arguments, used by members of both groups, are rel-
evant here. First, there is a concern that much data research practice today 
12 There are also other points of critique, which do not follow as directly from the friction 
between epistemic traditions discussed above. For example, some have argued that the prolifera-
tion of digital projects leads to an ‘instrumentalization’ of humanities (teaching and) research 
(e.g. Grusin 2014). 
13 A piece that exemplif ies this position is literary critic and New Republic editor Adam Kirsch’s 
contribution on the ‘false promise’ of the digital humanities (2014), which attests to a rather 
profound awareness of current debates on the topic. 
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does not involve the kind of interpretive intervention that the humanities 
are known for. Evans and Rees for instance wonder whether some practition-
ers might be getting caught in a logic of ‘abstracted empiricism’ (a term they 
borrow from sociologist Charles Wright Mills) ‘which focuses so minutely 
on macro data that it fails to ref ine meaning’ (2012: 29). The reasoning here 
is that researchers are so in awe of their data and visualizations that they 
‘forget’ to also attribute meaning. Other critics react instead to the claim 
that digital scholars do not actually need to do this: that it is enough that 
they discover patterns (Hayles 2012: 51; Kitchin 2014: 131) as these already 
‘show us what we would never have been aware of’ without our digital tools 
(Currie in Evans & Rees 2012: 21). For many, this assumption undermines 
the fundamental humanistic premise that knowledge gets produced in an 
encounter between a subject and his or her sources or data. To them, a kind 
of ‘post-human’ scholarship ‘in which human interpretation takes a back 
seat to algorithmic processes’ (Hayles 2012: 48) seems highly undesirable. 
A second set of arguments in contrast relate to the observation that the 
results of data research are always, necessarily, a product of interpreta-
tion. The critique here centres on practitioners’ inability or unwillingness 
to recognize this, or to consider it in their process. As Hayles points 
out, interpretation inevitably comes into play – whether it is humans or 
machines who do the ‘reading’ of data. The reason is that it is the former 
who create programmes, use them, and in doing so, make sense of the 
results (Hayles 2012: 47). Drucker, speaking more specif ically of informa-
tion visualizations, takes this a step further, arguing that the very data 
we use are already infused with interpretation. Rendering information in 
graphical form, she claims, ‘gives it a simplicity and legibility that hides 
every aspect of the original interpretative framework on which the […] data 
were constructed’ (2014: 128). Drucker’s point here is that data are always 
preconstituted, shaped by the parameters for their selection. Others have 
stressed that these parameters are never neutral, but construct the world as 
profoundly ideological (e.g. Posner 2015).14 Therefore, we are well-advised to 
think of them not as data (given) but rather as capta (taken), ‘constructed 
as an interpretation of the phenomenal world’ rather than inherent to it 
(Drucker 2014: 128).15
14 Tara McPherson extends this argument to the computational systems – the technologies and 
their functionalities – that digital humanists work with (2012). See also McPherson in Jenkins 
2015: n.p.
15 The term capta, as used in this way, is preferred also by Rob Kitchin (2014: 2), who in turn 
attributes it to one H.E. Jensen, writing in 1950. Alexander Galloway makes an argument similar 
to Drucker’s, however without using the term (2011: 87-88).
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New Agendas
Over time, such criticism has profoundly affected how data researchers have 
viewed their practices and responsibilities, and even more crucially, how 
they have approached their research. These days, more and more digital 
humanists f ind it mandatory to consider methodological and epistemic 
issues as part of the studies they conduct. Doing digital research, these 
scholars are convinced, requires explicit reflection on the status of one’s 
data (how are they shaped by parameters for selection and how does this 
affect what one can learn from them?), one’s methods and tools (which 
overt and covert assumptions about the world and how we know it do they 
incorporate, and how does this shape one’s results?), and the interpretations 
one makes (how do they relate to calculation and representation; how do 
they tie in with the here and now; are alternative interpretations possible 
as well?). D. Sculley and Bradley Pasanek, in a piece on data mining and 
machine learning in the humanities, argue that these methods force us 
to ‘trade in a close reading of the original text [a common pursuit in the 
traditional humanities] for something that looks like a close reading of 
experimental results’ (2008: 417).16 This requires in turn that we navigate 
the ambiguities and contradictions our softwares produce (ibid.).
Some authors however f ind such measures insuff icient. Among others, 
they suggest that even those who stress the limitations of their methods 
or tools often concede in the process to what is ultimately a positivist ideal 
of establishing facts, even if they conceive of it as an unattainable one (e.g. 
Ramsay 2008). Instead, these commentators plead for a better integration 
of computational methods with the core activities of humanities research, 
so as to ultimately redeem its characteristic strengths. One way of doing 
this is to use the computer’s calculation and visualization powers not to 
test preconceived hypotheses, but to probe data in an exploratory manner. 
Scholars in various f ields have argued that one of the great merits of digital 
tools is their capacity for ostranenie: for ‘making strange’, or defamiliarizing 
us from, our objects of study – and by the same token, for calling into ques-
tion our most profound assumptions about them (e.g. Ramsay 2008: n.p.; 
Schnapp, Presner & Lunenfeld 2009: 10; Manovich 2012: 276).17 Embracing 
16 ‘Machine learning’, in this sentence, refers to the use of computational methods for making 
predictions on the basis of data.
17 Ostranenie is a concept theorized among others by the Russian Formalist Victor Shklovsky. 
He used it to refer to the techniques writers deploy in transforming everyday into poetic lan-
guage, in order to induce a heightened state of perception in their readers. 
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this potential requires that one uses one’s tools not to solve existing schol-
arly problems, but to raise new questions, trigger new ideas, or as a prompt 
to try out alternative perspectives on the same objects (not necessarily with 
the help of digital tools).18 
Another way of reconciling humanistic interests with the possibilities 
of computation is to exploit, as Daniel Chávez Heras puts it, software’s 
aff inity with ‘notions of inf inity, contingency or paradox’ (2012: 10). The 
author draws inspiration here from Drucker’s proposal for a ‘speculative 
computing’ (Drucker & Nowviskie 2004). Much digital humanities work 
today, Drucker argues, is premised on automation: the mechanistic ap-
plication of set procedures, according to an unchanging logic. The problem 
with such procedures is that they inevitably restrict the user’s interpretive 
options. In her view, humanists should invest instead in tools that enable 
‘augmentation’ (a term by Douglas Engelbart): the extension of their intel-
lectual and imaginative capabilities. The objective here is to bring forward 
in the research sequence acts of – active, openly performed – interpretative 
intervention. Rather than making do with tools that limit interpretation to 
a ‘reading’ of that which has already been sorted and measured (according 
to a set of often hidden parameters), humanities researchers should work 
towards a kind that could, for instance, integrate their own engagements 
with data into the calculations and representations performed or generated 
by computers. Of course, such an approach not only reclaims some of the 
characteristic strengths of humanities scholarship (at least, as perceived 
by the above-mentioned critics) and puts them centre stage, it also forces 
far-reaching transformations in terms of how this research is performed (in 
Drucker’s case, for example, a shift from a text-based to a fundamentally 
visual modus operandi).19
18 Note however that this approach has also been criticized, most famously by the literary 
theorist Stanley Fish, in a blog post for the New York Times (2012) which he wrote partly in reaction 
to Stephen Ramsay’s Reading Machines (2011). In this piece Fish attests to his preference for the 
sort of deductive approach – one that involves reasoning on the basis of a hypothesis – that 
Kitchin calls ‘hegemonic within modern science’ (132). The above pleas, in contrast, open the 
way for a more inductive approach, where the use of algorithms serves an exploratory purpose. 
For more on this topic, see also Scheinfeldt 2012 (which sees room in digital humanities research 
for both principles and procedures). 
19 David J. Bodenhamer, in an article on the use of GIS technologies for historical research, 
imagines a similarly f lexible kind of representation (multilayered and structurally open) but 
specif ically for geospatial information. In his piece, he adds to Chávez Heras’ and Drucker’s argu-
ments that it would also help (re)position scholarship, and the spatial humanities in particular, 
as a conversation or negotiation between (many) experts or contributors (2013: 10-12). 
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Demands for a more profoundly humanistic digital practice are countered 
by parties who see computational methods rather as an opportunity for a 
more comprehensive integration of the humanities and the sciences – and in 
some cases, even the arts and technology. Further integration is necessary, 
they argue, because it can help safeguard the humanities’ central role in 
our contemporary society (e.g. Schnapp, Presner & Lunenfeld 2009: 11) or 
even ensure the continuity of scholarly practice as such (Lin 2012: 296). 
Although formulations vary, the observation is often made in this context 
that cooperation in digital projects should evolve from its current inter-
disciplinarity to a more profound ‘transdisciplinarity’, which ‘radicalises 
existing disciplinary norms and practices and allows researchers to go 
beyond their parent disciplines, using a shared conceptual framework that 
draws together concepts, theories, and approaches from various disciplines 
into something new that transcends them all’ (ibid.: 298). 
Inevitably, pleas such as these suggest that the situations their authors 
envision have not quite materialized in practice. Today still, the participants 
of projects in humanities data research relate in very different ways to the 
research traditions they encounter, either through their various collabora-
tions or in the tools they use. (And, as Olesen’s piece in this volume suggests, 
dissent on how data research should be conducted also occurs between 
scholars working in the same specialist f ields.) Moreover, they attest to the 
fact that it is a lot easier to formulate requirements for a truly humanistic 
data research than to devise the methods and tools that meet them.
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2. Towards a ‘Humanistic Cinemetrics’?
Christian Gosvig Olesen
In recent years, f ilm scholars have increasingly developed quantitative 
methodologies to produce data visualizations for a historical analysis of 
f ilm style. Through methods of Cultural Analytics, Cinemetrics (2005) 
and ACTION (2014), which can be described as cinemetric or stylometric, 
scholars measure, quantify and visualize stylistic patterns in, for instance, 
editing, light or sound. These are used to investigate historical developments 
in f ilm aesthetics and narration and to produce statistical profiles of f ilms, 
directors or national cinemas.
Characterized by scientif ic rigour, deduction and hypothesis-testing, 
Cinemetrics’ quantitative framework has been perceived as introducing a 
new empiricism or positivism in f ilm historical research (Christie 2008). A 
significant reason for this is that the tool resuscitates a scientific paradigm of 
historical style analysis initiated in the 1970s to produce evidence for research 
on f ilm editing and shot types (ibid.). The recent quantitative, statistical ap-
proaches of Cultural Analytics and ACTION, which build on this paradigm as 
a conceptual departure point, have equally been associated with a positivist 
epistemology (Manovich 2012a; Casey & Williams 2014). Yet, as I will argue in 
this article, their emergence is engendering an inductive, exploratory form 
of Cinemetrics which necessitates a change in the perception of cinemetric 
methodology as being primarily scientist. As I shall discuss further on, 
their practices, in the words of Eef Masson, suggest ‘prob[ing] data in an 
exploratory manner’ and highlight how data visualization defamiliarizes our 
objects of study by foregrounding their constructed nature (see the chapter 
by Mason in this publication, p. 33). In these aspects it seems they qualify as 
humanistic data research but that they still need to be fully recognized and 
distinguished as such. By attending to the development and deployments of 
Cultural Analytics and ACTION in comparison to Cinemetrics, my article 
takes further steps in this direction.1 This, I argue, may open a critical path 
for contemporary, statistical style analysis and contribute to increased 
methodological pluralism in data-driven f ilm historical research.
1 The developers of Cultural Analytics and ACTION, respectively, have emphasized their 
practices as more exploratory than Cinemetrics through blog posts and conference papers. 
It is these steps that I wish to acknowledge and theorize further by situating them within the 
discussion of scientism vs. hermeneutics in the present volume.
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To introduce such a distinction is important because film studies, unlike 
history, sociology or literary studies, have tended to develop digital tools at a 
slow pace, arguably because digitized films for many years remained too data-
heavy objects for automated analysis.2 Consequently, data-driven research on 
film is characterized by less methodological pluralism than other disciplines 
and in particular lacks critical, quantitative methodologies. It seems however, 
that there is a desire for the latter among f ilm historians. As Yuri Tsivian, 
co-founder of Cinemetrics, has observed regarding the tool’s potential users, 
‘[…] not every student of f ilm history is ready or eager to masquerade as a 
scientist’ (2008: 765). Furthermore, as discussed by Masson in Chapter 1 in this 
publication, many humanities scholars broadly speaking tend to wish to reflect 
their critical legacy and interpretative frameworks in their conceptualization 
of digital tools. In this regard, distinguishing and theorizing Cultural Analytics 
and ACTION as ‘humanistic cinemetrics’ based on what I see as their explora-
tory, critical modus operandi may provide a fruitful departure in this direction 
and make them more widely compelling to film scholars.
To present this argument, I draw on the theory of history of Michel de 
Certeau. De Certeau, responding to enthusiastic claims that had surrounded 
quantitative, computational history throughout the 1970s, reminded his col-
leagues that these methods remain technically and socially biased towards 
the specif ic traditions and institutions they emanate from (1986). When 
historians adopt the computer’s scientif ic procedures, he argued, they es-
sentially express and respond to their contemporary concerns and historical 
f ictions, producing a ‘science f iction’ which combines scientif ic and poetic 
gestures of interpretation (ibid.: 215). Therefore he argued that historians 
should challenge the ‘neutral’ aura of computational history by remaining 
acutely aware of its institutional processes of knowledge production and 
limitations, and seek to reflect the latter in their methods (ibid.). Through this 
theoretical lens I analyse how the underlying social and technical processes 
of Cinemetrics, Cultural Analytics and ACTION attribute meanings to data 
visualizations as epistemic images in order to elicit the tools’ differences.
My article is divided into three parts. First, I provide a historical discus-
sion of statistical style analysis’ epistemology by tracing cinemetric practices 
back to its foundational ideas in f ilm studies in the 1970s. Second, I focus 
2 However, it should be noted that f ilm scholars have engaged extensively with and adopted 
digital methods of text editions deriving from literary studies to develop scholarly DVD presenta-
tions of f ilms and with GIS technologies from socio-economic history to study f ilm distribution, 
exhibition and reception. Yet only little work has been done which intervenes analytically in 
digitized archival f ilms to detect formal patterns.
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on the software Cinemetrics as an emblematic development of computer-
based style analysis which introduces scientif ic, visual analytics to produce 
evidence for stylistic history. Finally, I discuss how cinemetric theory and 
techniques have developed beyond this approach in Cultural Analytics and 
ACTION to highlight the poetic aspects of data visualization. In this section 
I argue that they gesture towards a humanistic data analysis which may 
open a critical, methodological avenue for f ilm scholars.
Statistical Style Analysis and Representation of Filmic Structure
To understand where cinemetric tools come from it is necessary to go back to 
the 1970s. In this period, f ilm historians began developing systematic, quan-
titative methods to study film style, as f ilm studies was institutionalizing as 
an academic discipline (Bordwell 1997). As Harvard professor of film studies at 
the time Vlada Petric contended, the film histories used in academic curricula 
had described especially f ilm editing and style’s developments haphazardly 
without a firm, empirical basis (1975).3 According to Petric, to reliably account 
for film editing’s ‘historical evolution’, film historians should scrutinize archi-
val films as ‘primary documents’ to produce extensive and precise analytical 
documentation of editing patterns from canonical f ilms, genres and periods 
and disseminate them in ‘visual/analytical’ representations (ibid.: 23-24).
Concurrently, f ilm scholar Barry Salt questioned contemporary style 
analysis which he perceived as relying too much on hermeneutics rather 
than systematized, scientif ic procedures (1974).4 Salt instead envisioned a 
f ilm history which would achieve a more objective, scientif ic foundation by 
embracing statistical methods and the natural sciences’ attitude (1983). He 
suggested a form of Scientif ic Realism, which would observe and measure 
stylistic features such as cutting rates, camera movements and shot scales 
as real phenomena, to verify or disprove hypotheses about f ilm editing’s 
historical development.5 In doing so, Salt aspired to discover if aesthetic or 
3 Petric in particular addressed the f ilm histories written by Georges Sadoul, Rachael Low, 
Lewis Jacobs and Lotte Eisner.
4 Specif ically, Salt addressed Andrew Sarris’s classic work The American Cinema: Directors 
and Directions 1929-1968 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1968). In his key work Film Style & Technology. 
History & Analysis (Starword, 1983) which also explains his method in greater depth than his 
1970s articles, Salt developed this approach with attention to classic mainstream cinema.
5 Salt mentioned that he found inspiration for his Scientif ic Realism in the work of philoso-
phers of science such as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos, without however providing 
a detailed discussion of how exactly they informed his work.
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narrative qualities followed recurrent or exceptional patterns (for example, 
slow versus fast editing) and to facilitate a comparative, historical analysis 
following uniform, scientif ic principles (ibid.).
Attending primarily to films’ cutting rates, what Salt dubbed Average Shot 
Lengths (ASL), he developed statistical, reduced forms of representation to 
express his results. In doing so, he aspired to yield more objective insights into 
film editing’s evolution and norms, to facilitate the comparative analysis of 
f ilms (ibid.). For this, Salt relied in particular on the widely used method of 
lognormal distribution to create histograms of ASLs which visualized patterns 
in film directors’ oeuvres or norms in films from specific periods (Salt 2006a).6 
Using lognormal distribution for f ilm style analysis implies that shots are 
grouped into class intervals or bins out of their sequential order to establish 
normal distributions of shot lengths. This creates a histogram displaying the 
film structure as a curve with a simple shape which, according to Salt, is ideal 
for visualizing and comparing film structure and discerning patterns, or for 
instance identifying outliers – meaning shots of potential analytical interest.7
While widely known by now and influential in f ilm studies, the rigour of 
Salt’s method was hotly debated in the 1970s and 1980s. Film scholars like 
Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell pointed to several inconsistencies, 
such as the circumstance that Salt initially calculated ASLs using 30-minute 
samples, which he regarded as representative, and not entire films (Bordwell 
& Thompson 1985). This, they argued, led Salt to provide inaccurate data 
himself.8 Furthermore, they felt Salt’s approach exaggerated the general 
applicability of quantitative approaches and was essentially positivist, in 
spite of presenting itself as a softer, scientif ic method.9
6 Lognormal distribution analysis emerged in the late nineteenth century developed by British 
scientist Francis Galton as a response to contemporary probability statistics and has since been 
ref ined into several variants. A somewhat simplif ied explanation of its scope is that it calculates 
the probability of a phenomenon’s occurrence from a given data set with the aim of predicting its 
future development. It is widely used for instance to predict price developments, the occurrence 
of illnesses or for weather forecasts. See: Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 
1820-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 139 and J. Aitchinson and J.A.C. Brown’s 
classic The Lognormal Distribution, with Special Reference to its Uses in Economics (Cambridge 
University Press, 1957), the latter of which guided Salt in the conception of his method.
7 The terms ‘bin’ and ‘interval’ can be used interchangeably and in statistical style analysis 
refer to the different categories of shot lengths. Illustrative examples of Salt’s histogram visu-
alizations can be seen in his article ‘The Metrics in Cinemetrics’ which is accessible online. See: 
www.cinemetrics.lv/metrics_in_cinemetrics.php, last accessed 6 April 2016.
8 Bordwell calculated the ASLs of several entire f ilms to compare them to Salt’s results based 
on 30-minute samples, to support this criticism.
9 As they remarked, Salt seemed to suggest ‘that science’s strongest certainties are those 
which can be reduced to numbers’ (ibid.: 225).
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Nonetheless, Bordwell and Thompson endorsed Salt’s method more 
broadly in light of how stylistic history had hitherto been produced. As 
they wrote:
His demand for precision of description, including statistical representa-
tion, comes as a welcome alternative to the practices of a generation 
of historians who relied upon memory, reviews, and gossip for their 
evidence. (ibid.: 234)
This remark may be taken as a concise characteristic of the direction in 
which f ilm historical research was pushed by Petric and Salt in the 1970s. 
Responding to a scholarly need to develop scientif ic approaches for f ilm 
style’s history, they developed statistical methods which have increasingly 
appealed to f ilm historians drawn to empirical research in the following 
decades (Buckland 2008).
Having sketched the emergence of statistical style analysis in the 1970s, I 
shall now turn to a discussion of Cinemetrics, which develops Salt’s concept 
of ASL into a more fully f ledged scientif ic method.
Style Analysis as Scientific Data Research: Cinemetrics
Conceived by University of Chicago professor Yuri Tsivian together with 
computer scientist Gunars Cijvans, Cinemetrics was launched in 2005 as 
‘an open-access interactive website to collect, store and process digital 
data related to f ilm editing’ (Tsivian 2008: 766). It shares statistical style 
analysis’ assumption that f ilm editing is a key distinguishing feature of 
f ilm art and places it within an even broader theoretical reference frame 
to underline how scholars, also long before the 1970s, studied f ilm editing 
quantitatively.10 Highlighting how great directors throughout f ilm history 
have measured segments at the editing table to achieve the pinnacle of 
10 See ‘Cinemetrics Predecessors’: www.cinemetrics.lv/topic.php?topic_ID=38. Last accessed 
28 July 2015. Tsivian has recurrently pointed to early f ilm theorist Hugo Münsterberg’s measure-
ments of cutting rates in the mid-1910s for studies of spectatorship and psychology. Kristin 
Thompson f inds inspiration in German f ilm critic Georg Otto Stindt’s article ‘Bildschnitt’ 
(1926) which compared shot lengths in US and German f iction f ilms. And f ilm historian Frank 
Kessler highlights German f ilm historian Herbert Birett’s foundational work on f ilm statistics 
initiated in the 1960s. For a representative example of Herbert Birett’s statistical style analysis 
see: Herbert Birett, ‘Alte Filme: Filmalter und Filmstil’, Diskurs Film. Münchner Beiträge zur 
Filmphilologie 2 (1988): 69-87.
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their art through variations in shot length, the website’s presentation calls 
for a metric, computational approach to f ilm style (Tsivian 2008).11 Cur-
rently, Cinemetrics’ database counts approximately 15,000 titles uploaded 
by more than a thousand users.12 These uploads do not follow a unifying 
selection criterion nor apply standard details on provenance and technical 
specif icities. They constitute a heterogeneous data mass which facilitates 
comparison between primarily limited corpora with uniform, technical 
standards rather than providing evidence for a universal, evolutionary 
f ilm history as in the 1970s (ibid.).13 Popular among scholars propagating 
statistical style analysis in the 1970s and 80s such as Salt, Thompson and 
Bordwell, as well as newcomers, Cinemetrics users seek to ref ine style 
analysis into a more scientif ically sound theoretical approach based on 
computer-generated data visualizations. In the following, I shall attend 
to key aspects of this development through a discussion of the underlying 
processes of its data visualization, the Cinemetrics graph.
Though not the only visualization format used by cinemetricians, the 
Cinemetrics graph is the primary ‘inscription device’ and evidentiary im-
age used for summarizing and distributing editing data among the site’s 
community (Latour 1987: 68).14 As a standard representation, it consists 
of a custom-made red graph plotted onto a grid of horizontal lines, using 
11 In particular, Tsivian highlights the formally dense works of the avant-garde directors Abel 
Gance, Dziga Vertov and, perhaps most emblematically, Peter Kubelka’s ‘metric’ cinema.
12 See: www.cinemetrics.lv/database.php, last accessed 11 June 2014. However, it should be 
noted that this number includes a fair amount of television programmes, music videos and f ilm 
excerpts as well. This aspect has however prompted discussions among academic Cinemetrics 
users about the data’s reliability and the possibility of introducing rankings of user data to 
ensure cleaner data. See discussion thread ‘Data Ranking and Verif ication’: www.cinemetrics.
lv/topic.php?topic_ID=355, last accessed 30 July 2015.
13 In this aspect, Cinemetrics nurtures a piecemeal approach. In general, Cinemetrics is 
critical of the teleological, universalizing accounts which 1970s style analysis supported. Tsivian 
argues at length how the earlier teleological f ilm histories’ account of cinema becoming an 
accomplished art form only in the late silent era, obfuscates an understanding of early cinema’s 
distinct modes of expression.
14 Some users, such as Mike Baxter and Nick Redfern, explore alternative visualization 
formats, using the open-source software R. British scholar Nick Redfern for instance f inds order 
structure matrices to structure the data in such a way that it allows for easier identif ication 
of clusterings of shots in sequences within f ilms and shifts between segments. See Mike 
Baxter, Notes on Cinemetric Data Analysis (Nottingham, self-published, 2014), 46. See: www.
cinemetrics.lv/dev/Cinemetrics_Book_Baxter.pdf, and Nick Redfern, ‘An introduction to using 
graphical displays for analysing the editing of motion pictures’, p. 22, 24, www.cinemetrics.
lv/dev/redfern_q2_opt.pdf, last accessed 11 December 2015. For background information on R 
see: http://cran.r-project.org/.
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a classic statistical format as has existed for centuries (Drucker 2014).15 
Numbered shots appear as white bars from above in sequential order. 
The x- and y-axes represent the variables of time code and shot duration, 
respectively, and users can annotate and comment on each shot/bar.16 While 
the principle of showing a f ilm’s shot lengths as bars, combined through a 
curve resembles in fundamental aspects Salt’s idea to use a histogram for 
comparative analysis, there remain signif icant differences.
First of all, the Cinemetrics graph reflects adversary, scholarly positions 
on the key parameter ASL. Tsivian considers Salt’s ASL problematic because 
it only offers a single datum per f ilm as a basis for comparison (Tsivian 
2013). A single datum does not convey how cutting rates shift in relation to 
depicted events or motifs giving little insight into internal f ilm dynamics. 
Therefore, Cinemetrics represents shots sequentially and is also designed to 
reflect a wider array of parameters such as cutting swing, which measures 
how the cutting rate shifts throughout a f ilm’s segments and diverges from 
its overall ASL. It also shows a f ilm’s cutting range, which is the difference 
between its shortest and longest shots (ibid.). In this regard, Cinemetrics 
offers a way for scholars to identify and link editing statistics on specif ic 
shots to f ilm narration in greater detail.
In addition to Tsivian, British media scholar Nick Redfern has chal-
lenged the ASL concept by suggesting Median Shot Length (MSL) as an 
alternative (2011). ASL represents a mean value and is calculated by divid-
ing a f ilm’s duration with its number of shots to f ind its average. MSL, on 
the other hand, locates the middle value of the cutting range to def ine 
it as a f ilm’s norm. In practice, this means that MSL performs outlier 
correction of the f ilm’s longest and shortest shots, producing different 
values.17 Redfern has argued that MSL gives a more accurate impression 
of the typical shot length one may expect to see in a f ilm because it is less 
sensitive to extreme outliers. Opposing MSL, Salt contends that MSL alters 
the data to an undesirable degree in cases where outliers may be relevant, 
15 As Drucker points out, ‘before the seventeenth century, the number of statistical graphs 
– that is, visual expressions of variables charted against each other as abstract quantities – 
was extremely small’, but f lourished in the following centuries with René Descartes’ work in 
analytical geometry.
16 For a representative example of the Cinemetrics graph made by Yuri Tsivian, see for instance 
his visualization of Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window (US, 1954), added to the database 23 May 
2009: http://cinemetrics.lv/movie.php?movie_ID=3166, last accessed 6 April 2016.
17 Redfern gives examples of two Josef von Sternberg f ilms, The Lights of New York (USA, 1928) 
and Scarlet Empress (1934). For the former the ASL is 9.9 seconds and MSL 5.1 seconds. For the 
latter the ASL is 9.9 and MSL 6.5.
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stressing that ASL is also more widely accepted among cinemetricians (Salt 
2013).18 This discussion is reflected in the graph where MSL is included as 
an alternative to the ASL to enable comparison in each visualization. In 
this way, the graph accommodates internal adversary propositions on the 
function and value of the visual evidence’s graphical properties (Amann 
& Knorr-Cetina 1990).
In different ways, these discussions of ASL negotiate the relation between 
data, representation and analytical purpose to determine an ideal ‘analys-
ability’ of Cinemetrics’ scientif ic image (Amann & Knorr-Cetina 1990: 107). 
This process can be seen as reminiscent of the way scientists debate how 
to f ix their evidence in a representational form according to a shared set of 
assumptions and best practices. In this respect, Cinemetrics leans towards 
a scientist form of data research, following the natural sciences’ attitudes 
to data visualization in the lineage of Salt’s approach.
A second aspect of Cinemetrics that instantiates a scientist position is its 
emphasis on producing accurate data by eliminating potential inaccuracies 
caused by human reaction time. The tool’s f irst ‘classic’ version launched 
in 2005 is semi-automatic and requires full user participation throughout 
a f ilm’s playback. During playback the user runs Cinemetrics in a separate 
window, clicking a ‘Shot Change’ button for every new shot to calculate 
the ASL and generate a graph. With Cinemetrics second version, Frame 
Accurate Cinemetrics Tool (FACT), which has currently only been released 
in a beta-version under testing, shot boundary detection has become more 
f ine-grained and accurate by allowing users to pause and rewind so as to 
perform the shot segmentation with greater exactitude. Furthermore, while 
this is not integrated into FACT, users have expressed the overall ambition 
and projected as a future development – as also stated by Yuri Tsivian 
already in 2006 – to automate shot boundary detection in Cinemetrics in 
order to eliminate potential human inaccuracies, or to simply make the 
process of data collection quicker. However, there are different stances 
towards automatisation among cinemetricians and on whether human 
or computational annotation is most accurate or desirable. For instance, 
inspired by the key parameters of Cinemetrics’ underlying theory, and to 
complement Tsivian’s initiative, the related software Shot Logger – created 
by media scholar Jeremy Butler – goes a step further by offering automatic 
shot boundary detection developed in the PHP scripting language. However, 
18 As Salt dryly remarks, ‘Such an idea seems reminiscent of the Catholic church continuing 
its ban on the discussion of the idea of the earth going round the sun, even after the concept 
was in wide use’.
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while FACT still only exists in a beta version which does not offer automatic 
shot boundary detection, it projects a new relation between the scholar and 
the viewing equipment previously used by creating a closer approximation 
of f ilmic structure through visual analytics of cutting rates in digital source 
material.
To conclude, Cinemetrics recasts statistical style analysis’ methodology 
as articulated in the mid-1970s in central aspects. Salt’s ASL analysis initially 
favoured comparison between f ilms, representing each by a single datum. 
Cinemetrics, on the other hand, privileges a microscopic perspective on 
f ilms, displaying text-internal, hitherto imperceptible dynamics as, in Tsiv-
ian’s words, ‘hard facts’, from a wider range of perspectives, such as the MSL 
(Tsivian 2013). Cinemetrics enables scholars to closely study text-internal, 
micro-perspectives of single f ilms and to switch to a macro-perspective 
to raise questions on f ilm editing’s historical development by comparing 
groups of f ilms. One of Cinemetrics’ great affordances is especially its micro-
perspective, which was less prominent, if not absent, in 1970s sample-based 
style analysis, because it allows for a f ine-grained analysis of the dynamic 
relationship between shot lengths and depicted events.
The display of internal dynamics and the FACT acronym’s bold proposi-
tion that its procedures yield more accurate empirical data arguably advance 
style analysis’ realism by assuming a closer approximation between f ilm 
editing as a real-life phenomenon and its description (Salt 2006b). While 
Cinemetrics has its clear advantages for the study of f ilm style based on 
editing data, it can however also be said to embody a scientist concep-
tion of data research, which humanities scholars more broadly would feel 
uncomfortable engaging with. In particular, the observer-independence 
which Cinemetrics’ graph seems to imply and champion contradicts many 
humanities scholars’ consideration of visual evidence as inherently ambigu-
ous and contingent. Therefore, as I argued in my introduction, it is crucial 
to develop more critical, cinemetric approaches for f ilm historians who do 
not regard scientif ic images as observer-independent and wish to reflect 
the ambiguity of their research methods in their results.
Cultural Analytics and ACTION – Gesturing Towards Humanistic 
Cinemetrics?
Cinemetric analysis has developed beyond Tsivian’s initiative, in a variety of 
conceptually related, quantitative software applications. Some of these, Shot-
Logger and Edit2000 for instance, as Cinemetrics, analyse ASL but produce 
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differently styled graphs.19 Others, such as Cultural Analytics or ACTION, 
draw on cinemetric theory to focus on different moving image features such as 
light, sound or colour. While sharing Cinemetrics’ conceptual departure point 
in statistical style analysis their attitude towards data visualization differs 
fundamentally. They proceed inductively, without a preconceived theoretical 
framework and are less bound to tradition and established methodological 
operations. In this last section I would like to attend to these applications as 
practices that can be recognized as a form of ‘Humanistic Cinemetrics’ in 
their deployment of scientific data visualizations for style analysis.
Cultural Analytics is a research program which develops toolkits for visual 
analytics of cultural patterns in large image sets created within media theorist 
Lev Manovich’s Software Studies Initiative (Yamaoka, Manovich, Douglass 
& Kuester 2011). Suggesting a middle way between scientist and hermeneutic 
approaches to visual analytics, it departs from the question, ‘What will happen 
when humanists start using interactive visualizations as a standard tool 
in their work, the way many scientists already do?’20 Its core application is 
ImagePlot, an extension of the open-source scientific visualization software 
ImageJ, f irst known as NIH Image, developed by the US National Institute of 
Mental Health.21 Conceived by programmer Wayne S. Rasband in 1987 it ad-
vanced the combination of modern computation techniques with microscopy 
and gained widespread success in the natural sciences, because of its later 
translation into Java-programming (Schneider, Rasband & Eliceiri 2012).22
The software has always been open source, enabling users to tweak it and 
resulting in around 500 plug-ins by May 2012 (Schneider, Rasband & Eliceiri 
2012). ImagePlot added four of these.23 Manovich has developed ImagePlot’s 
visual analytics approach within the ‘Cultural Analytics’ research program 
and initially conceived it for analysing the digital age’s big data image sets, 
especially of amateur image sites such as Flickr and Instagram. In this regard, 
Manovich considered ImageJ capable of providing adequate ‘super-visualiza-
tion technologies’ to match these sets’ scale and discover patterns in them.24
19 See www.data2000.no/EDIT2000/ and www.shotlogger.org/, last accessed 10 April 2015.
20 See the project introduction ‘Cultural Analytics’: http://lab.softwarestudies.com/p/cultural-
analytics.html, last accessed 27 September 2015.
21 ‘About NIH Image’, see: http://rsb.info.nih.gov/nih-image/about.html, last accessed 22 April 
2015. ImageJ followed the NIH Image software on the basis of which it was created.
22 According to Schneider, Rasband and Eliceiri, in the late 1990s Java programming became 
considered an ‘operating system-agnostic’ language, compatible between Macintosh and PC. 
The ‘J’ in ImageJ stands for Java. (pp. 671-672).
23 See: http://lab.softwarestudies.com/p/imageplot.html#features1, last accessed 11 May 2015.
24 ‘Cultural Analytics’, op. cit.
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Cultural Analytics’ scope quickly expanded to digitized heritage col-
lections, art history and moving images.25 Regarding the latter, Cultural 
Analytics thinks along the lines of Cinemetrics by evoking how formally 
dense and complex f ilm works necessitate statistical approaches for 
analysing f ilmic structures (Manovich 2013).26 However, its distinguishing 
feature as a method is that it processes entire f ilms as image sets instead 
of extracting metadata to produce reduced, statistical representations. It 
breaks down video f iles into sequences of separate images and seriates 
or layers them according to various image features in different visualiza-
tion types. The ImageJ Montage visualization, for example, orders frames 
onto a grid according to their sequential order, from left to right, enabling 
a quick, comprehensive overview of movements between shots (ibid.).27 
Figurative in comparison to Cinemetrics’ graph, it seems close to early 
scientif ic cinematography, such as Etienne-Jules Marey’s and Eadweard 
Muybridge’s sequential photography, in particular the latter’s famous The 
Horse in Motion (1878) (Tosi 2005). It has been applied to f ilms by Soviet 
avant-garde director Dziga Vertov to grasp his f ilm’s complex structures 
and for understanding his reuse of footage within different f ilms. With 
another ImageJ visualization type, the Summary image, one can layer image 
sequences to visualize median values of colours in f ilms.28 Subsequently, 
with ImagePlot one may plot these visualizations or entire image sets on a 
y- and x-axis with different values.
Closer to Cinemetrics’ reduced visual analytics, the recent project Audio-
Visual Cinematic Toolkit for Interaction, Organization and Navigation 
25 For examples of the wider array of visualization formats, see: http://lab.softwarestudies.
com/p/research_14.html, last accessed 11 May 2015.
26 As in Cinemetrics Dziga Vertov’s documentary theory is used to conceptualize the potential 
of digital tools, aligning their analytical potential with Vertov’s conception of cinema as a 
machinic vision which unveils hidden structures of life to the human eye. Yet in contrast to 
Cinemetrics, Manovich has also prominently invoked Vertov’s documentary theory to regard 
new media as dynamic and as privileging multiple viewpoints rather than positivism, by analogy 
to Vertov’s staging of editing. See: Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2001), 199.
27 See: http://lab.softwarestudies.com/2013/01/visualizing-vertov-new-article-by-lev.html, 
last accessed 6 April 2015. The visualization of Vertov’s The Eleventh Year can be seen via the 
following link: www.flickr.com/photos/culturevis/3988919869/in/album-72157632441192048/, 
last accessed 6 April 2016.
28 For reasons of space I do not include a discussion of the Summary visualization here. For 
examples and an interesting recent application, I refer to f ilm scholar Kevin L. Ferguson’s use 
of Summary for studying the Western. See: Kevin L. Ferguson, ‘What Does the Western Really 
Look Like?’, https://medium.com/the-outtake/what-does-the-western-look-like-545981d93ae8, 
last accessed 27 September 2015.
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(ACTION) developed by Michael Casey, Mark Williams and Tom Stoll at 
Dartmouth College also analyses patterns in f ilm style. Using the open-
source software Matplotlib and Python to visualize ‘latent stylistic patterns’ 
of colour, sound and movement it creates auteur and f ilm profiles from a 
sample of 120 f ilms.29 Though not focused on f ilm editing, it extends cine-
metric theory to comprise other stylistic features and develops it by putting 
greater emphasis on machine learning processes in the hope of producing 
more precise, clean data (Casey & Williams 2014).30 Using algorithms to 
extract for instance mean values of colour and sound, it charts the results 
onto order structure matrices or tabular diagrams where single data of mean 
values represent auteur profiles to enable comparison, much in the vein 
of Salt’s original approach. In the latter format, directors are represented 
by their initials, AH for Alfred Hitchcock and JLG for Jean-Luc Godard for 
instance, and are classif ied according to their mean values of colour.
While conceptually related to Cinemetrics, these uses of visual analytics 
can be said to take different measures to distance themselves from its scient-
ism. Manovich evokes statistician John Tukey’s tradition of Exploratory Data 
Analysis (EDA) as an inductive approach, to underline that ImagePlot does 
not depart from a clearly defined hypothesis but uses visualizations for ex-
ploratory purposes as a stepping stone to new research questions (Manovich 
2012a).31 According to Manovich, this produces open answers rather than 
f inite, hard scientif ic explanations and encourages multiple interpreta-
tions. Furthermore, Cultural Analytics also nods to literary scholar Franco 
Moretti’s quantitative, historical approach as middle way between scientist 
methodological rigour and hermeneutics’ ‘free play’ of subjectivity (Manovich 
& Douglass 2009; Moretti 2008). Arguably, this ‘free play’ manifests itself in 
an attitude towards data visualizations which does not regard them as hard 
evidence but equally contemplates their graphic features to highlight their 
abstract and constructed nature. Manovich, for example, underscores the 
limits of ImagePlot visualizations when he associates its graphic properties 
with the characteristic compositions of Soviet photographer Alexander Rod-
chenko’s avant-garde photography (Manovich 2012b). In doing so, he stresses 
how ImagePlot’s visualizations may also be taken to render reality more 
unfamiliar to us rather than serving solely a revelatory, scientific function.
29 See https://sites.dartmouth.edu/mediaecology/content-partners/campus-partners/action/, 
last accessed 10 November 2015.
30 The project’s white paper is available online and contains the list of the 120 f ilms analysed 
within the project as well as the visualizations which I refer to here. See: https://securegrants.
neh.gov/PublicQuery/main.aspx?f=1&gn=HD-51394-11, last accessed 6 April 2016.
31 See also Bernhard Rieder’s and Theo Röhle’s discussion of Tukey in this anthology.
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Through a similar attitude, ACTION also seems to locate itself midway 
between the scientif ic and aesthetic contemplation of data visualizations 
to emphasize its contingencies (Casey 2014). This can be seen in the appro-
priation work One Million Seconds (US, 2014) which Casey produced using 
sound classif ications of f ilm samples analysed within ACTION.32 Where 
Manovich associatively muses on ImagePlot’s visualization in relation to 
Rodchenko, Casey uses Glenn Gould’s famous recording of Bach’s Goldberg 
Variations (1981) as a template from which f ilm excerpts are retrieved based 
on their audio similarities with Gould’s recording. Thus, Casey creates a 
frenetic video piece where glimpses of barely recognizable f ilm excerpts 
replace each other in rapid succession based on their audio similarity to 
Gould’s Goldberg Variations, in which both the f ilms’ and Gould’s recording 
are audible.
While tentative, experimental gestures, both Manovich’s and Casey’s 
appropriations can be said to point to the uncertainty in their analytic 
and representational practices, inviting us to think critically about the 
meanings we assign to data visualizations. In this regard ImagePlot and 
ACTION differ from Cinemetrics because they do not strive towards best 
practices following positivist aspirations nor idealize data visualization 
for stylistic analysis. Whereas Cinemetrics’ graph is perceived as a strong 
evidentiary image among its practitioners, ACTION and ImagePlot embrace 
the analytical potential of computational stylometry while stressing how 
data visualizations can also be perceived as abstract and, as discussed by 
Masson, defamiliarize our objects of study (Masson in this volume). In 
doing so, they arguably appreciate scientif ic, graphical expressions within 
a historically long-standing intersection of science and art to open for less 
formalized exploratory methodologies.33 Consequently, Cultural Analyt-
ics and ACTION come across as more self-reflexive towards data’s visual 
shapes and may be seen as congruent with a humanistic approach which, 
as Johanna Drucker def ines it, ‘calls to attention its madeness – and by 
extension, the constructedness of knowledge, its interpretative dimensions’ 
(2014: 178).
Bearing in mind this observation, I would conclude by suggesting that 
Cultural Analytics and ACTION can also productively be considered 
32 Michael Casey’s video appropriation and description of the work can be accessed via the 
following link: https://vimeo.com/105909439, last accessed 14 May 2015.
33 On this subject see Caroline A. Jones and Peter Galison, ‘Introduction’ in Caroline A. Jones 
& Peter Galison (eds.), Picturing Science, Producing Art (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 1998) 
and Monique Sicard, La fabrique du regard. Images de science et appareils de vision (Xve-XXe 
siècle) (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1998).
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consistent with de Certeau’s notion of computational history as a ‘science 
f iction’ referred to in my introduction, by foregrounding both the scientif ic 
and poetic dimensions of its making (de Certeau 1986). Concretely, I take 
them to suggest, lending a characterization of de Certeau’s historiography 
from Jeremy Ahearne, ‘a method [which] is alternately scientif ic and 
anti-scientif ic. It oscillates between interpretation and something like 
anti-interpretation’ (Ahaerne 1995: 35). Thinking along these lines when 
visualizing data, I believe, may especially enable f ilm historians with res-
ervations about style analysis’ scientif ic realism to move in a new, critical 
direction which restores one of the fundamental tasks of the historian 
on their terms, namely to emphasize the ambiguity of the relationship 
between past and present and its construction (de Certeau 1986). In doing 
so, we may to a greater degree underline the enigmatic enterprise of (f ilm) 
history making, while embracing computational methods in fruitful new 
ways to study f ilmic structures and directorial styles and review the way 
we understand the inner workings of f ilms new and old.
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3. Cultural Analytics, Social Computing 
and Digital Humanities
Lev Manovich
Social Computing vs. Digital Humanities
I define Cultural Analytics as the analysis of massive cultural data sets and 
flows using computational and visualization techniques. I developed this 
concept in 2005, and in 2007, the Software Studies Initiative1 research lab 
was established to start working on Cultural Analytics projects.
Our work is driven by a number of theoretical and practical questions: 
What does it mean to represent ‘culture’ by ‘data’? What are the unique 
possibilities offered by the computational analysis of large cultural data 
in contrast to qualitative methods used in humanities and social sciences? 
How can quantitative techniques be used to study the key cultural form of 
our era – interactive media? How can we combine computational analysis 
and visualization of large cultural data with qualitative methods like ‘close 
reading’? Put another way, how can we combine the analysis of larger pat-
terns with the analysis of individual artefacts and their details? How can 
computational analysis do justice to variability and diversity of cultural 
artefacts and processes, rather than focusing on the ‘typical’ and ‘most 
popular’? 
Eight years later, the work of our lab has become a tiny portion of a very 
large body of research. Thousands of researchers have published tens of 
thousands of papers analysing patterns in massive cultural data sets. This is 
data describing activity on most popular social networks (Flickr, Instagram, 
YouTube, Twitter, etc.), user-created content shared on these networks 
(tweets, images, video, etc.), and users’ interactions with this content (likes, 
favourites, reshares, comments). Researchers have also started to analyse 
particular professional cultural areas and historical periods, such as website 
design, fashion photography, 20th-century popular music, and 19th-century 
literature. This work is being carried out in two newly developed f ields: 
Social Computing and Digital Humanities.
Given the scale of that research, I am not interested in proposing Cultural 
Analytics as some alternative ‘third way’. However, I think that the ideas this 
1 Software Studies Initiative: www.softwarestudies.com.
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term stands for remain relevant. As we will see, Digital Humanities and Social 
Computing have carved out their own domains in relation to the types of data 
they study, while ‘Cultural Analytics’ continues to be free of such limitations. 
It also attempts not to take sides vis-à-vis humanities vs. scientif ic goals and 
methods. In this article I don’t take sides vis-à-vis humanities vs. scientif ic 
goals and methods. In this chapter I reflect on both paradigms, pointing out 
opportunities and ideas that have not yet been explored.
Digital Humanities scholars use computers to analyse mostly historical 
artefacts created by professionals, such as writers, artists and musicians. To 
take an example, one area of study could be novels written by professional 
writers in the 19th and 20th century. Yet for reasons of access, they stop 
at the historical boundaries def ined by copyright laws in their countries. 
According to the United States copyright law, for example,2 the works pub-
lished in the last 95 years are automatically copyrighted. (So, for example, 
as of 2015, everything created after 1920 is copyrighted, unless it is recent 
digital content that uses Creative Commons licenses.) I have no qualms 
about respecting copyright laws, but in this case that means that digital 
humanists are shut out from studying the present.
The field of Social Computing is thousands of times larger. Here, research-
ers with advanced degrees in computer science study online user-created 
content and user interactions with this content. Note that this research is car-
ried out not only by computer and information scientists who professionally 
identify themselves with the ‘Social Computing’ f ield, but also researchers 
in a number of other computer science f ields such as Computer Multimedia, 
Computer Vision, Music Information Retrieval, Natural Language Process-
ing, and Web Science. Therefore, social computing can also be used as an 
umbrella term for all computer science research that analyses content and 
activity on social networks. These researchers work with data from after 
2004, when social networks and media sharing services started to become 
popular.3 The data sets are usually much larger than the ones used in digital 
humanities. It is not uncommon to find tens or hundreds of millions of posts, 
photos or other items. Since the great majority of user-generated content 
is created by regular people rather than professionals, Social Computing 
studies the non-professional, vernacular culture by default.
2 A branch of computer science focused on the intersection of computational 
systems and social behaviour. See w w w.interaction-design.org/literature/book/
the-encyclopedia-of-human-computer-interaction-2nd-ed/social-computing.
3 Since it takes 1-2 years to do research and publish a paper, typically a paper published in 
2015 will use the data collected in 2012-2014.
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The scale of this research may be surprising to humanities and arts prac-
titioners who may not realize how many people are working in computer 
science and related f ields. For example, an October 2015 search on Google 
Scholar for ‘Twitter dataset algorithm’ returned 102,000 papers, a search 
for ‘YouTube video dataset’ returned 27,800 papers, and a search for ‘Flickr 
images algorithm’ returned 17,400 papers. Searching for ‘computational 
aesthetics dataset’, I got 14,100 results. Even if the actual numbers are much 
smaller, this is still impressive. Obviously not all these publications directly 
ask cultural questions, but many do.
The following table summarizes the differences between the two f ields:
Table 3.1.  Comparing Social Computing and Digital Humanities.
Social Computing and 
various fields of computer 
science where researchers 




analysis using computer 
science techniques)
Number of publications Tens of thousands few hundred
Period and material 
studied
websites and social media 
content and activity after 2004
historical artefacts up to the 
early 20th century
Authors of artefacts 
studied
regular people who share 
content on social networks
professional writers, artists, 
composers, etc.
Typical size of data sets Thousands to hundreds of 
millions of items, billions of 
relations
hundreds to thousands of 
items
Why do computer scientists rarely work with large historical data sets of any 
kind? Typically, they justify their research by referencing already existing 
industrial applications – for example, search or recommendation systems 
for online content. The general assumption is that computer science will 
create better algorithms and other computer technologies useful to industry 
and government organizations. The analysis of historical artefacts falls 
outside this goal, and, consequently, only a few computer scientists work 
with historical data (the f ield of Digital Heritage being one exception).
However, looking at many examples of computer science papers, it 
becomes clear that they are actually doing Humanities or Communication 
Studies (in relation to contemporary media) but at a much larger scale. Con-
sider these recent publications: ‘Quantifying Visual Preferences Around the 
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World’ (Reinecke & Gajos 2014), and ‘What We Instagram: A First Analysis 
of Instagram Photo Content and User Types’ (Hu et al. 2014). The f irst study 
analyses worldwide preferences for website design using 2.4 million ratings 
from 40,000 people from 179 countries. Studies like this of aesthetics and 
design traditionally belong to the humanities. The second study analysed 
the most frequent subjects of Instagram photos – a method comparable to 
art history studies of the genres in the 17th-century Dutch art which would 
be more appropriately categorized as humanities.
Another example is a paper called ‘What is Twitter, a Social Network 
or a News Media?’ (Kwak et al. 2014). First published in 2010, it has since 
been cited 3,284 times in other computer science publications.4 It was the 
f irst large-scale analysis of Twitter as a social network, using 106 million 
tweets by 41.7 million users. The study looked in particular at trending 
topics, showing ‘what categories trending topics are classif ied into, how 
long they last, and how many users participate’. This is a classic question 
of Communication Studies, going back to the pioneering work of Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in the 1940s who manually counted the topics 
of radio broadcasts. But I would argue that given that Twitter and other 
micro-blogging services represent a new form of media, like oil painting, 
printed books and photography before them, understanding the specif icity 
of Twitter as a medium is also a topic for humanities.
A small number of publications lie at the intersection of Digital Hu-
manities and Social Computing. They take computational methods and 
algorithms developed by computer scientists for studying contemporary 
user-generated content and apply them to historical media artefacts created 
by professionals. The most prominent examples are ‘Toward Automated 
Discovery of Artistic Influence’ (Saleh et al. 2014), ‘Infectious Texts: model-
ling Text Reuse in Nineteenth-Century Newspapers’ (Smith et al. 2013), 
‘Measuring the Evolution of Contemporary Western Popular Music’ (Serrà 
et al. 2012) and ‘Quicker, faster, darker: Changes in Hollywood f ilm over 75 
years’ (Cutting et al. 2011).
Until a few years ago, the only project that analysed cultural history 
on the scale of millions of texts was carried out by scientists rather than 
by humanists. I refer here to N-Gram Viewer created in 2010 by Google 
scientists Jon Orwant and Will Brockman following the prototype by two 
Harvard PhD students in Biology and Applied Mathematics. More recently, 
however, we see people in Digital Humanities scaling up the data they 
study. For example, in ‘Mapping Mutable Genres in Structurally Complex 
4 https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=M6i3Be0AAAAJ&hl=en.
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Volumes’ literary scholar Ted Underwood (2013) and his collaborators 
analysed 469,200 volumes from Trust Digital Library. Art historian Maxi-
milian Schich and his colleagues (2014) have analysed the life trajectories 
of 120,000 notable historical individuals. And even larger historical data 
sets are becoming available in the areas of literature, photography, f ilm 
and TV, although they have yet to be analysed. In 2012, The New York City 
Municipal Archives released 870,000 digitized historic photos of NYC 
(Taylor 2012). In 2015, HathiTrust made data extracted from 4,801,237 
volumes (containing 1.8 billion pages) available for research (2016). In 
the same year Associated Press and British Movietone uploaded 550,000 
digitized news stories covering the period from 1895 to today to YouTube 
(Associated Press 2015).
What is the importance of having such large cultural data sets? Can’t we 
simply use smaller samples? I believe that there are a number of reasons. 
First of all, to have a representative sample, we f irst need to have a much 
larger set of actual items to draw from or at least a good understanding 
of what this larger set includes. So, for example, if we want to create a 
representative sample of 20th-century f ilms, we can use IMDb (2015), which 
contains information on 3.4 million f ilms and TV shows (including separate 
episodes). Similarly, we can create a good sample of historical US newspaper 
pages using the Historical American Newspaper collection of millions of 
digitized pages from the Library of Congress (2016). However, in many other 
cultural f ields such larger data sets do not exist and without them, it may 
be impossible to construct representative samples.
The second reason is the following: without a large enough sample, we 
can only f ind general trends and patterns, but not local patterns. For exam-
ple, in the already mentioned paper ‘What We Instagram’, three computer 
scientists analysed 1,000 Instagram photos and came up with the eight 
most frequent categories (self ie, friends, fashion, food, gadget, activity, pet, 
captioned photos). The sample of 1,000 photos was randomly selected from 
a larger set of photos shared by 95,343 unique users. It is possible that these 
eight categories were also most popular among all Instagram photos shared 
worldwide at the time when the scientists did their study. However, as we 
at the Software Studies Initiative saw from projects analysing Instagram 
photos in different cities and their parts (for example, the centre of Kyiv 
during the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution in The Exceptional and the Everyday 
(Manovich et al. 2014)), people also share many other types of images 
beyond Hu et al.’s eight categories. Depending on the geographic area and 
time period, some of these types may replace the top eight in popularity. 
In other words, while a small sample allows f inding the ‘typical’ or ‘most 
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popular,’ it does not reveal what I call ‘content islands’ – types of coherent 
content with particular semantic and/or aesthetic characteristics shared 
in moderate numbers.
Cultural Analytics
When I f irst started thinking about Cultural Analytics in 2005, both Digital 
Humanities and Social Computing were just getting started as research fields. 
I felt the need to introduce this new term to signal that our lab’s work would 
not simply be a part of digital humanities or social computing but would cover 
subject matter studied in both fields. Like digital humanists, we are interested 
in analysing historical artefacts, but we are also equally interested in contem-
porary digital visual culture: Instagram as well as professional photography, 
artefacts created by dedicated non-professionals and artists outside of the art 
world like those found on deviantart.com,5 and accidental creators, such as 
those who occasionally upload their photos to social media networks.
Like computational social scientists and computer scientists, we are also 
attracted to the study of society using social media and social phenomena 
specif ic to social networks. An example of the former would be using social 
media activity to identify similarities between different city neighbourhoods 
(Cranshaw et al. 2012). An example of the latter would be analysing patterns 
of information diffusion online (Cha et al. 2012). However, if Social Comput-
ing focuses on the social in social networks, Cultural Analytics focuses on 
the cultural. Therefore, the most relevant part of social sciences for Cultural 
Analytics is sociology of culture, and only after that sociology and economics.
We believe that content and user activities on the Web (on social networks 
and elsewhere) give us the unprecedented opportunity to describe, model and 
simulate the global cultural universe while questioning and rethinking basic 
humanities concepts and tools that were developed to analyse ‘small cultural 
data’ (i.e. highly selective and non-representative cultural samples). In the very 
influential 1869 definition by British cultural critic Matthew Arnold (1869), 
culture is ‘the best that has been thought and said in the world’. The academic 
institution of humanities has largely followed this definition. And when they 
started to revolt against their canons and to include the works of previously 
excluded people (women, non-whites, non-Western authors, queer, etc.), they 
often included only ‘the best’ created by those who were previously excluded.
5 ‘The largest online social network for artists and art enthusiasts’, http://about.deviantart.
com/, retrieved 22 August 2015.
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Cultural Analytics is interested in everything created by everybody. In this, 
we are approaching culture the way linguists study languages or biologists 
study life on earth. Ideally, we want to look at every cultural manifestation, 
rather than selective samples, in a systematic perspective not dissimilar 
to that of cultural anthropology. This larger inclusive scope combining 
the professional and the vernacular, the historical and the contemporary, 
is exemplif ied by the range of projects we have worked on in our lab since 
2008. We have analysed historical, professionally created cultural content 
in all Time magazine covers (1923-2009); paintings by Vincent van Gogh, 
Piet Mondrian and Mark Rothko; 20,000 photographs from the collection of 
the Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA); and one million manga 
pages from 883 manga series published in the last 30 years. Our analysis 
of contemporary vernacular content includes Phototrails (the comparison 
of visual signatures of 13 global cities using 2.3 million Instagram photos) 
(Hochman et al. 2013), The Exceptional and the Everyday: 144 Hours in Kyiv 
(the analysis of Instagram images shared in Kyiv during the 2014 Ukrainian 
Revolution) (Manovich 2014) and On Broadway (the interactive installation 
exploring Broadway in NYC using 40 million user-generated images and 
data points) (Goddemeyer et al. 2014). We have also looked at contemporary 
amateur or semi-professional content using one million artworks shared 
by 30,000 semi-professional artists on deviantart.com. Currently, we are 
exploring a data set of 265 million images tweeted worldwide between 
2011 and 2014. To summarize, our work doesn’t draw a boundary between 
(smaller) historical professional artefacts and (bigger) online digital content 
created by non-professionals. Instead, it draws freely from both.
Obviously, online social networks today do not include every human 
being, and the content shared is sometimes specif ic to these networks 
(e.g. Instagram self ies), as opposed to something which existed before. 
This content is also shaped by the tools and interfaces of technologies used 
for its creation, capturing, editing and sharing (e.g. Instagram f ilters, its 
Layout app, etc.). The kind of cultural actions available are also def ined by 
these technologies. For example, in social networks you can ‘like’, share or 
comment on a piece of content. In other words, just as in quantum physics, 
the instrument can influence the phenomena we want to study. All this 
needs to be carefully considered when we study user-generated content and 
user activities. While social network APIs make it easy to access massive 
amounts of contents, it is not ‘everything’ by ‘everybody’.
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The General and the Particular
When the humanities were focused on ‘small data’ (content created by 
single authors or small groups), the sociological perspective was only one 
of many options for interpretation – unless you were a Marxist. But once we 
started studying online content and the activities of millions of people, this 
perspective became almost inevitable. In the case of ‘big cultural data’, the 
cultural and the social closely overlap. Large groups of people from different 
countries and socio-economic backgrounds (sociological perspective) share 
images, video, texts, and make particular aesthetic choices in doing this 
(humanities perspective). Because of this overlap, the kinds of questions 
investigated in sociology of culture of the 20th century (exemplif ied by its 
most influential researcher, Pierre Bourdieu (2010)) are directly relevant 
for Cultural Analytics.
Given that certain demographic categories have been taken for granted 
in our thinking about society, it appears natural today to group people 
into these categories and compare them in relation to social, economic or 
cultural indicators. For example, Pew Research Center regularly reports 
the statistics of popular social platform use, breaking up their user sample 
by demographics such as gender, ethnicity, age, education, income and 
residence (urban, suburban and rural) (Duggan et al. 2015). So if we are in-
terested in various details of social media activities (such as types of images 
shared and liked, f ilters used or self ie poses) it is logical to study the differ-
ences between people from different countries, ethnicities, socio-economic 
backgrounds or levels of technical expertise. The earlier research in social 
computing did not, and most of the current work still does not consider such 
differences, treating all users as one undifferentiated pool of ‘humanity’. 
More recently, however, we have started to see publications separating 
users into demographic groups. While we support this development, we 
also want to be careful in how far we want to go. Humanistic analysis of 
cultural phenomena and processes using quantitative methods should not 
be simply reduced to sociology and only consider common characteristics 
and behaviours of human groups.
The sociological tradition is concerned with f inding and describing 
the general patterns in human behaviour, rather than with analysing or 
predicting the behaviours of particular individuals. Cultural Analytics, 
too, is interested in patterns that can be derived from the analysis of large 
cultural data sets. However, ideally the analysis of the larger patterns will 
also lead us to individual cases, such as individual creators, their particular 
creations or cultural behaviours. For instance, the computational analysis 
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of all photos made by a photographer during her long career may lead us to 
the outliers – the photos that are most different from all the rest. Similarly, 
we may analyse millions of Instagram images shared in multiple cities to 
discover the types of images unique to each city.
In other words, we may combine the concern of social science, and 
sciences in general, with the general and the regular, and the concern 
of humanities with the individual and the particular. The just described 
examples of analysing massive data sets to zoom in on the unique items 
illustrate one way of doing this, but it is not the only way.
The Science of Culture?
The goal of science is to explain phenomena and develop compact math-
ematical models for describing how these phenomena work. Newton’s three 
laws of physics are a perfect example of how classical science approached 
this goal. Since the middle of the 19th century, a number of new scientif ic 
f ields have adopted a new probabilistic approach. The f irst example is the 
statistical distribution describing likely speeds of gas particles presented 
by Maxwell in 1860, now called the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution. 
Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, many thinkers were expecting 
that, similar to physics, the quantitative laws governing societies would 
also be eventually found (Ball 2004), yet this never happened. The closest 
19th-century social thought came to postulating objective laws was in 
the works of Karl Marx. Instead, when positivist social science started to 
develop in the late 19th and early 20th century, it adopted the probabilistic 
approach. So instead of looking for deterministic laws of society, social 
scientists study correlations between measurable characteristics and model 
the relations between ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ variables using various 
statistical techniques.
After deterministic and probabilistic paradigms in science, the next 
paradigm was computational simulation – running models on computers to 
simulate the behavior of systems. The f irst large-scale computer simulation 
was created in the 1940s by the Manhattan Project to model a nuclear 
explosion. Subsequently, simulation was adapted in many hard sciences, 
and in the 1990s it was also taken up in the social sciences.
In the early 21st century, the volume of digital online content and user 
interactions allows us to think of a possible ‘science of culture’. For example, 
by the summer of 2015, Facebook users were sharing 400 million photos 
and sending 45 billion messages daily (Smith 2015). This scale is still much 
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smaller than that of atoms and molecules.6 However, it is already bigger 
than the numbers of neurons in the whole nervous system of an average 
adult, which is estimated at 86 billion. But since science now includes a few 
fundamental approaches to studying and understanding the phenomena 
– deterministic laws, statistical models and simulation – which of them 
should a ‘science of culture’ adapt?
Looking at the papers of computer scientists who are studying social 
media data sets, it is clear that their default approach is statistics.7 They 
describe social media data and user behaviour in terms of probabilities. 
This includes the creation of statistical models – mathematical equations 
that specify the relations between variables that may be described using 
probability distributions rather than specif ic values. A majority of papers 
today also use supervised machine learning, an automatic creation of 
models that can classify or predict the values of the new data using already 
existing examples. In both cases, a model can only account for part of the 
data, and this is typical of the statistical approach.
Computer scientists studying social media use statistics differently 
than social scientists. The latter want to explain social, economic or po-
litical phenomena.8 Computer scientists are generally not concerned with 
explaining patterns in social media by referencing some external social, 
economic or technological factors. Instead, they typically either analyse 
social media phenomena internally or try to predict the outside phenomena 
using information extracted from social media data sets. The example of 
the former is a statistical description of how many favourites a photo on 
Flickr may receive on average after a certain period of time.9 The example 
of the latter is the Google Flu Trends service that predicts f lu activity using 
a combination of Google search data and the US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention’s off icial f lu data (Stefansen 2014).
The difference between deterministic laws and non-deterministic 
models is that the latter describe probabilities, not certainties. The laws 
of classical mechanics apply to any macroscopic objects. In contrast, a 
probabilistic model for predicting the number of favorites for a Flickr 
photo as a function of time since it was uploaded cannot tell us exactly the 
6 1 cm³ of water contains 3.33 *1022 molecules.
7 Computer scientists also use many recently developed methods including techniques of 
data mining and machine learning that were not part of 20th-century statistics. I discuss these 
differences in ‘Data Science and Digital Art History,’ International Journal for Digital Art History, 
issue 1 (2015), https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/dah/article/view/21631. 
8 For example, the effect of family background on children’s educational performance.
9 See ‘Delayed information cascades in Flickr.’
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numbers of favourites for any particular photo. It only describes the overall 
trend. This seems to be the appropriate method for a ‘science of culture’. If 
instead we start postulating deterministic laws of human cultural activ-
ity, what happens to the idea of free will? Even in the case of seemingly 
automatic cultural behaviour (people favouring photos on social networks 
with certain characteristics such as pretty landscapes, cute pets or posing 
young females), we don’t want to reduce humans to mechanical automata 
for the passing of memes.
The current focus on probabilistic models in studying online activity 
leaves out the third scientif ic paradigm – simulation. As far as I know, 
simulation has not yet been explored in either Social Computing or Digital 
Humanities as a tool for studying user-generated content, its topics, types of 
images, etc. If scientists at IBM’s Almaden research centre simulated human 
visual cortex using 1.6 billion virtual neurons with 9 trillion synapses in 
2009 (Fox 2009), why can’t we think of simulating, for instance, all content 
produced yearly by users of Instagram? Or all content shared by all users 
of major social networks? Or the categories of images people share? The 
point of such simulations will not be to get everything right or to precisely 
predict what people will be sharing next year. Instead, we can follow the 
authors of the influential textbook Simulation for the Social Scientist (Gilbert 
& Troitzsch 2005) when they state that one of the purposes of simulation is 
‘to obtain a better understanding of some features of the social world’ and 
that simulation can be used as ‘a method of theory development’ (emphasis 
added). Since computer simulation requires developing an explicit and 
precise model of the phenomena, thinking of how cultural processes can 
be simulated can help us to develop more explicit and detailed theories 
than we use normally.10
And what about ‘big data’? Does it not represent a new paradigm in 
science with its own new research methods? This is a complex question 
that deserves its own article.11 However, as a way of conclusion, I do want to 
mention one concept interesting for humanities that we can borrow from 
big data analytics and then push in a new direction.
10 For the example of how agent-based simulation can be used to study the evolution of human 
societies, see ‘War, space, and the evolution of Old World complex societies’, http://peterturchin.
com/PDF/Turchin_etal_PNAS2013.pdf.
11 If we are talking about research methods and techniques, the developments in computer 
hardware in the 2000s, including the increasing CPU speed and RAM size, and the use of GPUs 
and computing clusters, were probably more important than availability of larger data sets. And 
while use of machine learning with large training data sets achieved remarkable successes, in 
most cases it does not provide explanations of the phenomena.
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The 20th-century social science was working on what we can call ‘long 
data’.12 That is, the number of cases was typically many times bigger than the 
number of variables being analysed. For example, imagine that we surveyed 
2,000 people asking them about their income, family educational achieve-
ment and their years of education. As a result, we have 2000 cases and three 
variables. We can then examine correlations between these variables, or 
look for clusters in the data, or perform other types of statistical analysis.
The beginnings of social sciences are characterized by the most extreme 
asymmetries of this kind. The f irst positivist sociologist, Karl Marx, divided 
all humanity into just two classes: people who own means of production and 
people who don’t, i.e. capitalists and the proletariat. Later sociologists added 
other divisions. Today these divisions are present in numerous surveys, 
studies and reports in popular media and academic publications – typically, 
gender, race, ethnicity, age, educational background, income, place of living, 
religion, and some others. But regardless of details, the data collected, 
analysed and interpreted is still very ‘long’. The full populations or their 
samples are described using a much smaller number of variables.
But why should this be the case? In the f ields of computer media analysis 
and computer vision, computer scientists use algorithms to extract thou-
sands of features from every image, video, tweet, email, and so on.13 So 
while Vincent van Gogh, for example, only created about 900 paintings, 
these paintings can be described on thousands of separate dimensions. 
Similarly, we can describe everybody living in a city on millions of separate 
dimensions by extracting all kinds of characteristics from their social media 
activity. For another example, consider our own project On Broadway where 
we represent Broadway in Manhattan with 40 million data points and 
images using messages, images and check-ins shared along this street on 
Twitter, Instagram and Foursquare, as well as taxi rides data and the US 
Census indicators for the surrounding areas.14
In other words, instead of long data we can have wide data – very large 
and potentially endless number of variables describing a set of cases. Note 
that if we have more variables than cases, such representation would go 
against the common sense of both social science and data science. The latter 
refers to the process of making a large number of variables more manageable 
12 I am using this term in a different way than Samuel Arbesman in his ‘Stop Hyping Big Data 
and Start Paying Attention to “Long Data”’, wired.com, 29 January 2013, www.wired.com/2013/01/
forget-big-data-think-long-data/.
13 I explain the reason for using a large number of features in ‘Data Science and Digital Art 
History.’ (Manovich 2015).
14 Described at length in the following chapter.
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as dimension reduction. But for us, ‘wide data’ offers an opportunity to 
rethink fundamental assumptions about what society is and how to study 
it, and similarly, what is culture, an artistic career, a body of images, a group 
of people with similar aesthetic taste, and so on. Rather than dividing 
cultural history using one dimension (time), or two (time and geographic 
location) or a few more (e.g. media, genre), endless dimensions can be put 
in play. The goal of such ‘wide data analysis’ will not be only to f ind new 
similarities, aff inities and clusters in the universe of cultural artefacts, but 
to question a taken-for-granted view of things, where certain dimensions 
are taken for granted. This is one example of the general Cultural Analytics 
method: estrangement (ostranenie)15, making our basic cultural concepts 
and ways of organizing and understanding cultural data sets foreign to 
us so that we can approach them anew. In this way, we use data and data-
manipulating techniques to question how we think, see and ultimately act 
on our knowledge.
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4. Case Study
On Broadway
Daniel Goddemeyer, Moritz Stefaner, Dominikus Baur & 
Lev Manovich
Modern writers, painters, photographers, f ilmmakers and digital artists 
have created many fascinating representations of city life. Paintings of Paris-
ian boulevards and cafés by Pissarro and Renoir, photomontages by Berlin 
Dada artists, Spider-Man comics by Stan Lee and Steve Ditko, Broadway 
Boogie-Woogie by Piet Mondrian and Playtime by Jacques Tati are some of 
the classic examples of artists encountering the city. Today, a city ‘talks’ to 
us in data. Many cities make data sets available and sponsor hackathons 
to encourage the creation of useful apps using their data. For example, the 
NYC Open Data website, sponsored by the NYC Mayor’s Off ice, offers over 
1,200 data sets covering everything from the trees in the city to bike data. 
On top of that, locals and tourists share massive amounts of geo-coded 
visual media using Twitter, Instagram and other networks. Services such as 
Foursquare tell us where people go and what kind of venues they frequent. 
At the start of a new Cultural Analytics project, Daniel Goddemeyer, Moritz 
Stefaner, Dominikus Baur and Lev Manovich1 asked themselves the follow-
ing questions: How can we represent the 21st century using such rich data 
and image sources? Is there a different way to visualize the city besides 
graphs, numbers or maps?
The result of their explorations is On Broadway: a visually-rich, image-
centric interface without maps and where numbers play only a secondary role.
Like a spine in a human body, Broadway runs through the middle of 
Manhattan Island curving along its way. In order to capture the activities 
nearby, a slightly wider area than the street itself was included. To def ine 
this area, points were selected at 30-metre intervals going through the 
centre of Broadway, and 100-metre-wide rectangles centred on every point 
were def ined (see Figure 4.2). The result is a spin-like shape that is 21,390 
metres (13.5 miles) long and 100 metres wide.
This project’s attempt to make a combination of a variety of data sets 
visible within the same visualization can be seen as an example of ‘wide 
data’. The data was collected from f ive main sources: Instagram, Twitter, 
1 The team’s previous work includes Self iecity: self iecity.net.
70 Daniel GoDDeMeyer, MoriTz STefaner, DoMiniKuS baur & lev Manovich 
Fig. 4.1:  On Broadway display in the New York Public Library (NYPL)
Fig. 4.2:  Close-up showing the width of the area centred on Broadway that was 
used as a data filter
caSe STuDy 71
Foursquare, Taxi pick-up and drop-off data and census data from the 
American Community Service. Using Gnip, a social media monitoring 
service, all geo-coded Instagram images publicly shared in the New York 
City area between 26 February and 3 August 2014 were downloaded. This 
data set contained 10,624,543 images out of which 661,809 are from the 
Broadway area used for the project. Since the On Broadway project is part 
of the Twitter Data Grant awarded to the Software Studies Initiative, the 
artists received all publicly shared tweets with images around the world 
between 2011 and 2014. This data set was f iltered, leaving only tweets 
shared inside the Broadway area during the same time period as was used 
for Instagram (158 days in 2014). Data from Foursquare could be obtained 
using its own API. With this service 8,527,198 check-ins along Broadway 
between March 2009 and March 2014 were downloaded. Chris Whong 
was able to obtain taxi pick-up and drop-off data from NYC Taxi and 
Limousine Commission (TLC). Filtering the data set containing the 140 
million trips made in Manhattan in 2013 using Broadway coordinates left 
him with 10,077,789 drop-off and 12,391,809 pick-up locations, a total of 
22 million trips. Finally, for the economic indicators, the latest published 
data from American Community Service (ACS, 2013) was used. It is a 
yearly survey of the US Census Bureau’s sample of the US population. 
ACS reports the data summarized by census tracks. These are areas 
that are much larger than the 30 x 100 metre rectangles that are used to 
def ine the Broadway area (the 713 selected rectangles cross 73 larger US 
Census tracks). Given this discrepancy, any Census indicator summarized 
per track will only approximately apply to the smaller Broadway parts. 
That is why only a single economic indicator from the estimated average 
household income is used. This data is shown as one of the layers in the 
application.
The Visualization
The artwork that directly inspired the project is Every Building on the 
Sunset Strip by Edward Ruscha (1996). It is an artist book that unfolds to 
25 feet (8.33 metres) to show continuous photographic views of both sides 
of a 1.5-mile section of Sunset Boulevard. The interactive installation and 
Web application represents life in the 21st century city through a compila-
tion of images and data collected along the thirteen miles of Broadway 
that span Manhattan. The project proposes a new visual metaphor for 
thinking about the city: a vertical stack of image and data layers created 
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from the activities and media shared by hundreds of thousands of people. 
There are thirteen such layers in the project, all aligned to locations along 
Broadway. As you move along the street, you see a selection of Instagram 
photos from each area, left, right and top Google Street View images 
and extracted top colours from these image sources. In addition, the 
visualization shows the average numbers of taxi pick-ups and drop-offs, 
Twitter posts with images, and average family income for the parts of the 
city crossed by Broadway.
Moritz Stefaner comments on how we were interested in how we could 
enable seamless navigation between high-level condensed views of the city 
and zoomed in, anecdotal data. In the exploratory phase of the project, we 
experimented a lot with different remixes and montages of the many data 
and image materials we had available. The f inal application reflects this 
enormous data diversity and richness: from taxi rides and median income 
to colour palettes and Twitter messages.
Daniel Goddemeyer draws attention to the fact that we were determined 
not to use a conventional map view and instead focused on creating a new 
multi-layered interaction paradigm: ‘The use of Google Street View images 
allows users to quickly look at urban physical context of every data point 
and Instagram image. In this way we are juxtaposing the digital with the 
physical.’




With On Broadway, the artists would like to raise awareness of the fact that 
more and more data about people is produced and collected, not only visibly, 
but also through subtle and invisible practices. By showing the immense 
amounts of available data within a single visual interface an experience 
of estrangement is pursued, hopefully leaving the spectator with food for 
thought.
During the production of this book the team has continued working on 
the analysis of all the data assembled for the project. The results of this 
research will be published as academic articles and also as blog posts on 
www.softwarestudies.com.

5. Foundations of Digital Methods
Query Design
Richard Rogers
digital methods and Online Groundedness
Broadly speaking digital methods may be considered the deployment of 
online tools and data for the purposes of social and medium research. More 
specif ically, they derive from online methods, or methods of the medium, 
which are reimagined and repurposed for research. The methods to be 
repurposed are often built into dominant devices for recommending sources 
or drawing attention to oneself or one’s posts. For an example of how to 
reimagine the inputs and outputs of one such dominant device, consider 
the difference between studying search engine results to understand in 
some manner Google’s algorithms, or recent algorithmic updates, or treating 
them, as in the Google Flu Trends project, as indications of societal concerns. 
Here, there is a shift from studying the medium to using device data to study 
the societal. That is, akin to the digital methods outlook generally, Google 
Flu Trends and other anticipatory instruments use online social signals to 
measure trends not so much in the online realm but rather ‘in the wild’.1
Once the f indings are made the question becomes how to ground them, 
that is, with conventional offline methods and techniques, such as the Cent-
ers for Disease Control’s means of studying flu incidence through hospital 
and doctor reports, as in the Flu Trends project, or through additional, online 
methods and sources. In digital methods research, online groundedness, as 
I have called it, asks whether and when it is appropriate to shift the site of 
‘ground-truthing’, to use a geographer’s expression. As a case in point, when 
verifying knowledge claims, Wikipedians check prior art through Google 
searches, thereby grounding claims via the search engine in online sources.
Digital methods thereby rethink conditions of proof, f irst by considering 
the online as a site of grounding, but also in a second sense. One makes social 
research f indings online, and, rather than leaving the medium to harden 
them, one subsequently inquires into the extent to which the medium 
1 The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ran a competition in 2013-14 for 
instruments that use search and social media data to forecast influenza, and the one employing 
the data from Google Flu Trends won the award. 
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is affecting the f indings. Medium research thus serves a purpose that is 
distinct from the study of online culture alone. As I will come to shortly, 
when reading and interpreting social signals online, the question concerns 
whether the medium, or media dynamics, is overdetermining the outcomes.
Making Use of Online Data: From the Semantic to the Social
As noted, digital methods make use of online methods, by which I refer to 
an array of techniques from the computational and information sciences – 
crawling, scraping, indexing, ranking, and so forth – that have been applied 
to and redeveloped for the Web. They refer to algorithms that determine 
relevance and authority and thereby recommend information sources as in 
Google’s famed PageRank, but also boost all manner of items, from songs 
and ‘friends’ to potential ‘followers’.
Many of the algorithms are referred to as ‘social’, meaning that they make 
use of user choices and activity (purposive clicks such as liking), and may 
be contrasted with the ‘semantic’, meaning that which is categorized and 
matched (as in Google’s Knowledge Graph). Digital methods seek to take 
particular advantage of socially derived rankings, that is, users making their 
preferences known for particular sources, often unobtrusively. Secondarily, 
the semantic (sources that have been pre-matched or taxonomied) are 
also of value, for example when Wikipedia furnishes a curated seed list 
of sources (‘climate change sceptics’ as a case in point), which have been 
derived manually by information experts or the proverbial crowd guided 
by the protocols of the online encyclopaedic community.
The distinction between social and semantic is mentioned so as to em-
phasize Web-epistemological ‘crowdfindings’ (as implied by the ‘social’), as 
distinct from ‘results’ from information retrieval.2 Thus with digital methods, 
as I relate below, one seeks to query in order to make findings from socialised 
Web data (so to speak) rather than query in order to find pre-sorted informa-
tion or sources, however well annotated or enriched with metadata.
Why Query Google (Still) for Research Purposes?
Over the course of the past decade or more Google arguably has transformed 
itself from an epistemological machine outputting reputational source 
2 Crowdfindings is a term coined by Christian Bröer.
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hierarchies to a consumer information appliance providing user-tailored 
results. Here I would like to take up the question of how and to which ends 
one might still employ Google as an epistemological machine.
There are largely two research purposes for querying Google: medium 
and social research. With medium research, one studies (often critically) 
how and for whom Google works. To which degree does the engine serve 
a handful of dominant websites such as Google properties themselves in 
a ‘preferred placement’ critique, or websites receiving the most attention 
through links and clicks? One would seek to lay bare the persistence of 
so-called ‘googlearchies’ that boost certain websites and bury others in the 
results, as Matthew Hindman’s classic critique of Google’s outputs would 
imply. Here the work being done is an engine results critique, where the 
question revolves around the extent to which the change in 2009 in Google’s 
algorithmic philosophy, captured in the opening chapter of Eli Pariser’s 
Filter Bubble, from universal to personalized outputs, dislodges or upholds 
the pole positions of dominant sites on the Web. Indeed, another critical 
inroad in engine results critique is the so-called f ilter bubble itself, where 
one would examine the effects of personalization, investigating Pariser’s 
claim that Google furnishes increasingly personalized and localised results. 
In this enquiry, one may reinvigorate Nicholas Negroponte’s ‘Daily Me’ 
argument and Cass Sunstein’s response concerning the undesirable effects 
of homophily, polarization and the end of the shared public exposure to 
media which leaves societies without common frames of reference. In this 
line of reasoning, personalization leads to social atomisation and severe 
niching, otherwise known as ‘markets of one’, as described by Joseph Turow 
in Niche Envy. It also would imply the demise of the mass media audience.
In the second research strategy, there is a mode switch in how one views 
the work of the search engine (and for whom it could work). Google’s queries, 
together with its outputted site rankings, are considered as indicators of 
social trends. That is, instead of beginning from the democratizing and 
socializing potential of the Web and subsequently critiquing Google for its 
reintroduction of hierarchies, one focuses on how examining engine queries 
and results allows for the study of social sorting. How to study the hierarchies 
Google offers? Which terms have been queried most signif icantly (at which 
time and from which location)? Do places have preferred searches? May we 
geo-locate temporal pockets of anxiety? The capacity to indicate general and 
localisable trends makes Google results of interest to the social researcher.3
3 Not only Google Trends but also Google Related Search provides means for studying keyword 
salience as well as the association between keywords, including co-occurrence.
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Apart from trends one may also study dominant voice, commitment and 
concern. One may ask in the f irst instance, when and for which keywords 
do certain actors appear high on the list and others marginal? Which actors 
are given the opportunity to dominate and drive the meaning of terms and 
their discussion and debate? Here the engine is considered as serving social 
epistemologies for any keyword (or social issue) through what is collectively 
queried and returned.
The engine also can be employed to the study of commitment in terms of 
the continued use of keywords by individual actors, be they governments, 
non-governmental organizations, radical group formations or individuals. 
Fig. 5.1:  Greenpeace campaigns, 1996-2012, ranked and arrayed as word cloud 
according to frequency of appearances on Greenpeace.org front page. 
Source: Data from the Internet Archive, archive.org. Analysis by Anne 
Laurine Stadermann.
Fig. 5.2:  Greenpeace campaigns mentioned on Greenpeace.org as ranked 
word cloud, 2012. Source: Data from Greenpeace.org gathered by the 
Lippmannian Device, Digital Methods Initiative. Analysis by Anne 
Laurine Stadermann.
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Here the researcher takes advantage not of the hierarchies inputted and 
outputted (socio-epistemological sorting) but of the massive and recent 
indexing of individual websites. For example, non-governmental organi-
zation Greenpeace once had the dual agenda of environmentalism and 
disarmament (hence the fusion of ‘green’ and ‘peace’). Querying Greenpeace 
websites lately for issue keywords would show that their commitment to 
campaigning for peace has signif icantly waned in comparison to that for 
environmental causes, for green words resonate far more than disarmament 
ones. Here one counts incidences of keywords on Web pages for the study 
of issue commitment (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
One also may query sets of actors for keywords in order to have an 
indication of the levels of concern for an issue. For example, querying a 
representative environmental group and a species group (respectively) for 
Fukushima would show that the environmental group is highly active in 
the issue space whilst the species NGO is largely absent, showing a lack of 
concern for the matter (see Figure 5.3).
In all, for the social researcher, Google is of interest for its capacity to rank 
actors (websites) per social issue (keyword), thereby providing source hierar-
chies, and allowing for the study of dominant voice. It is also pertinent for its 
ability to count the incidence of issue words per actor or sets of actors, thereby 
allowing for the study of commitment through continued use of keywords.
Clean Google Results to Remove ‘Artefacts’?
One might distinguish between the two research types above by viewing one 
as primarily doing media studies and the other social research. Yet in practice, 
the two are entangled with one another. As mentioned in the introduction, 
Fig. 5.3:  Greenpeace with numerous mentions of Fukushima and World Wildlife 
Fund with few, November 2016. Source: Data and visualization by the 
Lippmannian Device, Digital Methods Initiative.
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here the entanglement assumes a particular form. Medium research is in 
service of social research in the sense of concentrating on the extent to which 
the f indings made have been overdetermined by media effects.
It is important to stress from the outset that it not assumed that engine 
effects can be removed in toto, thus enabling a researcher to study ‘organic’ 
results, the industry term for editorial content untouched by advertising 
or preferred placement. Rather there should be awareness of a variety of 
types of routinely befouling artefacts (‘media effects’) that nevertheless 
are returned by the engine. Google properties (e.g. YouTube videos), Google 
user aids (e.g. ‘equivalent results’ for queried terms), and SEO’d products 
(whether through white or black hat techniques) are all considered media 
effects, and in principle could be removed or footnoted. There are software 
settings (e.g. remove Google properties from results), query design (use 
quotation marks for exact matches) and also strategies for detecting at least 
obviously SEO’d results.
The more problematic issue arises with any desired detection of the 
effects of personalization. The point here is that users now co-author engine 
results. The search engine thereby produces artefacts that are of the user’s 
making. The search engine, once critiqued for its social sorting and Mat-
thew effect in the results, leans towards inculpability, since users have 
set preferences (and had preferences set for them) and some results are 
affected. There is the question of detecting how many and which results are 
personalized in one form or another, according to one’s location (country 
as well as locality), language, personal search history as well as adult and 
violent content f ilter.
Certain queries would likely have no organic results in the top ten, thus 
making any content cleaning exercise into an artif icial act of removal, given 
that most users: a) click the top results, b) have the results set to the default 
of ten, and c) do not venture beyond one page of results. There are also 
special cases to consider for removal, such as Wikipedia, which is delivered 
in the top results for nearly all substantive queries, making it appear to be 
at once an authoritative source (for its persistent presence) and an engine 
artefact (for its uncannily persistent presence). Wikipedia’s supra-presence, 
so to speak, provides a conundrum for the researcher who may wish to clean 
content of Google artefacts and media effects, and is perhaps the best case 
for retaining them at least in the f irst instance.
One way forward would be to remove the user, so to speak, and strive 
to have the engine work as unaffected as possible. Removing the user is a 
means of re-conjuring the pre-2009 distinction between universal results 
(served to all) and personalized results (served to an individual user). A 
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research browser would be set up, where one is logged out of Google, and 
no cookies are set. The ncr (no country redirect) version of Google is used, 
or one would query from a non-location, or obfuscated one.
Studying Media Effects or the Societal ‘in the Wild’?
The question of whether Google merely outputs Google artefacts and me-
dium effects or reveals social trends has been raised in connection with the 
flagship big data project, Google Flu Trends (Lazer et al. 2014). As mentioned 
at the outset, the project, run by Google’s non-profit Google.org, monitors 
user queries for flu and flu-related symptoms, geolocates their incidence and 
outputs the timing and locations of heightened flu activity; it is a tool for 
tracking where the virus is most prevalent. Yet does the increased incidence 
of queries for f lu and flu-related symptoms indicate a rise in the number 
of influenza cases ‘in the wild’, or does it mean that TV and other news of 
the coming flu season prompt heightened query activity? TV viewers may 
be using a ‘second screen’ and fact checking or enhancing their knowledge 
through search engine queries. Given that Flu Trends was over reporting 
for a period of time, compared to its baseline at the US Centers for Disease 
Control (and its equivalents internationally), the project seemed to be overly 
imbued with media effects.
Thus one may seek research strategies to study medium effects, formulat-
ing queries that in a sense put on display or amplify the effects. For which 
types of queries do more Google properties appear? How can Google be 
made to output user aids that are telling? How to detect egregiously SEO’d 
results?
When using Google as a social research machine, the task at hand, how-
ever, is to reduce Google effects, albeit without the pretension of completely 
removing them. This is the main preparatory work, conceptually as well as 
practically, prior to query design.
When Words are Keywords: A Query Design Strategy
The question of what constitutes a keyword is the starting point for query 
design, for that is what makes querying and query design practically part of a 
research strategy. When formulating a query, one often begins with keywords 
so as to ascertain who is using them, in which contexts and with which 
spread or distribution over time. In the following a particular keyword query 
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strategy or design is put forward, whereby one queries competing keywords, 
asking whether a particular term is winning favour and amongst whom.
The keyword has its origins in the notion of a ‘hint’ or ‘clue’. The New Oxford 
American Dictionary (built into Apple OS’s dictionary) calls it ‘a word which 
acts as the key to a cipher or code’. In this rendering keywords do not so 
much have hidden but rather purposive meaning so as to enable an unlock-
ing or an opening up. Relatedly, Raymond Williams, in his book Keywords, 
discusses them in at least two senses: ‘the available and developing meanings 
of known words’ and ‘the explicit but as often implicit connections which 
people are making’ (1976: 13). Thus behind keywords are both well-known 
words (elucidated by Williams’s elaborations on the changing meaning of 
‘culture’ over longer periods of time, beyond the high/low distinction) or 
neologistic phrases such as recent concerns surrounding ‘blood minerals’ 
or the more defused ‘conflict minerals’ mined and built into mobile phones. 
The one has readily available yet developing meanings and the other are 
new phraseologies that position. For the query design I am proposing, the 
purposive meaning of keywords is captured by Williams most readily in his 
second type (the new language). The f irst type may apply as well, such as in 
the case of a new use or mobilization of a phrase, such as ‘new economic order’ 
or ‘land reform’. The question then becomes what is meant by it this time.
Concerning how deploying a keyword implies a side-taking politics, I 
refer to the work of Madeleine Akrich, Bruno Latour and others, who have 
discussed the idea that, far from having stable meanings (as Williams also 
related), keywords can be part of programmes or anti-programmes. Pro-
grammes refer to efforts made at putting forward and promoting a particular 
proposal, campaign or project. Conversely, anti-programmes oppose these 
efforts or projects through keywords. Following this reading, keywords can 
be thought of as furthering a programme or an anti-programme. There is, 
however, also a third type of keyword I would like to add, which refers to 
efforts made at being neutral. These are specif ic undertakings made not 
to join a programme or an anti-programme. News outlets such as the BBC, 
The New York Times and The Guardian often have dedicated style guides 
that advise their reporters to employ particular language and avoid other. 
For example, the BBC instructs reporters to use generic wording for the 
obstacle separating Israel and the Palestinian Territories:
The BBC uses the term ‘barrier’, ‘separation barrier’ or ‘West Bank barrier’ 
as an acceptable generic description to avoid the political connotations of 
‘security fence’ (preferred by the Israeli government) or ‘apartheid wall’ 
(preferred by the Palestinians) (BBC Academy, 2013).
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When formulating queries, it is pertinent to consider keywords as being 
parts of programmes, anti-programmes or efforts at neutrality, as this 
outlook allows the researcher to study trends, commitments and alignments 
between actors. To this end (and in contrast to discourse analysis), one does 
not wish to have equivalents or substitutes for the specif ic issue language 
being employed by the programmes, anti-programmes and the neutral 
programmes. For example, there is a difference between using the term 
‘blood minerals’ or the term ‘conflict minerals’, or using ‘blood diamonds’ 
or ‘conflict diamonds’, because the terms are employed (and repeated) 
by particular actors to issuefy, or to make into a social issue forced and 
often brutal mining practices that fuel war (blood diamonds or minerals) 
or to have industry recognize a sensitive issue and their corporate social 
responsibility (conflict diamonds or minerals). Therefore, they should not 
be treated as equivalent and grouped together. (Here it is useful to return 
to the point that one should use quotation marks around keywords when 
querying, because without quotation marks and thus specif ic key word 
queries, Google returns equivalents.) Indeed, one should treat ‘conflict 
minerals’ and ‘blood minerals’ as separate, because as parts of specif ic 
programmes they show distinctive commitments and they can help to 
draw alignments. If someone (often a journalist) begins using a third term, 
such as ‘conflict resources’, it likely constitutes a conscious effort at being 
neutral and not joining the programmes using the other terms. Those who 
then enter the fray and knowledgeably employ what have become keywords 
(in Williams’s second sense) can be said to be taking up a position and a 
side, or avoiding one.
To demonstrate the notion of programmes, anti-programmes and efforts 
at neutrality further, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, alluded to above, 
presents a compelling case for studying positioning as well as (temporary) 
alignment. There are two famous, recorded exchanges that took place at 
the White House in the US between then President George W. Bush and 
the leader of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas; and, secondly, 
between President Bush and the then Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon 
(see Figure 5.4). These exchanges, from the time when the barrier was 
under construction, show the kinds of positioning efforts that are made 
through the use of particular terms and thus the kind of specif ic terminol-
ogy that one should be aware of when formulating queries. They also 
reveal temporary alignments that put on display diplomacy, with the US 
President using the Palestinian and then the Israeli preferred terminology 
in the company of the respective leaders, but only partly, thereby never 
fully taking sides.
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The f irst exchange between President Bush and the Palestinian leader, 
Abbas, begins with a discussion in which Bush refers to the barrier as a 
‘security fence’, which is the off icial Israeli term. Abbas then makes an 
attempt to correct this keyword by replying with the term ‘separation wall’, 
thereby using a very different adjective – separation instead of security – to 
allude to the interpretation of the purpose of the barrier as separating 
peoples and not securing Israel. Abbas also uses a poignant noun, wall. 
The word ‘fence’, as in the Israeli ‘security fence’, connotes a lightweight, 
neighbourly fence. By calling it a ‘wall’, however, Abbas connotes the Berlin 
Wall. The third person in this exchange, the journalist, then steps in with 
the term ‘barrier wall’ in an effort not to take sides, though at the moment 
‘wall’ actually gives the Palestinian position some weight. Following this 
exchange, Bush, being diplomatic, realizes when talking to Abbas that the 
word ‘wall’ is being used, so he switches terms and concludes by using the 
term, albeit without an adjective that would validate Abbas and clash with 
the off icial Israeli term.
Four days later, the Israeli Prime Minister, Sharon, visits the White House 
to talk to President Bush, and he begins by using ‘security fence’, the off icial 
Israeli term. A journalist steps in and seems not to have read any newspaper 
Fig. 5.4:  The use of keywords by US, Palestinian and Israeli leaders, showing 
(temporary) terminological alignments and diplomacy. Exchanges 
between the leaders at the Rose Garden, US White House, 2003.
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style guides on the matter, because he f irst says ‘separation fence’ and 
then ‘wall’. The journalist, moreover, does not use ‘security fence’ and, 
therefore, the question he poses, whilst critical, also seems one-sided for it 
was preceded by quite some Palestinian language (separation, wall). Bush 
concludes by being diplomatic once again to both parties involved: he is 
tactful to Sharon by just using the word ‘fence’, but he does not use any 
adjective so as to be wary of Abbas, his recent visitor.
Wall and fence talk in the Middle East, of course, is very specif ic conflict 
terminology, but it does highlight a particular programme (‘security fence’), 
an anti-programme (‘separation wall’) as well as an effort at being neutral 
(‘barrier wall’). It also shows how temporary alignments, often only partial 
ones, are made with great tact, providing something of a performative 
def inition of diplomacy.
Issue spaces can be analysed with this sort of keyword specif icity in 
mind. A related example in this regard concerns the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council’s debates on the barrier between Israel and the Palestin-
ian Territories, which took place in 2003 and 2005 when it was f irst being 
constructed (Rogers & Ben-David 2010). The terms used by each country 
participating in the debates were lifted directly from the Security Council 
transcripts. The resultant issue maps, or network graphs, contain nodes 
that represent countries, clustered by the term(s) that each country uses 
when referring to the barrier (see Figures 5.5 and 5.6). The network clearly 
demonstrates the specif icity of the terminology put into play by the respec-
tive countries at the table as well as the terminological alignments that 
emerge. When countries utter the same term, groupings or blocs form, to 
speak in the language of international relations. For example, the largest 
surrounds ‘separation wall’, and mention of other terms (‘expansionist 
wall’, ‘racist wall’, ‘security wall’, ‘the barrier’, ‘the fence’, ‘the wall’, ‘the 
structure’, ‘separation barrier’, and so forth) make for smaller groupings 
or even isolation.
In 2003 a majority of countries came to terms around ‘separation wall’ or 
‘the wall’, both Palestinian side-taking terms, and there was a smattering 
of more extreme terms, e.g. ‘racist wall’. On the other side of the divide, the 
term ‘security fence’, the off icial Israeli nomenclature, is only spoken by 
Israel and Germany, showing terminological alignment between the two 
countries. Two years later, in 2005, the next UN Security Council debate on 
the barrier took place, and a similar pattern of terminology use emerged, 
albeit with two distinct differences. Neutral language had found its way 
into the debate, with ‘the barrier’ enjoying support. And this time, Israel 
was alone in using the term ‘security fence’, and is thereby isolated.
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Fig. 5.5:  Cluster graph showing co-occurring country uses of terminology for 
the structure between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, UN Security 
Council meeting, 2003. Visualization by ReseauLu.
Fig. 5.6:  Cluster graph showing co-occurring country uses of terminology for 
the structure between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, UN Security Council 
meeting, 2005. Visualization by ReseauLu.
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Countries are ‘linked’ or isolated by terminology. They settle into a debate 
by subscribing to programmes, anti-programmes and efforts at neutrality, 
together with light gestures towards the one side or another (e.g. by using 
just wall or fence). In some cases, there are evident language blocs. Each 
bloc shows alignment in that countries (over time) come to terms with other 
countries by means of using the same language. It is precisely this alignment 
of actors to programmes, anti-programmes or efforts at neutrality that one 
seeks to build into query design from the outset.
Unambiguous and Ambiguous Queries
If you peruse the search engine literature, there are mentions of navigational 
queries, transactional queries and substantive queries, among other types. 
Yet, on a meta-level, we can broadly speak of two kinds of queries: unam-
biguous and ambiguous. The original strength of Google and its PageRank 
algorithms lay in how they dealt with an ambiguous query that matches 
more than one potential result and thereby is in need of some form of 
‘disambiguation’. An example that was often used in the early search engine 
literature is for the query ‘Harvard’. This could refer to the university, a city 
(in Illinois, USA) or perhaps businesses near the university or in the city. 
By looking at which sites receive the most links from the most influential 
sites, PageRank would return Harvard University as the top result because 
it would presumably receive more links from reputable sources than a 
dry-cleaning business near the university, for example, called Harvard 
Cleaners. Therefore, without unambiguous matching of keyword to result, 
the outputs depend on a disambiguating mechanism (Google’s PageRank) 
that places Harvard University at the top. The ability to disambiguate is 
also thereby socio-epistemological or one that reveals social hierarchies. 
Harvard University is at the top because it has been placed there through 
establishment linking practices.
The social researcher may take advantage of how the search engine treats 
ambiguous queries. In the example, the ambiguous keyword, ‘rights’, is 
queried in a variety of local domain Googles (e.g. google.co.jp, google.co.uk 
etc.), in order to create hierarchies of concerns (rights types) per country, 
thereby employing Google as a socio-epistemological machine.
Contrariwise, an unambiguous query is one in which it is clear which 
results one is after. If we return to the cluster maps of countries using par-
ticular terms for the barrier between Israel and the Palestinian Territories, 
precise terms were used. By putting these terms in quotation marks and 
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querying them, Google would return an ordered list of sources that use 
those specif ic terms. If one forgoes the use of quotation marks in the query, 
Google, as mentioned, ‘helpfully’ provides the engine user with synonyms or 
equivalents of sorts. For example, if one does not wish to make a distinction 
between mobile phones (British English) and cell phones (North American 
English), you can simply search for [mobile phones] without quotation marks 
and Google will furnish results for both of them. If one places a term in quota-
tion marks, however, Google will provide results specif ic to that one term.
It is instructive to point out a particular form of annotation when writing 
about queries. When noting down the specific query used, the recommendation 
is to use square brackets as markers. Therefore, a query could be [“apartheid 
wall”], where the query has square brackets around it and the query is made 
as unambiguous as possible (for the engine) by using quotation marks. Often-
times, when a query is mentioned in the literature, it will have only quotation 
marks without the square brackets. A reader is often left wondering whether 
the query was in fact made with quotation marks or whether the quotation 
marks are used in the text merely to distinguish the term as a query. To solve 
this problem, the square brackets annotation is employed. If one’s query does 
not have quotation marks they are dropped but the square brackets remain.
Doing Search as Research
There are two preparatory steps to take prior to doing search as research. 
The first one is to install a research browser. This means installing a separate 
instance of your browser, such as Firefox, or creating a new profile in which 
you have cleaned the cookies and otherwise disentangled yourself from 
Google. The second preparatory step is to take a moment to set up one’s 
Google result settings. If saving results for further scrutiny later (including 
manual interpretation as in the Rights Types project discussed below), 
set the results from the default 10 to 20, 50 or 100. If one is interested in 
researching a societal concern, one should set geography in Google to the 
national level – that is, to the country level setting and not to the default city 
setting. If one is interested in universal results only, consider obfuscating 
one’s location. In all cases one is not logged into Google.4
4 It is also important to note that simply using private browsing tools, such as the incognito 
tool on Google Chrome, does not suff ice as a disentanglement strategy, as this only prevents 
the saving of one’s search history to one’s own machine. It is still being saved at headquarters 
so to speak. When in incognito mode, one is still served personalized results.
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I would like to present, f irst, an example of research conducted using 
unambiguous queries. The project in question concerns the Google image 
results of the query for two different terms for the same barrier: [“apartheid 
wall”], which is the off icial Palestinian term for the Israeli-Palestinian 
barrier mentioned previously, versus the Israeli term, [“security fence”] 
(see Figure 5.7). The results from these two queries present images of 
objects distinctive from one another. The image results for [“apartheid 
wall”] contain graff itied, wall-like structures, barbed wire, protests, and 
people being somehow excluded, whereas with [“security fence”] there is 
another narrative, one derived through lightweight, high-tech structures. 
Furthermore, there is a series of images of bomb attacks in Israel, presented 
as justif ication for the building of the wall. There are also information 
graphics, presenting such figures as the number of attempted bombings and 
the number of bombings that met their targets before and after the building 
of the wall. In the image results we are thus presented with the argumenta-
tion behind the building of the fence. The two narratives resulting from 
the two separate queries are evidently at odds, and these are the sorts of 
f indings one is able to tease out with a query design in the programme/
anti-programme vein. Adding neutral terminology to the query design 
would enrich the f indings by showing, for example, which side’s images 
(so to speak) have become the neutral ones.
When doing search as research as above, the question is often raised 
whether to remove Google artefacts and Google properties in the results, 
and under which circumstances. Wikipedia, towards the top of the results 
for substantive queries, is ranked highly in the results for the query [“apart-
heid wall”] yet has as the title of its article in the English-language version 
an effort at neutrality in ‘West Bank barrier’, however much it includes 
a discussion of the various names given to it. Whilst a Google artefact, 
Wikipedia’s efforts at neutrality should be highlighted as such rather than 
removed. A more diff icult case relates to a Google artefact in the results for 
an ambiguous query [rights] in google.com, discussed in more detail below. 
The R.I.G.H.T.S. organization is returned highly in the results, owing more 
to its name than to its signif icance in the rights issue space. Here again the 
result was retained, and footnoted (or highlighted) as a Google artefact, 
which in a sense answers questions regarding the extent or breadth of 
artefacts in the f indings. Here the research strategy is chosen to highlight 
rather than remove an artefact, so as to anticipate critique and make known 
media effects.
As the last example, I would like to present a project using an am-
biguous query that takes advantage of Google’s social sorting. In this 
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case we undertook a project about rights, conducted by a large group 
of researchers who spoke some 30 languages amongst them. Using this 
abundance of diverse language skill, we set about to determine which 
sorts of rights are held dear to particular cultures relative to others. In 
the local languages we formulated the query for [rights], and we ran 
the query in all the various local domain Googles per language spoken, 
interpreting the results from google.se as Swedish concerns, .f i for Finn-
ish, .ee for Estonian, .lv for Latvian, .co.uk for British, and so forth. With 
the results pages saved as HTML (for others to check), the researchers 
were instructed to work with an editorial process where they manually 
extracted the f irst 10 unique rights from the search results of each local 
domain Google.5 Information designers visualized the results by creating 
an icon for each right type and a colour scheme whereby unique rights 
and shared rights across the languages were differentiated. The resultant 
5 According to Google’s terms of service, one is not allowed to save results, or make derivative 
works from them. The research thus could be considered to break the terms of service, however 
much the spirit of those terms is to prevent commercial gain through redistribution rather than 
to thwart academic research. The results pages are saved as HTML, with a uniform naming 
convention so that one could return to them, and they, in recognition of the terms of service, 
were not shared to a data repository.
Fig. 5.7:  Contrasting images for [“Apartheid Wall”] and [“Security Fence”] in 
Google Images query results, July 2005.
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infographic graphically shows rights hierarchies per country as well as 
those rights that are unique to a country and those shared amongst two 
or more countries. One example of a unique right is the case of Finland, 
in which the ‘freedom to roam’ is high on the list (see Figure 5.8). Far 
from being a trivial issue, what this freedom means is that one can walk 
through someone’s backyard, whereas in other countries (e.g. the UK) it 
is not a right, and organizations are lobbying for the right to ramble and 
walk the ancient pathways. Another example is in Latvia, where pension 
rights for non-citizens are of particular importance.
Conclusions
Digital methods have been developed as a distinctive strategy for internet-
related research where the Web is considered an object of study for more 
than online or digital culture only. As a part of the computational turn in 
social research, digital methods were developed as a counterpart to virtual 
methods, or the importation of the social scientif ic instrumentarium into 
the Web, such as online surveys. Digital methods, as an alternative, strive 
to employ the methods of the medium, imagining the research affordances 
Fig. 5.8:  Rights types in particular countries, ranked from Google results of the 
query [rights] in the local languages and local domain name Googles 
(Google.se, Google.fi, Google.ee and Google.it), July 2009.
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of engines and platforms, and repurposing their methods and outputs for 
social (and medium) research.
The contribution here is foundational is the sense of outlining certain 
premises of digital methods but also the nitty-gritty of doing online analysis. 
In conclusion, I would like to return to the premises of doing digital methods 
with Google Web Search in particular as well as to the f iner points of query 
design, which underpins ‘search as research’ as an approach distinctive 
from other analytical traditions, such as discourse and content analysis.
First, in the digital method, search as research, Google is repurposed from 
its increasing use as a consumer information appliance, with personalized 
results that evermore seek to anticipate consumer information needs (such 
as with autosuggest as well as the Google Instant service). Rather, Google is 
relied upon as an epistemological machine, yielding source hierarchies and 
dominant voice studies (through its ranked results for a keyword query) as 
well as individual actor commitment (through its quantitative counts for 
a single or multiple site query). Transforming Google back into a research 
machine (as its founders asserted in the early papers on its algorithms) these 
days requires disentangling oneself from the engine through the installa-
tion of a clean research browser and logging out. Once in use, the research 
browser is not expected to remove all Google artefacts from the output (e.g. 
Google properties, SEO’d results, etc.), but in the event they become less 
obfuscated and an object of further scrutiny (medium research) together 
with the social research one is undertaking with repurposed online methods.
Query design is the practice behind search as research. One formulates 
queries whose results will allow for the study of trends, dominant voice, 
positioning, commitment, concern and alignment. The technique is sensi-
tive to keywords, which are understood as the connections people are 
currently making of a word or phrase, whether established or neologistic, 
leaning on Raymond Williams’s second definition of a keyword. Indeed, 
in the query design put forward above, the keywords used could be said 
to take sides, and are furthermore conceptualized as forming part of a 
programme or anti-programme, as developed by Madeleine Akrich and 
Bruno Latour. I have added a third means by which keywords are put into 
play. Journalists, and others conspicuously not taking sides, develop and 
employ terms as efforts at neutrality. [“West Bank barrier”] is one term 
preferred by BBC journalists (and the English-language Wikipedia) over 
[“security fence”] (Israeli) or [“apartheid wall”]. Querying a set of sources 
(e.g. country speeches at the UN Security Council debates) for each of the 
terms and noting use as well as common use (co-occurrence) would show 
positioning and alignment, respectively.
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Secondly, for digital methods practice, I would like to emphasize that for 
query design in the conceptual framework of programme/anti-programme/
efforts at neutrality, one retains the specif ic language (instead of grouping 
terms together), because the exact matches are likely to show alignment 
and non-alignment. Furthermore, language may also change over time. 
Therefore, if one conducts an overtime analysis, one can determine whether 
or not certain actors have, for example, left a certain programme and joined 
an anti-programme by changing the language and terms they use. Some 
countries may have become neutral, as was noted when contrasting term 
use in the 2003 versus the 2005 Security Council debates on the barrier. As 
another example, one could ask, has there been an alignment shift signified 
through actors leaving the ‘blood minerals’ programme and joining the 
‘conflict minerals’ programme?
Thirdly, whilst the discussion has focused mainly on unambiguous que-
ries, search as research also may take advantage of ambiguous ones. As has 
been noted, if we are interested in researching dominant voice, commitment 
and showing alignment and non-alignment, an unambiguous query is in 
order. Through an ambiguous query, such as [rights], one can tease out 
differences and distinct hierarchies of societal concerns across cultures. 
Here a cross-cultural approach is taken which for search as research with 
Google implies a comparison of the results of the same query (albeit in each 
of the native languages) of local domain Google results.
Finally, query design may be viewed as an alternative to forms of 
discourse and content analysis that construct labelled category bins and 
toss keywords (and associated items) into them. That is, in query design 
specif icity of the language matters for it differentiates as opposed to 
groups. More generally, it allows one to cast an eye onto the entire data set, 
making as a part of the analysis so-called long tail entities that previously 
would not have made the threshold. One studies it all without categorizing 
and without sampling, which (following Akrich and Latour) allows not 
only for the actors to speak for themselves and for the purposes of their 
programme, anti-programme or efforts at neutrality, but (following Lev 
Manovich’s Cultural Analytics) provides opportunities for new interpretive 
strategies. That there arises a new hermeneutics (one that combines close 
and distant reading) could also be seen as the work ahead for the analytical 
approach.6
6 At the lecture delivered at the digital methods Winter School, January 2015, Lev Manovich 
proposed work on a ‘new hermeneutics’ after the study and visualization of ‘all data’, substituting 
continuous change for periodization and continuous description for categorization.
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6. Case Study
Webs and Streams – Mapping Issue Networks Using 
Hyperlinks, Hashtags and (Potentially) Embedded Content
Natalia Sánchez-Querubín
Political scientist Hugo Heclo f irst employs the term ‘issue networks’ in 
The New American System, a book published by the conservative think 
tank, The American Enterprise Institute, in 1978. The term describes the 
emergence of groups of loosely associated NGOs, funders, academics, policy-
watchers and activists working to influence policy in Washington, D.C. 
during the 1970s. These webs of actors, with ‘issues as their interest, rather 
than interests def ining positions on issues’ (Heclo: 102), represented a new, 
and for Heclo concerning, mode of political organization. The activities of 
these ‘issue-people’, he argued, preceded the involvement of government 
officials, politicians and the general public, and thus they carried with them 
a threat to democratic legitimacy: ‘We tend to overlook the many whose 
webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of power. These webs 
are what I will call “issue networks”’ (ibid.). The opaqueness of the issue 
network became, indeed, substantial to Heclo’s argument. He admonishes, 
for example, about the diff iculties of knowing where a ‘network leaves off 
and its environment begins’ (ibid.) and who the dominant participants are 
in groups in constant state of f lux.
Four decades later the term f igures without the alarming connotations 
for the most part and instead describes issue politics experienced as part of 
liberal democracy. The details of this transition are beyond the scope of this 
paper and have already been developed at length by Marres (2006). Neverthe-
less, visiting the origins of the term helps remind one of the labour-intensive 
and strategic nature of issue making and the methodological challenges for 
rendering these groups legible through issue network mapping. Regarding 
the latter, academics and practitioners have found epistemological and 
methodological opportunities on the Web. The practice of mapping issue 
networks, when taken to online environments, involves repurposing public 
displays of connection between Web entities (most commonly by employing 
webs of hyperlinks) and reading them through a ‘politics of association’ 
(Rogers 2012). With that being said, the aim of this paper is to contribute 
to this tradition by proposing a framework for using not hyperlinks but 
streams of hashtags as a way of redoing issue network analysis for social 
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media. To do this, I characterize issue networks as research objects on the 
internet, suggest how the hashtag stream can be read through a ‘politics of 
association’, and follow by reviewing three leading techniques for working 
with it. I conclude with a suggestion for further study: repurposing traces 
left by social media content embedded on external platforms could offer 
yet another technique for mapping networks, located somewhere within 
webs and streams.
Three Premises on What Are (and Are Not) Issue Networks
The first premise states that issue networks are assemblages of actors whose 
ties emerge around issues and are maintained through issue labour. This 
is to say, that associations do not depend on shared positions, previous 
alliances or common goals, as in the community or policy-network, but 
rather they are brought together by public entanglement with an affair, 
and thus potentially, with each other. For example, when turning to the 
Web to study the issuefication of engineered foods, the remarks made by 
Marres and Rogers (2005) did not meet expectations about f inding debates 
or conversations taking place in digital public spheres. Instead, the activity 
encountered was described as ‘issues being done in networks by a variety 
of techniques’ that serve to present ‘the issue, what it was about, and what 
should be done about it’ (923). Tracing how actors do particular issues is what 
ultimately enabled the deployment of ties and the location of issue networks.
The second premise adds to the f irst: actors in issue networks are 
heterogeneous and their labour is time-sensitive and occasionally opposi-
tional. Hence, they differ from ‘the friendly networks of the social and the 
noncommittal networks of information sharing’, and instead ‘direct our 
attention to antagonistic configurations of actors from the governmental, 
non-governmental and for-profit sectors, and the contestation over issue 
framings that occurs in them’ (Marres 2006: 15). For instance, returning 
to the study referenced above, organizations from different sectors both 
opposing and supporting engineered foods participate in defining the risks 
associated with them, and if studied over time, the realignments of their 
commitments would potentially be observable. The third premise describes 
issue networks as hierarchical assemblages, in which some actors are better 
connected, enjoy more resources and have better platforms. Consequently, 
when looking at the promises made by networks one might f ind that they 
differ from the actual structuring of actor relationships. This makes the ren-
dering of the distribution of agency into an activity of political importance.
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The three premises not only delineate what issue networks are, they also 
inform their mapping practice, which is to locate and make them legible. 
For example, one may ask, who is in the business of ‘doing’ a particular issue 
and are they acting as a network? For instance, are they intertwined with 
clusters of actors and sub-issues, or particular events and slogans? And if so, 
do they change over time and is agency fairly distributed among them? For 
answering these questions the techniques put forward by contemporary issue 
network mappers involve taking advantage of the traceability, agreeability 
and networkness of online interactions, as well as studying issue labour 
by repurposing info-actions and data transfers. In fact, the internet can be 
regarded as a ‘particularly fruitful site of research for empirical inquiry into 
distributed processes of issue formation’, for example, by attending to ‘the 
minutes of a meeting of an expert committee, the plans of an activist group, 
fresh scientif ic data, that is, many of the snippets of information’ (Rogers & 
Marres 2004: 134). Translated into method, in order to map an issue network, 
one can begin with an issue, follow up by designing trials to repurpose info-
traces in order to locate actors and draw associations between them (thus 
fleshing out networks), and then proceed to unflatten and annotate them.
Lastly, the capture and analysis of these traces is enabled by digital meth-
ods, as with the ones reviewed in the coming section – which ‘strive to follow 
the evolving methods of the medium’ (Rogers 2013: 2-3) – in order to perform 
issue network mapping with hyperlinks and hashtags. Before moving forward, 
a critical outlook is recommended: when mapping one must move beyond 
aspirations of f inding objects ‘cleaned’ from the biases of digital devices and 
instead approach ‘noise’ assertively. Or better said, ‘the investigation of how 
digital settings influence the public articulation of contested affairs must 
then become part of our empirical inquiry’ (Marres 2015: 19). Thus a platform’s 
definition of what counts as relevant or connected cannot be assumed in-
nocently, but rather must be devised to both include and critique how digital 
objects participate and shape the public making of issues.
Webs of Hyperlinks
Reading link-making through a ‘politics of association’ becomes a way of 
thinking critically through the medium and operationalising the study 
of issue networks using co-link analysis, a well-documented technique 
for locating issue networks on the Web. Rogers introduces the ‘politics of 
association’ as an alternate way to think about and map the Web, separate 
from notions of Web spaces as pathways navigated by users who freely 
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authored info-stories. Instead, he conceives the selectivity, directionality 
and intentionality involved in hyperlinking as epistemologically valuable, 
indicative of discursive connection and an opportunity for the exploration 
not of hyper-textuality but of information politics. Consequently, ‘making 
a link to another site, not making a link, or removing a link may be viewed 
as acts of association, non-association or disassociation, respectively.’ In 
turn, hyperlinking becomes an activity through which one can learn about 
professional and public political culture, through so-called ‘hyperlink 
diplomacies’ (Rogers 2010: 117). For example, governmental pages tend to 
link amongst each other, while corporate pages rarely do so.
The modus operandi is to follow hyperlinks between Web entities (rather 
than, for example, digging scandalous secret data transfers on the back end) 
and use them in order to detect entangled actors in the business of doing 
an issue: ‘[it is these] sets of inter-linked pages which treated the affair in 
question, which we dubbed issue-networks’ (Marres & Rogers 2005: 1). To 
facilitate this form of research the now well-known network locator soft-
ware, Issue Crawler, was developed by Rogers and his colleagues at govcom.
org. Users can input URLs relevant for an issue area (compiled with expert 
lists or search engine queries) for the crawler to fetch shared hyperlinks, 
expanding the known network and visualizing it as a directed graph. Here 
directness is fundamental. Two-way links are read differently than those 
that go unreciprocated: for example, in the first instance entities may be said 
to acknowledge each other, while the latter can be indicative of aspirational 
relationships. Lastly, in order to unflatten and annotate the issue network, 
inbuilt functions in the crawler and qualitative analysis become available 
and help profile actors according to their linking behaviour. Edge degree 
locates clusters and isolated concerns, domain names aid grouping enti-
ties by sectors, actors are pinpointed on maps using IP-addresses, agenda 
points are used to label nodes and edges, and reading into the framing of 
hyperlinks helps characterize relationships. For example, one can inquire 
if a hyperlink is found ‘under a particular heading, or as part of an overview 
of the issue’ (ibid.). Formats matter and, if found in PowerPoint or PDF f iles 
instead of directly on the site, one’s issue might suffer.
The Hashtag Stream as Issue Space
If tracing hyperlinked webs deployed issue spaces demarcated by acts of 
associations, following hashtags now produces the stream as a new type 
of issue space. Broadly def ined, the stream is a live thematic flow of tweets 
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containing the same hashtag, created when users place the # symbol before 
a string of characters, and that one assumes enjoys topical aff inity. In order 
to capture a hashtag stream the researcher may use dedicated software 
and, in negotiations with API and query, fetch samples of tweets along 
with their metadata over a period of time. For example, in a number of case 
studies referenced below, the T-CAT tool developed by the Digital Methods 
Initiative was used to capture tweets posted between 23 November 2012 
and 30 May 2013 that included hashtags related to climate change, such as 
#climatechange and #globalwarming.
Fortunately for the issue researcher, hashtags are as amicable as the 
hyperlink. They have, for instance, already been theorized with relation to 
publics, topical formations, public time and liveness (Bruns & Burgess 2011; 
Highfield 2012; Marres & Weltevrede 2013). What this section then aims to 
demonstrate is that they too can be read through a ‘politics of association’ 
and streams repurposed for locating issue networks. Regarding the latter, a 
f irst point to be made is that similar to hyperlinked webs, hashtag streams 
are not easily described as conversation or debate spaces. Unless one traces 
threads of replies and mentions between users and reconstructs the ebb 
and flow of their interactions, what is most accurately found are actors in 
the business of formatting, framing and circulating issues in tweets. For 
instance, hashtags formalize policy ideas (Jeffares 2014), enable the circula-
tion of campaigns and contextualize statements by means of association 
to recognizable areas of concern and vocabularies. To illustrate this, when 
studying the #Ferguson stream, Bonilla and Rosa (2015) describe the upris-
ings as increasingly framed as part of larger global affairs through hashtags 
pairing: ‘#Egypt #Palestine #Ferguson #Turkey, U.S. made tear gas, sold on 
the almighty free market represses democracy’ (n.p). On a similar note, 
Moyer (2015) of The Washington Post, reflects on the political implications 
of having the hashtag #baltimoreriots, instead of more neutral terminology 
such as ‘protest’, trending as the events unfold. Moyer frames the situation 
with a reminder: ‘naming is a political act’ (n.p). In all, employing hashtags 
can be described as intentional and somewhat strategic association with 
topical streams and with those that participate in them. Consequently, 
the co-occurrence of hashtags can be read as discourse and capturing the 
vocabularies, actors and URLs attached to them can help deploy networks 
of entangled actors and objects.
A second point is that, as with hyperlinks, hashtag association also allows 
topical mobility between contested positions. While in the Web, users 
follow one-way links amongst Web entities and now the social media user 
journeys between streams using hashtags. This is used tactically, allowing 
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users to inf iltrate, for example, ideologically demarcated streams, and 
thus, it is not uncommon to f ind ‘politically motivated individuals an-
notating tweets with multiple hashtags whose primary audiences consist 
of ideologically-opposed users’ (Conover et al. 2011: 1). The intention is to 
expose them to different points of views, bounding together heterogeneous 
and oppositional actors. Lastly, because hashtags can be traced back to 
their users, a third point to be made is that they provide researchers with 
the means to profile and group actors based on their tagging labour, and 
thus deploy issue networks using (but not limited to) three techniques 
presented below.
Profiling Tweet Collections, Hashtags Publics and Issue Tweets
The f irst technique involves prof iling a tweet collection by repurposing 
the metrics and metadata associated with the captured tweets in order to 
answer research questions. For example, in the mentioned climate change 
collection, the following inquiry underlined the research: Within the larger 
issue of climate change, do sub-issues of adaption, mitigation, scepticism 
and conflict bring together different assemblages of actors and things? And 
do their interests overlap? An answer was produced by f iltering the stream 
using the keywords [adaption], [mitigation], [scepticism] and [conflict], 
resulting in four sub-collections along with their metrics, including most 
active and mentioned users, shared URLs, retweets and second-tier hashtags 
(see Figure 6.1). To uptake platform relevance, the organizational principle 
singled out entities that laboured most eff iciently and travelled better, 
and thus are assumed key to the issue network. Intensity and frequency 
in Twitter, it is argued, can replace features such as centrality when deal-
ing with actors as success is often ‘a function of the message frequency 
instead of the network structure’ (Toledo & Galdini 2013: 263). Ultimately, 
the exercise revealed that in each subarea of the climate change issue, 
different types of actors excelled. For adaptation NGOs working on food 
security dominated, while eco-friendly lifestyle blogs and academics ranked 
highly within mitigation, and hashtags related to scepticism were co-opted 
to raise climate awareness.
The second technique invites prof ile users involved with a hashtag (or 
hashtag publics) based on who they are and what it is that they like to tweet 
about. For instance, by looking at account prof iles one can group users 
based on f ield, domain or discipline, as was done by Marres and Gerlitz 
(2015) in their study of hashtags related to climate change events which 
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Fig. 6.1:  Profiling adaptation and its place in climate change debates with 
Twitter (I). Hashtag profile poster. Liliana Bounegru, Sabine Niederer 
(University of Amsterdam); Alex Williams, Noel Wimmer, San Yin Kan, 
Carlo De Gaetano, Stefania Guerra (DensityDesign). Twitter data ranges 
from 23 November 2012 to 30 May 2013 and was analysed during the 
digital methods Summer School, 24 June – 5 July 2013. http://climaps.
org/#!/narrative/reading-the-state-of-climate-change-from-digital-
media. Visualization is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
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included dividing account holders as human and non-human (more on this 
below) and characterized them as individuals, news sources or politics. 
In their study they found that event hashtags are mainly pushed by the 
politically inclined. One can also perform content analysis and focus with 
more detail on the tweets produced by selected users in the stream, and 
determine if ties emerge amongst them based on, for example, political af-
f iliation if coded as conservative or liberal. The technique can be extended 
by visiting the accounts, coding tweets that were produced before the 
stream was captured, and testing the consistency of their tweeting when 
the hashtags were not trending (for an example see Conover et al. 2011). 
Lastly, if keeping close to the logics of hyperlinking, the researcher can 
use an expert list of accounts run by NGOs, activists and politicians as 
a starting point and test if they follow, retweet or reply to each other, 
extend the network, and see if their publics overlap. All in all, the outcomes 
use different levels of detail to describe who is in the business of doing a 
particular issue on Twitter and what ties they enjoy beyond their thematic 
entanglement.
The last technique deploys ties between actors based on tweeting styles. 
A f irst operationalization involves mapping networks made of co-occurring 
hashtags (i.e. topical clusters), made of associated areas of concern and 
emerging actor-object formations. With this in mind, Niederer and Waterloo 
visualize climate-related hashtags as nodes and trace edges between them 
when they are used together, with proximity describing the likelihood of 
their co-occurrence (see Figure 6.2). The criterion here is no longer platform 
relevance, as in the previous example, but instead co-occurrence. Thus most 
active actors make way for the most active issues (Marres & Gerlitz 2015). In 
their graph, the associations of drought and conflict describe the increasing 
public uptake of this overlap.
A second example, this time around the hashtag #openaccess, takes the 
process a step further by profiling not only hashtags occurring together but 
also deploying users that tend to combine hashtags in similar ways. The 
results of this particular mapping indicate how big publishers have taken 
over an issue space once dominated by activists by means of combining open 
access with publicizing hashtags (Gray et al. 2016). A final operationalization 
is reminiscent of the unflattening of hyperlink networks: ties among actors 
using hashtags can be described based also on directionality and rhythm. 
For example, ‘users who rarely post tweets but have many followers tend 
to be information seekers, while users who often post URLs in their tweets 
are most likely information providers’ (Pennacchiotti & Popescu 2011: 282).
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Tracing Embedded Issue Networks
Journalists and other actors involved in issue labour online currently em-
ploy embedded tweets as a mode of digital referencing (somewhat similar 
to in-text hyperlinking) that enables statements to be included in the body 
of articles and blog posts while retaining a link that can be followed back 
to their authors and the platforms in which they were originally produced. 
Embedding, if one takes as example Twitter’s media guidelines, is ‘one way 
to add additional context […] often employed by journalists and publications 
to enhance their stories’ (Twitter 2015). This type of usage is encountered 
when embedded tweets are used as eye witness testimonies to breaking 
news, narratives are built around tweets produced by politicians and 
celebrities about matters of public concern, and when hashtags created by 
activists are detected by the mainstream media, tweets containing them 
are fetched in order to populate articles and produced curated lists. An 
inventory published by The Times containing the most powerful tweets 
Fig. 6.2:  Co-hashtag map in climate Twitter collection. Sabine Niederer, Sophie 
Waterloo (University of Amsterdam), Gabriele Colombo (Density Design). 
http://climaps.org/#!/map/profiling-adaptation-and-its-place-in-climate-
change-debates-with-twitter-ii. Twitter data ranges from 18 September 
2012 to 23 November 2013 and was analysed during the Digital Methods 
Initiative Fall Data Sprint, 21-25 October 2013. Visualization is licensed under 
a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
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with the hashtag #yesallwomen, a grassroots feminist ‘meme event’ (Thrift 
2014) used to raise awareness about everyday experiences of misogyny, and 
a list of recommended accounts run by journalists, activists, politicians 
and researchers engaged in tweeting about climate change published by 
The Guardian, serve as examples. This paper’s concluding suggestion is 
that embedding can also be, as was done with hyperlinks and hashtags, 
repurposed for studying issue labour and locating issue networks, by means 
of tracing the displacement of social media content across platforms. Since 
it is beyond the scope of this last section to produce a technique or an 
accompanying case study, what will instead be provided are avenues for 
thinking about how this research might be done and interpreted elsewhere. 
What kinds of issue networks are embedded issue networks? And how can 
embedding be rendered epistemologically valuable for the issue researcher 
and be read through a ‘politics of associations’?
From the user’s perspective, embedding tweets is quite simple, pressing 
a button included on the tweet makes the code available to be copied and 
pasted on a website’s template, a request is sent, and the tweet can be seen 
in a non-native space, so to speak. Consequently, embedded issue networks 
can be thought of as being composed of Web entities such as websites, 
blogs and news media platforms and the tweets that become embedded in 
them. These ‘data pours’ (Liu 2004) occurring, especially through ‘social 
buttons’, have been studied at length both theoretically and empirically by 
Helmond (2015). The phenomenon, which she describes as platformisation, 
describes the media ecologies that emerge as a result of the modular and 
programmable qualities of Web platforms, to which embedded content 
and the code that animates them are part of. What is proposed here is that 
these ‘data pours’ can be studied for the benefit of issue research by applying 
techniques that would enable one to follow the links created by those that 
embed and those that become embedded, and go on to annotate these 
connections with respect to their substance, directionality and selectivity. 
For example, what assemblages of actors emerge as entangled with a given 
topic if the accounts attached to the embedded tweets are profiled? Could 
comparing lists of embedded tweets from various news sources lead to 
f inding biases and omissions? Do account holders endorse their inclusion 
on a list and, if not, how can they resist, for example, by deleting their 
statement on the platform? And if settings and plug-ins could be tweaked, 
could politics be read into them?
With respect to the latter, work that looks critically at the practice of 
embedding both in terms of the framing and settings chosen by journalists 
might help the issue researcher design mapping trials. For example, in their 
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study about how The Lede uses embedded citizen journalist videos, Wall 
and El Zahed (2014) argue that a transformation takes place when videos 
are relocated from social media. In their analysis they describe not only 
the qualities of these user-generated videos in terms of their length and 
aesthetic qualities, but they also take note of how the video was framed 
by the media platform. They discover that, even though one can in fact 
determine when a video will start and end playing when embedding it, the 
news organization was inclined to show them in their entirety. However, in 
the tags and text used to label and introduce the video the term ‘clip’ was 
mostly used, while professional videos were associated instead with the 
word ‘report’. A similar question might be asked of how tweets are embed-
ded and framed by journalists. A second author who touches on the topic 
is Chouliaraki (2010). In her description of the intersections between digital 
technologist and citizen journalism, she highlights issues that inherently 
arise when journalists embed not single tweets but streams of tweets in 
their platforms. These streams are usually composed of tweets sharing a 
hashtag and are updated as new tweets are produced. ‘The key implication 
of this multi-mediated textually’ – she argues – ‘is that it dislocates ordinary 
voice from a coherent news narrative of “dramatic action”, condenses it in 
“sound-bite” form and places it in a temporally cohesive but narratively 
incoherent sequence’ (2010: 12). Then when the embedding is automatic, the 
critique can then be done at the level of the platform and one can attend 
in more detail to how processes of calculation and organization of social 
media platforms participate in the creation of topical assemblages around 
issues, in and beyond Twitter.
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Section 2
Data Practices in Digital Data Analysis

7. Digital Methods
From Challenges to Bildung
Bernhard Rieder & Theo Röhle
In a previous text (Rieder & Röhle 2012) we argued that the existing tradi-
tions of the humanities and social sciences, including their particulari-
ties, interests and methods, are currently encountering an object – the 
computer – that is characterized by its own logics, logistics, styles of 
reasoning (Hacking 1992), habits, (best) practices, modes of valorisation, 
actor-networks and institutions. The computer may well be a contained 
technical object, but its accumulated history and therefore its substance 
is full of heterogeneous elements that constitute a type of a priori that 
cannot be easily ignored. Now that various attempts are being made to 
build ‘digital’ versions or extensions of long-established disciplines, this 
encounter marks a moment of destabilization and deterritorialization, 
a moment that implies signif icant contingency and different possible 
outcomes. Although it remains doubtful that even Kuhn’s ‘normal science’ 
(1962) was ever truly settled, this is a moment that provokes and requires 
far-reaching debate and inquiry into the practice, meaning and purpose 
of our academic disciplines.
The encounter between the humanities and computing plays out in 
different ways in different arenas, but needs to be addressed in principle 
as well as in relation to particular settings. The fact that after 50 years 
of experimentation many of the fundamental questions remain deeply 
controversial can be seen as an indicator for how close these questions come 
to core debates about the means and purposes of scholarly work. While 
terms like ‘digital humanities’, ‘Cultural Analytics’, ‘digital methods’ or ‘web 
science’ can play the role of buzzwords, their proliferation can be seen as 
indicator for a ‘computational turn’ (Berry 2011a) that runs deeper than a 
simple rise of quantitative or ‘scientif ic’ modes of analysis. Large and often 
unusual data sets, advanced visualization techniques and fuzzy processing 
have led some of those who have held numbers, calculations and comput-
ers at a safe distance for a long time to warm up to new computational 
possibilities. Our core question was therefore: If these new methods are 
more than just another set of tools in our arsenal, how do we deal with the 
fundamental transformations that challenge established epistemological 
practices and paradigms?
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The starting point for our previous investigation was the concept of 
‘method’. Defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘pursuit of know-
ledge, mode of investigation’, we are also reminded that this pursuit is both 
systematic and orderly. Additionally, method is directed and purposeful: 
specif ic decisions are tied to specif ic goals. Like a blueprint or recipe, 
research methods guide behaviour and even if some of our approaches are 
only moderately explicit, their commonality allows us to share experience 
and establish reference points that provide orientation – even when there 
is little agreement on utility and validity.
Although we are wary of Tom Scheinfeldt’s assessment of ours as a ‘post-
theoretical age’ (Cohen 2010), his diagnosis of a ‘methodological moment’ 
is certainly appropriate. Coming from German academic tradition, we 
developed our perspective against a backdrop of decades of Methodenstreit 
(‘methods dispute’), beginning with Weber’s endorsement of sociology as 
an ‘understanding’ (verstehend) rather than an ‘explaining’ (erklärend) 
discipline, which later morphed into the famous Positivismusstreit (‘positiv-
ism dispute’) between Adorno and Popper. Part of this was the sometimes 
profoundly paralysing and sterile opposition between quantitative and 
qualitative research methods in empirical social science. While not truly 
analogue to Snow’s ‘two cultures’ problem (1959), there are certainly paral-
lels here that point towards different ways of knowing and thinking – styles 
of reasoning – caught up in larger normative horizons, as seen in the alterca-
tions between ‘critical’ and ‘administrative’ types of research, epitomized 
by the clash between Adorno and Lazarsfeld.
Our refusal to cede to simple oppositions is built on an anti-essentialist 
approach to many of the concepts that appear in these debates. Computa-
tion, quantification, algorithm, visualization, graph, data analysis, statistics, 
software, and so forth, are terms that point to concepts – but also to objects, 
practices and skill sets – that we consider to have considerable internal 
heterogeneity and variation. That does not mean that they are not caught 
up in particular configurations and constellations that are productive in 
very specif ic ways in terms of knowledge and power; but it means that 
the spaces of design and ‘appropriation’ (Akrich 1998) of computational 
methods afford considerable leeway and do not translate into or perform 
singular logics. Even if ‘the digital’ has become a dominant passage point, 
it works like a meat grinder: the shredded material does not come out as a 
single thread, but as many.1 To connect back to the Methodenstreit: compu-
1 For a detailed investigation into different types of digital processing, see Winkler (2015) 
(where the meat grinder is actually used metaphorically on the cover).
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tational methods can be both deductive and inductive (see e.g. Tukey’s (1962) 
concept of exploratory data analysis), both quantitative and qualitative in 
outlook, both critical and administrative. But these spaces of movement, 
of epistemic freedom have to be constructed and defended, sometimes by 
forging alliances, sometimes by demarcation; certainly through a better 
understanding of what computers can actually contribute to knowledge 
production and of the ways they produce this epistemic ‘surplus’.
If digital technology is set to change the way scholars work with their 
material, how they ‘see’ it and interact with it, a pressing question is how 
these methods affect the way we generate, present and legitimize knowl-
edge in the humanities and social sciences. In what way are the technical 
properties of these tools constitutive of the knowledge generated? What 
are the technical and intellectual skills we need to master? What does 
it mean to be a scholar in a digital age? To a large extent, the answers to 
these questions depend on how well we are able to critically assess the 
methodological transformations we are currently witnessing.
As a growing range of investigations into the status of (big) data (e.g. 
Gitelman 2013; Elmer, Langlois & Redden 2015; Amoore & Piotukh 2015), as 
well as ongoing discussions in the digital humanities (Gold 2012; Arthur & 
Bode 2014; Svensson & Goldberg 2015) suggest, there is something deeply 
complicated about this methodological moment. We argue that, if some of 
the criticism being phrased towards the wider f ield of digital humanities 
and social sciences is indeed justif ied, this should not be seen as discourage-
ment, but as a challenge, in the most engaging sense of the term.
In this chapter, we want to shortly summarize what we consider to 
be f ive central challenges before interrogating Berry’s concept of ‘digital 
Bildung’ (Berry 2011a) as a means of facing these challenges. Our goal in this 
discussion is, maybe paradoxically, to move the spotlight from ‘the digital’ 
and the associated über-skill, programming, to the plethora of concepts 
and knowledges mobilized in digital tools. To this end, we discuss three 
examples that allow us to both concretise and complicate the debate.
Five Challenges
In our previous paper (Rieder & Röhle 2012), we presented a non-exhaustive 
list of broad issue clusters that we believe have to be addressed if we want 
to productively integrate the new methods without surrendering control 
over the conceptual infrastructure of our work. Our question was not how to 
conduct ‘good’ digital research in the narrow sense: we were not concerned 
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with specif ic methodological pitfalls or ‘errors’ in data collection, or with 
the choices and applications of methodological tools, but with the larger 
ramif ications of digital research inside the f ield of the humanities and 
social sciences. In that sense, we wanted to tackle the challenges faced by 
even the ‘best’ work in the f ield.
A f irst challenge, which we called ‘The Lure of Objectivity’, raised the 
question why computational tools have sparked such a tremendous amount of 
interest when it comes to studying social or cultural matters. One explanation 
might be the notion that the computer is able to reach beyond human particu-
larities and into the realm of objectivity. We discussed the fascination that 
the ideal of detached, mechanical reasoning was able to induce historically 
and asked whether this fascination might keep us from laying bare the many 
explicit and implicit decisions that went into our tools and instruments. Ques-
tions of bias and subjectivity, which the computer was thought to do away 
with, enter anew on a less tangible plane – through the choices concerning 
modes of formalization and algorithmic procedures, as well as through the 
various ways data processing can mask partiality (see Barocas & Selbst 2015). 
This becomes an especially pressing problem when studying commercial 
social media platforms. Considering the ‘politics of circulation’ (Beer 2013) 
that these platforms are embedded in and the resulting elaborate ecosystems 
of API regulations (Bucher 2013; Puschmann & Burgess 2014; Rieder et al. 
2015), issues of preselection constitute a major methodological dilemma. 
The challenge is thus to accept the fact that, on an epistemological level, 
computational methods often create complications rather than resolve them.
Under the heading ‘The Power of Visual Evidence’, we discussed the 
role of visual output, such as depictions of network topologies, timelines 
or enriched cartographies. Since these visualizations possess spectacular 
aesthetic – and thus rhetorical – qualities, we asked how the argumentative 
power of images could (or should) be criticized. We stressed the tradition 
of critical inquiry into the use of images that the humanities have fostered 
over the years, but remarked that the situation now has indeed changed, 
since digital humanists themselves produce and rely on images as evidence 
and heuristic devices. The challenge is thus to maintain a productive self-
reflexive inquiry into our own visual practices, i.e. to acknowledge how 
analysis and cognition are both partial and interwoven with power relations 
– both currently and historically (Halpern 2015) – without abandoning the 
promise of gaining insights via visual forms (Drucker 2014: 130-137).
‘Black-boxing’ referred to our ability to understand the method, to see how 
it works, which assumptions it is built on, to reproduce and criticize it. Despite 
the fact that writing software forces us to make procedures explicit by laying 
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them out in computer code, ‘readability’ is by no means guaranteed. However, 
an open process of scrutiny is one of the pillars of scholarship and, in the 
end, of scholarship’s claim to social legitimacy. We argued that this problem 
presents itself on at least three different levels: a) concerning the practical 
possibility to access the most obvious layer of functional specification, i.e. 
a tool’s source code; b) concerning the ability to understand the code and, 
even more importantly, the ability to grasp its epistemological ramif ica-
tions, and c) concerning methods that become opaque despite being fully 
explicit, such as techniques issued from the field of machine learning, where 
the connections made between inputs and outputs can no longer be easily 
retraced by human observers. This point really concerns the question how 
the epistemological surplus that is provided by computation can be specified, 
controlled and relayed to others without falling victim to the sometimes 
deceptive simplicity of graphical user interfaces and shiny visualizations.
We identif ied ‘Institutional Perturbations’ as a fourth set of challenges. 
We saw a chance that, given the growing need for computational expertise, 
the humanities may increasingly hire researchers from computer-adept 
disciplines. Also, computational methods may have advantages in set-
tings where even humanistic research is increasingly f inanced on a project 
basis – which implies very particular pragmatics based on structured time 
frames, planned expectations and identif iable ‘deliverables’. The challenge, 
we argued, is to develop a sensibility for such wider repercussions of meth-
odological innovation. In many areas there is an argument to be made for 
the confident defense of methods that are based on principles other than 
mechanized ‘persistent plodding’ (Wang 1963: 93).
The f ifth issue we highlighted was ‘The Quest for Universalism’. Here, we 
argued that the establishing of pervasive concepts and principles becomes 
increasingly common whenever computers come into play. When reality is 
perceived to adhere to a specif iable system of rules, the computer appears 
to be the quintessential tool to represent this system and to calculate its 
dynamics. The epistemological commitments and reductive nature of the 
underlying models are often ‘forgotten’ when it comes to the explanations 
derived from them. Instead, the scope of the explanations is extended 
indefinitely, reminiscent of the universalist aspirations running through 
historical discourses on computation. Concepts from network science are a 
case in point. The challenge is, thus, to arrive at a more adequate demarca-
tion of the explanatory reach of formal models, e.g. by combining different 
methodological configurations, both digital and non-digital.
In terms of a conclusion, we continue to advocate involvement with the 
new methods. By involvement, we mean both the actual application of these 
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methods and a critical reflection of such uses. We thus argue for a transfer 
of the concept of ‘critical technical practice’, proposed by Agre (1997a), to 
the scholarly domain: a practice that oscillates between concrete technical 
work and methodological ref lexivity. Current approaches that draw on 
Agre’s concept hold a lot of promise in this regard. As Matt Ratto, Sara Ann 
Wylie and Krik Jalbert (2014) argue, actual engagement with materiality – 
what they call ‘critical making’ – can be a productive complement to the 
traditional linguistic forms of knowledge production, also in f ields such as 
STS and media studies. Rather than developing methods with a clear goal 
in mind, the design process can be a means to advance a more inquisitive 
attitude towards our digital environments – ‘bringing unconscious aspects 
of experience to conscious awareness, thereby making them available for 
conscious choice’, as Sengers et al. state in their outline of ‘reflective design’ 
(2005: 50).
In what follows, we want to focus specif ically on the challenge of black 
boxing and, more generally, on the role of digital tools in emergent research 
constellations. All of these challenges, however, connect more or less di-
rectly to the question what we need to know in order to make this critical, 
reflective, inquisitive and nuanced practice a reality. We thus turn to the 
matter of knowledge and skill, which has been discussed with particular 
vigor in the digital humanities, often with a focus on programming as the 
watershed expertise that separates ‘who’s in and who’s out’ (Ramsay 2011). 
We consider this emphasis to encode a somewhat reductive understanding 
of computing and suggest a deeper appreciation of both conceptual and 
technical knowledge and practice in the face of an ever increasing arsenal 
of digital methods.
From Challenges to Bildung
In this section, we approach the question of the challenges for and to 
(digital) humanities and social sciences through the lens of Berry’s no-
tion of ‘digital Bildung’, ‘a liberal arts that is “for all humans”’ (2011b: 20), 
although we will focus on digital humanists and social scientists rather than 
a general public.2 Our question is what we need to know to become digital 
2 Berry’s description of digital Bildung as ‘a rolling process of ref lexive thinking and col-
laborative rethinking’ (2011b: 22) seems to share many characteristics with design traditions 
that invoke Donald Schön’s notion of ‘ref lection-in-action’ (1983), as Agre (1997b: 10) also does.
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scholars able to ‘examine, theorise, criticise and imagine’ (ibid.: 169) research 
methodology – the systematic and reasoned pursuit of knowledge – that is 
caught up in computation. Ultimately, we believe that this debate remains 
vague and superficial without a concrete set of references. We will therefore 
discuss three examples, which we hope will contribute to a more in-depth 
discussion of how the challenges we identif ied can be related to a broader 
notion of digital Bildung.
A key question in this discussion is whether it is possible (or desirable) to 
train ‘computationally enlightened’ humanists who will themselves actually 
write the computational methods they will apply in their analyses. We hold 
that this notion is tempting, but ultimately unrealistic and even potentially 
problematic: while anybody can learn to write a bit of code in a couple 
of days, the practice of programming or software development requires 
far-reaching acculturation and many, many hours of practice. If we consider 
disposable time as a limited resource, the priority given to programming 
may actually come to the detriment of other technical and conceptual skills 
that facilitate the critical understanding of computational procedures. The 
singular focus on code may detract from what is actually coded.
Because for any experienced programmer, code may well be the medium 
of expression but, just like a writer attempts to say something through 
language, the meaning expressed through programming is functionality; 
and while the two cannot be fully separated, programmers and computer 
scientists generally reason on a conceptual level that is certainly circum-
scribed by the requirements of mechanical computation – what one of 
us has called the ‘shadow of computation’ (Rieder 2012) – but express-
ible in various forms, from systematized vocabulary and conversation 
to f lowcharts and, more often than not, mathematical notation. While 
implementation is certainly not irrelevant, the methodological core, the 
very def inition of what computation adds resides in what the program 
does. This functional level can be of daunting complexity, even if many 
sophisticated techniques can be boiled down to a small number of cen-
tral ideas. Subsuming these ideas under the broad notion of ‘the digital’ 
locks the analysis to a surface view that risks hiding the methodological 
substance or rationale of the work performed by methods rendered in 
software. Facing the challenges outlined above depends, at least in part, 
on whether we are able to get to the conceptual core of the computa-
tional techniques we are using. Only then can we assess the potentials, 
limitations and styles of reasoning held by the tools we integrate into our 
research conf igurations.
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To flesh out this argument in more depth, we turn to three examples 
that allow for a nuanced approach and highlight the diff iculty of setting 
overarching principles. In all of these examples, we ask what ‘understand-
ing’ a computational technique would mean.
Statistics
Since the empirical social sciences have been using digital tools as integral 
part of their work for decades, applied statistics is a good place to start. One 
of the most widely used software packages in the Social Sciences is SPSS 
(formerly Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) and the signif icant 
reliance by researchers on this program begs the questions to what extent 
these scholars are capable of ‘understanding’ – or even seek to under-
stand – the considerable methodological and epistemological choices and 
commitments made by the various analytical techniques provided. If we 
consider, for example, regression analysis, a technique that is extremely 
productive (literally, no endorsement implied) in academic research as 
well as in business and government, as a means to produce an epistemic 
surplus, how would we go about understanding more precisely what the 
technique and its intellectual contribution consists of?
The source code of SPSS is not available, but the way the software 
calculates its analytical measures is well documented in mathematical 
notation and relies on established and much discussed constructs such as 
the Pearson coeff icient for correlation (r) or established regression tech-
niques. Looking at an open-source alternative such as PSPP (no acronymic 
expansion), what would we actually gain from reading the source code 
instead of simply consulting the documentation and checking the research 
papers it refers to?
While a critique of the standardization and streamlining of research 
through widely available software packages is important and raises many 
concerns,3 it does not tell us how epistemological agency can be wrestled 
back from tools that make exceedingly complex methodological procedures 
available through simple graphical interfaces. A critique of digital tools is 
incomplete without a critique of their users and the wider settings they are 
embedded in. As banal as it may sound, what is required to understand 
and use SPSS reflectively – or any statistics package for that matter – is 
a robust understanding of statistics and probability theory, not a crash 
3 See Uprichard et al. 2008 for an in-depth discussion of the signif icance of SPSS for sociology.
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course in Java. What is black boxed in such a tool is not merely a set of 
calculative procedures, which are, in the end, sufficiently well documented, 
but statistics as a f ield that has not only its own epistemological substance, 
but many internal debates, contradictions and divergences. The ‘thirteen 
ways to look at the correlation coeff icient’ identif ied by Rodgers and 
Nicewander (1988) and the debates around null hypothesis testing, which 
Gigerenzer, Krauss and Vitouch (2004) refer to as the ‘null ritual’, are just 
two of many examples for the quite fundamental disagreements in the 
practice of applied statistics. While software can be designed in a way that 
highlights these divergences, it is too much to ask of a program to carry 
the weight of providing an education in the f ield it is mechanizing. This 
raises and complicates the question of the educational embedding of digital 
tools. If students and researchers are trained in using these tools without 
considerable attention being paid to the conceptual spaces they mobilize, 
the outcomes can be highly problematic. Digital Bildung thus requires 
attentiveness not just to the software form, but to the actual concepts 
and methods expressed and made operational through computational 
procedures.
Network Analysis
A very similar argument can be made for the popular f ield of network 
visualization. It is again important to notice that the point and line form 
comes with its own epistemic commitments and implications, and graph 
analysis and visualization tools like Gephi (Bastian et al. 2009) further 
structure the research process. But where do we go from there? If we 
consider that graph theory still provides powerful and interesting means 
to analyse a data set, what would critical analytical practice look like? For 
example, how can we consider the layout algorithms that transform n-
dimensional adjacency matrices4 into two-dimensional network diagrams? 
These artefacts interpose themselves as mediators because each algorithm 
reveals the graph differently, highlighting specif ic aspects of its structure, 
thus producing a specif ic interpretation.
There are different families of algorithms – most approaches are based 
on force simulations, but other strategies such as simulated annealing exist 
as well – but even the same algorithm, fed with different parameters, can 
4 An adjacency matrix is a way of representing a graph as a special kind of table (a square 
matrix) that specif ies which nodes are connected to each other.
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produce quite different outcomes. If we apply the ForceAtlas2 algorithm 
(Jacomy et al. 2014) to a graph f ile, should we go to Gephi’s source repository 
on Github and search for the ForceAtlas2.java f ile and try to make sense 
of it? What would we f ind there? A few hundred lines of Java code that 
implement a highly iterative simulation of attracting and repulsing forces 
that makes ample use of the notion of ‘swinging’ (in a very literal sense) 
to f ind an ‘optimal’ position for nodes on the canvas without getting stuck 
in local optima.5 It is very naive to believe that anybody who has not had 
considerable training in both programming and simulation modelling can 
say anything meaningful about how ForceAtlas2 is implementing the force-
direction concept differently from its historical and conceptual ancestor, 
the work of Fruchterman and Reingold; and much less how these differences 
affect spatialisation in concrete circumstances. How will properties of 
nodes and topological structure affect positions on the map? Which aspects 
of the latent structures in the data does the diagram reveal?
Even with the required training, testing and running the algorithm 
on different data sets with different parameters is a necessity to begin to 
understand how outcomes relate to instances of computation because no 
human brain can anticipate the result space of even simple functions iter-
ated thousands of times. The problem, again, comes from the fact that tools 
such as Gephi have made network analysis accessible to broad audiences 
that happily produce network diagrams without having acquired robust 
understanding of the concepts and techniques the software mobilizes. This 
more often than not leads to a lack of awareness of the layers of mediation 
network analysis implies and thus to limited or essentialist readings of the 
produced outputs that miss its artif icial, analytical character. A network 
visualization is closer to a correlation coeff icient than to a geographical 
map and needs to be treated accordingly.
We would again argue that the critical mastery of the methodological 
substance introduced by the software would be best served by studying 
material on graph theory, graph spatialisation and, in particular, literature 
on concrete analytical applications. Looking into the history and state of 
the art of sociometrics and network science would be helpful to acquire 
‘graph literacy’. To be even more concrete, an in-depth study of Linton 
Freeman’s The Development of Social Network Analysis (2004) would be 
a good start. Inevitably, spending considerable amounts of time trying 
5 Consider an analogue problem: a simple algorithm for hill climbing consisting of ‘always 
go up’ will end up on top of a hill (a local optimum), but not necessarily on the highest one (the 
global optimum). Swinging counteracts a similar problem of getting ‘stuck’ in a local optimum.
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out different algorithms on different data sets to build understanding 
of the specif ic ways they interpret a graph is crucial. Reflective practice 
requires much more than a critical attitude, it requires deeper involvement 
with the associated knowledge spaces to make sense of possibilities and 
limitations.
Thousands of Images
These two examples are certainly not fully representative of the tools used 
in the f ield, but the argument can be extended beyond the more complex 
software packages just discussed. The work that Lev Manovich (2012) has 
done under the label ‘Cultural Analytics’ can serve as an example: to order 
black and white manga images on a scatter plot, Manovich uses ‘entropy 
calculated over greyscale values of all pixels in a page’ for the y-axis, and 
after pointing to the history of the entropy concept explains what this 
measure expresses in terms of the images in question: ‘If an image consists 
of a few monochrome areas, its entropy will be low. In contrast, if an image 
has lots of texture and details and its colours […] vary signif icantly from 
place to place, its entropy will be high.’ (Manovich 2012: 266).
Independently of what we think about what Manovich is doing with 
these images in intellectual terms (Art history? Image science?), it is his 
considerable training and experience in working with digital images that 
allows him to confidently relate a mathematical measure to actual visual 
properties of the images in question. We are not qualif ied to say whether the 
results Manovich gets from this operation are truly useful for his analyti-
cal goals, but this is not the question here. What matters is that the skill 
applied in this example is the capacity to reason on images in formal or 
mathematical terms, to connect these terms to visual properties of the 
image as it is perceived by humans, and to derive an epistemic surplus from 
the whole operation. What would we gain from looking at the source code 
of Manovich’s script? Perhaps we would f ind an error. Perhaps we could 
come up with a more eff icient implementation. But although Manovich 
does not provide the used measure in mathematical notation (why not?), 
his reference to Claude Shannon is a good reason to believe that the entropy 
measure in question is something like -sum(p * log2(p)), where p contains 
the image’s histogram in 256 bins if the image is encoded in 8-bit.
Now, just like Anscombe’s famous four data sets (1973) that are quite dif-
ferent in structure but have the same statistical properties, a very synthetic 
measure like entropy, which expresses something about a complex object 
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such as an image in a single number, can label a very large number of very 
different images with the same value. Thus, Manovich not only had to 
commit to the entropy measure as such, but also to the entropy measure as 
it reacts to the data set in question. From what we understand, a greyscale 
gradient would have a very high entropy value since the histogram does 
not contain any information on how the colours are spatially distributed; 
it’s a simple occurrence count for every colour. Would a certain colouring 
style in a manga thus ‘break’ the measure? For certain data sets – Barnett 
Newman or Piet Mondrian maybe? – the measure could be completely 
useless because the salient element would be the arrangement of surfaces 
rather than the probability distribution of colours.
Fig. 7.1:  The four scatter plots from Anscombe (1973). They have identical values 
for number of observations, mean of the x’s, mean of the y’s, regression 
coefficient of y on x, equation of regression line, sum of squares of x, 
regression sum of squares, residual sum of squares of y, estimated 
standard error of bi, and multiple r2. Anscombe uses them in an 
argument for the usefulness of visualization in statistics.
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There is no doubt that programming skills are useful in this context. 
But entropy is not a ‘programming’ concept; it is, like most statistical 
measures, a means to summarize data, a means to speak about data from 
a very particular vantage point. It is reductive, certainly, but reductive in a 
specific way and therein lies its epistemic character. As a concept, entropy 
ties into the complex histories of information theory and statistics6, and 
reflective use will have to attend to these connections.
This is the work digital humanists and social scientists have to do and 
they cannot easily delegate it to computer science collaborators or hired 
programmers. Notice that this is a complex technical discussion that does 
not contain a single question about programming. Any somewhat capable 
programmer could produce a script from the specification ‘calculate entropy 
from greyscale histogram’ and in environments like MATLAB there are even 
predefined functions that do all the work for us. The actual methodological 
‘content’ and commitment is simply not a question of ‘software’, f irst and 
foremost. Certainly, we can only do this because there is software in the first 
place, and interfaces hide and cement our commitments, but the knowledge 
required to judge the method in question is only in very small part related 
to the question of code; rather, it spans a space from information theory to 
art history and visual studies in a way that certainly involves abstraction, 
but of a different kind than programming implies.
Conclusions
While our three examples might be considered very specif ic, we think 
that similar arguments could be made for a wide variety of cases where 
software performs a method. While methodological concepts and tech-
niques enter in negotiation with implementation, the ‘content’ of software 
is a procedure expressed in code, not simply code. We can certainly f ind 
cases where the mathematical dimension of a tool is completely trivial, 
but we would argue that in most of the tools that are used by digital 
scholars, signif icant methodological work is performed by techniques 
that have their origins in the conceptual substance of disciplines such as 
statistics, information science, sociometrics, computer science and – quite 
often – mathematics.
6 For an account of these histories that is accessible to and interesting for humanists, see for 
example Christian Kassung’s (2001) contextualization of Robert Musil’s ‘Man Without Qualities’ 
within modern physics, esp. pp. 132-260. 
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And this is the crux, here. Although we fully agree with Berry (2012) 
that digital Bildung – in particular for the digital humanist, but also be-
yond – would benefit from ‘iteracy […] def ined broadly as communicative 
competence in reading, writing and executing computer code’, the focus 
on programming as ‘writing code’ rather than ‘implementing a technique’ 
runs the risk of missing this more conceptual level that is, in our view, both 
epistemologically more relevant to scholarship relying on digital tools and, 
in many cases, more accessible in terms of skills to acquire.
While our evidence is only anecdotal, we notice in much of the humanities 
a desire to explain technology as quickly as possible through something 
else. Instrumental rationality, cybernetic utopias, neoliberalism, phantasies 
of perfect control, positivism, revenue maximization, and so forth. These 
assessments may ultimately be enlightening and meaningful at a very broad 
level of analysis. But if we want to meet the challenges of computational 
methods, we have to encounter technology as technology for at least a little 
while. Paradoxically, the one-sided focus on the ‘digital’ aspect of compu-
tational methods and, in conjunction, on programming as the Via Regia to 
digital enlightenment implies a reductionism that, again, serves to keep 
technology ‘small’. There is no doubt that programming skills and ‘iteracy’ 
are extremely valuable and a way to ease into some of the harsher complexi-
ties involved in computational methods. But we hope to have demonstrated 
through our examples that the tools we have come to use mobilize wide 
arrays of knowledge that we should only grudgingly compress into the sup-
posedly coherent category of ‘the digital’. The problem of black boxing does 
not begin with the opacity of computer code, but with the desire to banish 
technology from the ‘world of signification’ (Simondon 1958: 10).7 Behind the 
laudable efforts to increase levels of technical capacity lies the dangerous 
phantasm that technology’s epistemologies are ultimately ‘thin’ and that 
once programming skill has been acquired, mastery and control return.
We believe, on the contrary, that any nontrivial software tool implies 
thick layers of mediation that connect to computation as such, certainly, 
but in most cases also imply concepts, methods and styles of reasoning 
adapted from various other domains. We can critique the standardization 
of research through software all we want, but, to put it bluntly, there is no 
critical practice of statistics without considerable knowledge of statistics, 
7 ‘Culture is out of balance because it recognizes certain objects, such as the aesthetic object, 
and grants them the right of residence in the world of meaning, while it relegates other objects, 
and in particular technical objects, to the world without structure of those things that do not 
have a meaning, only a use.’ (Simondon 1958: 10, authors’ translation).
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independently of the question which tools are used. The problem of Bildung 
cannot be reduced to the acquisition of a set of skills. What Simondon (1958) 
calls ‘culture technique’ (technical acculturation) should not be limited to 
technical training, but needs to start with the recognition that technology 
constitutes a fundamental way of relating to the world and human diversity 
goes hand in hand with technological pluralism (cf. p. 218).
We have to be able to think with and in technology as a medium of ex-
pressing a will and a means to know. This is not only necessary to decide 
when to apply what techniques and to interpret the results they produce; it is 
also necessary to decide where the computational is superfluous, deceptive 
or simply sucking up to some funding agency’s idea of ‘innovative’ research. 
Digital methods are here to stay and to go beyond the simplistic reflexes 
of enthusiasm and rejection we need to engage in critical practice that is 
aware of the shocking amounts of knowledge we have stuffed into our tools.
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8. Data, Culture and the Ambivalence of 
Algorithms
William Uricchio
Humans have long defined, assessed, analysed and calculated data as factors 
in how they navigate reality. Indeed, the rules for what constitute data, 
together with the logics of their assembly, make up a core component of 
culture. Whether they be omens or numbers, whether they are qualitative 
or quantitative, whether they involve heuristics, hermeneutics or the rules 
of mathematics, the dyad of data and their organizing schemes give cul-
tural eras their specif icity. Considering developments ranging from Mayan 
astronomical calendars to Copernicus’s heliocentric observations, from 
seventeenth-century navigational charts to twentieth-century actuarial 
tables, one might say that this dyad underpins cultural possibility itself.1
Data have never been more abundant than they are today. Their unprec-
edented quantity owes as much to the digital encoding of most traceable 
phenomena as to the production of data by actors beyond our species. 
Whereas in the past, human observation translated events in the world 
into data, today, networked non-human actors are capable of directly 
generating machine-readable data. But as in the past, all that data would 
be meaningless without an organizing scheme. Behind the quintillions of 
bytes, behind our computers’ ever-growing processing power, is an organ-
izing scheme in the form of the algorithm. Like data, algorithms can be 
human- or machine-generated. And although an ancient idea, the algorithm 
has – or so I will argue – reached a tipping point in terms of its cultural 
operations: it is now being deployed in ways that redefine long-held subject-
object relationships and, in so doing, it poses some rather fundamental 
epistemological questions.
This change in the balance of things has produced its share of anxieties, 
as familiar ways of doing things seem superseded by ‘the algorithm’. The re-
cent explosion of headlines where the term ‘algorithm’ f igures prominently 
and often apocalyptically suggests that we are re-enacting a familiar ritual 
in which ‘new’ technologies appear in the regalia of disruption. But the 
emerging algorithmic regime is more than ‘just another’ temporarily unruly 
1 Portions of this essay f irst appeared as William Uricchio, ‘Recommended for You: Prediction, 
Creation and the Cultural Work of Algorithms,’ The Berlin Journal 28 (Spring 2015): 6–9. 
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new technology. My thesis is that the algorithm, an approach to problem 
solving that goes back at least to Euclid’s Elements (ca. 300 BC) and that 
enjoyed signif icant development in the hands of Leibniz and Pascal, has 
achieved new force as a cultural technology thanks to a confluence of fac-
tors that include the emergence of big data, intensive processing power and 
high-speed networks. It alters the subject-object relationship hard-wired 
in the project of the modern and visible in technologies like the printing 
press and three-point perspective, both of which amplify individual agency. 
Yet, like these technologies, the algorithm, combined with data, can be 
read as def ining an emerging epistemic era. If we are indeed like those in 
the early f ifteenth century who were poised on the edge of a new order of 
things, will we, like some of them, be inclined to embrace their potential 
for a new vision of ourselves in the world, a new social order? Or will we 
miss the radical potential of a new technology, retrof itting it to serve the 
still-dominant interests of the old?
Technologies do not, in themselves, change anything, but rather are 
socially constructed and deployed. So as we watch the possibilities of a new 
technology take shape in the hands of those with the greatest economic 
power, we have good reason to be anxious. The dyad of big data and algo-
rithms can enable new cultural and social forms, or they can be made to 
reinforce the most egregious aspects of our present social order. That is a 
political choice, of course. But what is truly new about this configuration 
is that we have a choice at all, of a magnitude not seen since the f ifteenth 
century. The pages ahead will chart these new enablements: f irst, by con-
sidering the definitional dynamics of algorithms; second, by looking at their 
newly acquired place particularly as a condition of cultural production; and 
f inally, by raising some questions regarding the larger epistemic implica-
tions of this new order and how we as a society will grasp it.
Definitional Dynamics
The term ‘algorithm’ seems to conjure up responses disproportionate to 
the simplicity of its meaning. Formally speaking, an algorithm is simply 
a recipe, a process or set of rules usually expressed in algebraic notation. 
The actual values plugged into the algorithm are less the point than the 
step-by-step formulations that govern their processing. They scale easily, 
whether working with the relatively meager data of the pre-computer 
era or the more than 2.5 quintillion bytes of data generated daily at the 
time of this writing. Yet despite their relative simplicity, algorithms today 
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pose some signif icant def initional problems, mostly because of a series of 
misapprehensions. Tarleton Gillespie (2014) has noted three broad uses of 
the term that obscure its meaning. Algorithms are invoked as synecdoche 
when the term stands in for a sociotechnical assemblage that includes the 
algorithm, model, data set, application and so on. They reveal a commitment 
to procedure, formalizing social facts into measurable data and clarifying 
problems into models for solution. And they function as talismans when 
the term implies an ‘objectifying’ scientif ic claim. Indeed, one might step 
back and note that these three uses say much more about social anxieties 
and aspirations than they do about algorithms. How, for example, can one 
make a claim to ‘objectivity’ with an authored protocol whose operations 
depend on the highly variable character and structure of a particular 
data set? And yet a glance at any newspaper will confirm the accuracy of 
Gillespie’s insights about the term’s ambiguity. The def inition of the algo-
rithm is also complicated by more insistent epistemological problems. Nick 
Seaver (2013) f inds that most discussions of algorithms get caught up with 
issues of access and expertise. Access is an issue because many commercial 
algorithms, Google’s for instance, are closely guarded secrets. ‘If only we had 
access…’ the mantra goes. But even if we had access, we would immediately 
face the expertise problem, for most individual algorithms inhabit vast 
interdependent algorithmic systems (not to mention models, goals, data 
profiles, testing protocols, etc.), and disaggregating and making sense of 
them typically require large teams of experts. But even more troublesome 
is the fact that any given process usually has many possible algorithmic 
combinations (circa 10 million in the case of a Bing search), some of which 
might be uniquely deployed or used for purposes of personalization or 
even testing. Individual algorithms and algorithmic clusters are recycled 
and appear in different settings, with some dating from before World War 
II still in circulation today. This means that we can never be sure precisely 
which set of algorithmic elements we are examining, and even if we were, 
the work of personalization would limit our ability to compare f indings. A 
further twist appears in the form of disciplinary specif icity. The valences of 
the term ‘algorithm’ differ in mathematics, computer science, governance, 
predictive analytics, law and in the culture at large, complicating cross-
disciplinary discussion.
Finally, unlike earlier technologies, developments in machine learning 
have enabled algorithms to self-optimize and generate their own improve-
ments. They can now self-author and self-create. This greatly complicates 
notions of authorship, agency and even algorithms’ status as tools, which 
imply an end user.
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Together, the various factors described by Gillespie and Seaver, which 
are embedded in our tradition of study and even our inherited notions of 
agency and authorship, all combine to render the simple def inition of an 
algorithm as a ‘rule set’ or ‘recipe’ into something quite… loaded. And they 
fundamentally challenge our inherited notions of culture and cultural 
production. The humanities research agenda not only has to deal with the 
implications of radically reconfigured notions of the author, agency and 
textual stability, but also has to embrace radically expanded corpora. Data, 
the structure of the data set, models, software systems and interfaces all 
play determining roles in cultural production and, as such, are not only 
appropriate but increasingly important sites for humanistic inquiry. Their 
analysis requires not only new literacies but evaluative paradigms that 
in many cases have yet to be created. Lev Manovich (2001) made an early 
appeal to meet these needs in his The Language of New Media, and this essay 
extends that call to include the algorithms underlying these operational 
systems.
Culture
Given the role that the dyad of algorithms and data currently plays in shap-
ing our access to information (Google) and the social world (Facebook), 
and their centrality to f inance (algorithmic trading) and governance (from 
predictive policing to NSA-style parsing of vast troves of data), looking at 
their cultural work might seem a low priority. Each of these sectors reveals 
some affordances of the pairing, and their most visible – and disturbing – 
applications reflect the interests of the prevailing power structure. However, 
the abusive deployment of algorithmically enabled data says more about 
the contradictions of our social order than the algorithm or data per se. 
Blaming ‘the algorithm’ or ‘big data’ puts us in the position of a bull f ixated 
on the matador’s cape: we fail to see the real source of malice.
We can sidestep the easy conflation of algorithms and data in the explicit 
service of power by turning to the cultural sector in order to throw into 
relief the dyad’s capacities to re-order the subject-object relationships at 
the heart of the new representational order. This re-ordering has far more 
profound implications than the retrof itting of algorithms and data in the 
service of twentieth-century notions of power (though doing the latter 
may wind up killing us if we aren’t alert). With art it is generally easier to 
see through the representation process and f ind traces of the underlying 
production system. The arts help us to see more clearly.
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Just as algorithms have a deep history but have also recently achieved 
new power thanks to their changing circumstances (big data and dramatic 
improvements in processing and transmission), their use in the arts also 
has a long history as well as a fast-evolving present. The historically oldest 
applications deploy algorithms to organize data for purposes of textual 
production, basically using the algorithm like a traditional artistic tool, 
though with an important twist. More recent applications go further, using 
algorithmic configurations of data for purposes of textual selection and 
customization, combing through large data sets to establish correlations 
regarding taste and likely matches between users and texts. Brief disam-
biguations of these different applications follow:
Algorithms as Tools in Traditional Artistic Production
The canon form in music, essentially an algorithm, goes back at least to 
the Middle Ages; and algorithms have appeared in works ranging from the 
Musikalisches Würfelspiel attributed to Mozart to Lejaren Hiller’s composi-
tions using the ILLIAC computer in the 1950s. Brian Eno (1975) put his f inger 
on the aesthetic twist of this application when he said:
Since I have always preferred making plans to executing them, I have 
gravitated towards situations and systems that, once set into operation, 
could create music with little or no intervention on my part. That is to say, 
I tend towards the roles of planner and programmer, and then become 
an audience to the results. (n.p.)
This disaggregation of artistic process from execution is nothing new (Rodin 
famously relied on it for his major sculptural works) but it has served as a 
persistent characteristic in the long history of algorithmic art. Tradition enters 
the picture when artists make a claim for ‘their’ authorship, rendering the 
algorithm a tool. The 1968 exhibition Cybernetic Serendipity, with its display 
of algorithmically generated music, painting, choreography, film and graphics, 
demonstrated the powers of this new toolkit across the arts to audiences in 
London and Washington. By the mid-1990s, artists such as Roman Verostko 
and Jean-Pierre Hébert proclaimed the tool as the basis of a movement: 
the Algorists.2 Today, the integration of algorithms into everyday textual 
production is so fundamental as to be quotidian (algorithms enable colour 
2 See www.algorists.org/.
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correction, editing and the very existence of image in film and video (Hoelzl 
& Marie 2015); recording, mixing and the creation of sound elements in music; 
the word processing program that I am using to craft this text, and so forth).
But paired with big data, the algorithm has grown far more powerful. 
According to The New York Times, the company Automated Insights alone 
created more than one billion algorithmically generated stories in 2014, 
mostly routine sports and f inancial market reporting (Podolny 2015). These 
two domains are made up of well-structured data sets, with timelines and 
data points that enable easy characterization and serve as low-hanging fruit 
for an emergent industry. But The Times story gave a sense of the ambitions 
for storytelling algorithms produced by companies such as Narrative Sci-
ence, and they go far beyond ‘translating’ simple data trails to generating 
creative prose and poetry.
Textual Recommendation Systems
A very different and relatively recent cultural use of algorithms paired 
with large data sets takes the form of selecting and pushing which texts 
we have access to, that is, of recommendation systems. Consider Echo-
Nest’s prediction algorithms that comb through data derived from millions 
of users’ behaviours as well as data drawn from musical texts, seeking 
correlations by extrapolating from past behaviours into future desires or 
by searching for other users’ patterns that might offer a basis for sugges-
tions. To the extent that users play along and offer consistent feedback, 
Pandora, Spotify and other streaming music services that use EchoNest’s 
algorithms demonstrate an uncanny ability to identify and provide access 
to the desired, the familiar and the reassuring. As users of Amazon’s book 
recommendation services or Netflix’s f ilm and video suggestions know, 
the same principles apply on these platforms as well. Indeed, one of the 
often referenced developments in this space was the 2009 Netflix Prize, a 
$1,000,000 bounty for creating the greatest improvements to Netflix’s own 
collaborative f iltering algorithm for predicting user ratings of f ilms (the 
winner, Bellkor, achieved a 10.09% improvement on predictions).3 In these 
3 The Netflix competition began in 2006 and ended with the 2009 award to the Bellkor team. 
The terms of the prize required that winners publish a description of the winning algorithm. 
Throughout the multi-year process, critics claimed that Netflix’s release of data sets violated 
US Fair Trade laws as well as the Video Privacy Protection Act. The Netflix Prize website has 
archived much of the process: www.netflixprize.com/. 
DaTa, culTure anD The aMbivalence of alGoriThMS 131
predictive systems, the past is prologue, as the data generated through our 
earlier interactions shape the textual world selected for us. No ‘surprises’ 
or ‘unwanted’ encounters, just uncannily familiar themes and variations. 
This logic extends into the informational domain as well, where it has been 
the subject of sharper critique, mostly focused on the argument that such 
predictive systems create an echo chamber in which our existing views of 
the world are reinforced but rarely challenged.4
Prediction as a Gatekeeper for Textual Production
Taste prediction has another rapidly growing dimension: in some settings 
the combination of data and algorithms serves as gatekeepers for cultural 
production, and in the process has displaced the embodied knowledge 
of established tastemakers. Epagogix, a company that specializes in risk 
mitigation, has found a niche in advising investors in the f ilm and televi-
sion industry about the likely success of a given project. Data from the 
script as well as various casting configurations are analysed by Epagogix’s 
proprietary algorithms, along with a f inancial assessment that may (or 
may not) serve as an incentive for investment. Needless to say, long-time 
industry specialists view such developments with suspicion if not outright 
contempt, but investors, convinced by the seeming objectivity of numbers 
and the system’s more-often-than-not accurate predictions, think other-
wise. Such investor response is understandable at a moment when most 
stock trading is algorithmically determined: the algorithm is a vernacular 
of sorts. But it also conf irms Gillespie’s observation that the algorithm is 
a talisman, radiating an aura of computer-conf irmed objectivity, even 
though the programming parameters and data construction reveal deeply 
human prejudices. The bottom line here is that decisions regarding what 
will and will not be produced are now often based on data of unknown 
4 The ‘echo chamber’ effect is widely used in journalism and mass communications to refer 
to the closed circle of media utterances and audience beliefs, as in Kathleen Hall Jamieson & 
Joseph N. Cappella, Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). The concept has been extended to social media 
such as Facebook, where algorithms f ilter and sequence the posts that users see, effectively 
creating an echo chamber. See for example Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is 
Hiding from You (London: Penguin Press, 2011). Facebook researchers Eytan Bakshy, Solomon 
Messing and Lada Adamic argue, however, that the data do not support this view (‘Expo-
sure to Diverse Information on Facebook’ 7 May 2015: https://research.facebook.com/blog/
exposure-to-diverse-information-on-facebook/).
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quality (What do they actually represent? How were they gathered?) that 
are fed into algorithms modelled in unknown ways (What constitutes 
success?).
‘Live’ Textual Production
Another relatively recent application of algorithms and textual data sets 
regards what might be termed ‘live’ or dynamic ‘on-demand’ textual produc-
tion. Whereas we saw that one of the oldest continuing cultural uses of 
algorithms was as a tool to streamline what we might term the production 
of traditional texts (from an occasional Mozart composition to Narrative 
Science’s articles for Forbes), here the texts are dynamic (in the sense of 
being interactive), responsive (in the sense of being tailored to individual 
preferences) and inherently unstable (that is, no two texts are identical). 
Interactive documentaries, often in the form of textual environments (i.e. 
databases) permit the user to follow his or her interests, with the resulting 
navigational trail as text. This approach requires the user’s active interac-
tion and choice; however, we are fast moving towards a situation where 
choices regarding text selection (i.e. data selection) will be made on the fly 
by algorithms armed with data about our preferences. Here, personalization 
algorithms meet textual production algorithms to create what seems like 
a seamless, traditional text, even though it will be a unique, real-time data 
ensemble for our eyes only.
The hundreds of reader responses to the Times article amply demon-
strated the provocative nature of these developments: text-generating 
algorithms force us to ask what it means to be human and how that relates to 
artistic production; production f ilters force us to reflect on the nature of our 
automated cultural gatekeepers; personalized texts force us to consider the 
future of shared experiences. For most commenters, the answer was clear-
cut: algorithmic creativity and content-as-data in the traditional cultural 
sectors seem oxymoronic. Culture is precisely about human expression, and 
anything else is either trickery or parody. But to designers of algorithms 
and data sets, such discourse – to the extent that it articulates a human je 
ne sais quoi – is useful in pinning down precisely the gap between human 
and algorithmic expressions, enabling engineers to define and to chip away 
at the problem. Much like the issue of intelligence, long-held assumptions 
regarding man-the-measure are undergoing a Copernican-like decentring, 
and in this sense, the coincidental appearance of developments such as 
post-humanism, actor network theory, object-oriented ontology and the rest 
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suggests that sectors of the academy are indeed thinking seriously about 
a paradigm shift and alternatives to a human-centric culture.5 All this is 
to say that the cultural deployments of algorithms and data have differ-
ent valances. An early and continuing strand of creativity has harnessed 
algorithms and data to the work of familiar artistic paradigms, where things 
like authorship and attribution are still relevant (Eno and Verostko still sign 
their computer-generated works). But as just noted, a rapidly emerging set 
of developments has seen algorithms used as f ilters, shaping our access 
to the cultural repertoire; as gatekeepers, helping to determine what will 
and will not be produced; and as semi-autonomous forces of production, 
writing texts, composing music and constructing f ilms – all dynamically 
personalized and assembled on the fly. Of course, these are still early days 
and results can sometimes be erratic (Microsoft’s Tay AI neural net chatbot 
was abruptly terminated shortly after her public release in 2016 when ‘she’ 
spouted Nazi rhetoric (Bright 2016)). But generally, so long as Moore’s Law 
holds, these developments are growing more intensive, driven by the ever 
more pervasive place of computational systems in our lives, the ability of 
algorithms to self-improve without active human intervention, and the 
ever-increasing depth of our data sets. They raise crucial questions regard-
ing agency and attribution (how to negotiate the space between human 
designers and machine learning? What is the nature of authorship and the 
creative act?), point of view (whose values, experiences and perceptions 
are bound up in this new order and the underlying def inition of data?) and 
cultural access (what notion of ‘personalization’ enables – or delimits – our 
encounters with texts, and with what implications?).
The Bigger Picture
Why do these questions, and the increasing insistence with which they 
are posed, matter? What are the stakes involved? Heidegger (1938) used 
an image, the ‘world picture’ (Weltbild), to mark the birth of the modern, 
saying that the moment at which the world becomes picture is the same 
moment that the human emerges as the subject in a characteristically 
5 These terms entail a vast and growing body of literature, including Graham Harman, The 
Quadruple Object (London: Zero Books, 2011); Levi Bryant, Graham Harman & Nick Srnicek, The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: re.press, 2011); Katherine N. 
Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduc-
tion to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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modern subject-object relationship. He argues that the modern social order 
can be defined through a representational system characterized by precisely 
def ined subject-object relations (the world as picture), a metaphysics of 
exactitude and an underlying spatiotemporal grid – all qualities that we 
can see materialized in Gutenberg’s printing press and Brunelleschi’s notion 
of perspective, technologies that amplif ied the subject and her viewing 
position.6
In the hundreds of years between these early-f ifteenth-century devel-
opments and Heidegger’s twentieth century, despite countless historical 
undulations and discoveries, we encounter a consistent logic of attribution, 
of a stable self and relationship to the world, a notion of mathematics as 
a language of precision, calculability and predictability. By contrast, the 
algorithm enabled by big data – as shown in the cultural deployments 
just discussed – stands between the calculating subject and the object 
calculated; it refracts the subject-centred world. Together algorithms and 
data f ilter what we have access to, produce our texts with unseen hands 
and unknown logics, and reshape our texts, rendering them contingent, 
mutable and ‘personalized’.
The implications of this change, if we take thinkers like Heidegger seri-
ously, are profound. Consider the contrast between Diderot’s Encyclopédie 
and the crowdsourced Wikipedia, or between Canaletto’s painting of Piazza 
San Marco and the hundreds of differently authored photos that in the 
aggregate constitute Photosynth’s ‘synth’ of the same locale. With Diderot’s 
compendium and Canaletto, the editor and the painter are known, their 
point of view embodied, their relationship to the object clear, and their text 
stable. With texts such as Photosynth, the author is potentially collective, 
diffused and anonymous; the points of view multiple; the relationship to 
the object both data-based and algorithmically mediated; and the text 
ever-changing and mutable. These differences, grosso modo, distinguish 
the project of the modern, Heidegger’s ‘age of the world picture’, from the 
enablements of the data-powered algorithmic era.
Authorship, in the algorithmic context, is both pluriform and problem-
atic. It turns on the algorithmic re-ordering of data (textual elements), 
informed and shaped by algorithmic assessments of data (reliability and 
preference correlations), all algorithmically calculated to achieve certain 
data markers (user rates). This is not to ignore human agency: humans 
6 For a developed version of this argument, particularly as it regards visualization technolo-
gies such as augmented reality and Photosynth, see William Uricchio, ‘The Algorithmic Turn: 
Photosynth, Augmented Reality and the State of the Image’ in Visual Studies 26:1 (2011): 25–35.
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take the photographs or shoot the video clips that make up a Photosynth 
‘synth’ or an interactive documentary (even if these processes also reveal 
fundamental partnerships between the human creator and light-as-data 
and algorithms-as-image-stabilizers built into our cameras).7 But when 
those human-created images are re-rendered into the abstraction of data 
sets, when those data are algorithmically deployed and stitched back 
into an image, then categories such as authorship, agency and motive are 
fundamentally blurred. Descartes’ triumphant subject and the Ich implied 
in Heidegger’s Weltbild are not eradicated, for their traces remain abundant 
in the individual images and clips. Rather, they are fundamentally repo-
sitioned by the algorithmic and data regimes that now stand between the 
subject and object.
If we understand this, we can think through the opportunities that await 
us rather than panic at the loss of the old certainties. We can explore the 
affordances of algorithmically-enabled collaboration and the new forms 
of collective creativity that might emerge from a world re-articulated as 
data, rather than tolerating the crude use of algorithmic systems and data 
sets to exploit and oppress. We can try to understand the implications 
of widespread personalization, the challenges of a predictive economy 
in which data trails become constitutive and the impact of a culture of 
radical contingency. How? We can f irst comprehend that conditions have 
changed, that we need to shift our focus from the simple causalities of the 
subject-object binary to a far less decipherable algorithmic intermediary. 
To do so requires a new literacy, not in the sense of making composited 
algorithms legible, for that is beyond comprehension, but rather by attend-
ing to their operations, noting their defaults, critiquing their judgements 
and the definitions of the data they are processing. And particularly at this 
moment of transition, we must carefully assess the ends to which these new 
tools are put – whether they are being bent to the whims of the old subject 
(aggregating power and control) or facilitate new collectivities.
In framing these issues, I’ve gone back several times to the f ifteenth 
century and the emergence of modern technologies such as the printing 
press and three-point perspective. These technologies amplify the position 
of the individual human subject and resonate through the six centuries of 
the modern that followed. That they are taken for granted even today, when 
they are increasingly displaced by a radically different representational 
regime and set of technologies, shows us that old habits die hard. Not 
7 And conversely, algorithms and data sets are in the majority of cases human-authored and 
assembled, even if they can go on to self-generate, further complicating the situation. 
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surprisingly for a moment of transition, today’s dominant deployments of 
algorithmically enabled systems emulate the representational traditions 
of the past: they often look ordinary and familiar. And we respond accord-
ingly, reading a Narrative Science -authored newspaper article as we would 
a human-authored story or viewing a Photosynth image as we would a 
photograph. It’s easy to miss the radical reworking of cultural logics in media 
res, easy to re-inscribe the new and uncertain into the familiar categories 
of the past… or to reject them as threats to the status quo.
We can probably learn something from our predecessors in the late 
Middle Ages, poised on the cusp of the modern, encountering the printing 
press and three-point perspective. What did people make of new and, in 
retrospect, era-defining technologies before that era was defined? Scholars 
such as Elizabeth Eisenstein (1979) have tended to see the printing press as 
a trigger for the modern (knowledge stabilization, spread, etc.), while others 
such as Adrian Johns (1988) have more recently chronicled the disparate 
and unruly practices that attended its initial decades. In Eisenstein’s story, 
emerging technologies exerted an impact, making a splash as harbingers 
of the new; and in Johns’s, they were taken up by a late-medieval populace 
and used in aberrant and contradictory ways. I would argue that we are 
in a similar position with our new era-defining technologies of algorithms 
enabled by big data and massive processing power.
The new era has yet to be defined, and it is impossible to know how future 
historians will inscribe our trajectory. Of course, the ‘newness’ of this regime 
comes with the danger that it will be retrofitted to sustain the excesses and 
contradictions of the fast-aging modern, to empower particular individual 
points of view, to control and stabilize a master narrative. But it also offers 
an opportunity for critical thinking and an imaginative embrace of the 
era’s new affordances. And for these opportunities to be realized, we need 
to develop critical perspectives, to develop analytical categories relevant 
to these developments and our place in them.
Much of what we today call the humanities harkens back to traditions de-
veloped during the long span of the modern, traditions predicated upon the 
stable subject-object relationship noted earlier and captured by Heidegger’s 
concept of the Weltbild. But although the term ‘humanities’ was coined 
in the Renaissance of the f ifteenth century (studia humanitatis), its texts 
and values go back to the pre-modern world of classical Greece and Rome, 
where the humanities involved practice more than study. The question is 
whether we can draw on this era-spanning tradition to anchor, critically 
assess and navigate the ‘age of the algorithm’ (to put the new era in terms 
equivalent to Heidegger’s ‘age of the world picture’). Can we disentangle the 
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centrality of the individual subject from the humanity at the core of the 
humanities agenda? Can we rethink our inherited categories of authorship 
and agency in ways that stimulate a critical discourse of collaborative and 
algorithmically-enabled work? Can we shift from familiar conditions such 
as precision, calculability and predictability and learn to grapple with the 
contingent, mutable and personalized? Is a poetics of data within our reach 
or even desirable?
To even begin to answer these questions, we need to develop new litera-
cies capable of assessing various data forms and organizing schemes such 
as algorithms. We have to understand how they are deployed and develop a 
critical sense of their limits, capacities, implications and possibilities. How 
do they operate, not so much as technological ensembles but as patterning 
activities, as enablers of collaboration and creativity, as potentially critical 
practices? The humanities – the questions their texts and values pose, the 
critical stance they espouse, the comparative and historical framings they 
deploy, the analytic attention that they expend – have never been more 
important. Yes, modernist assumptions need fundamental revision, and 
their corpora need to be radically expanded to include categories like data 
and algorithms. And yes, poised as we are on the cusp of a new era, we have 
much to learn from similar transitions in the past, particularly regarding the 
predictable rear-guard actions of those who seek to exploit the potentials 
of the new to extend the power dynamics of the old.
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9. Unknowing Algorithms
On Transparency of Unopenable Black Boxes
Johannes Paßmann & Asher Boersma
Algorithmic Black Boxes as a Challenge for Media Studies
The primary source for the suspicion with which the rise of and subsequent 
dependency on software as research instrument in the humanities is met, 
is that one does not know what the machine does. In many cases ‘machine’ 
means algorithm. Algorithmic black boxes have become so widespread that 
this objection could already be voiced as soon as a researcher uses Google. 
In digital methods and beyond, there is a dominant tendency for research 
processes to be dependent upon algorithmic black boxes, which even theo-
retically cannot be ‘opened’ (Bucher 2012). Kate Crawford speaks in this 
context of the ‘disappointingly limited calls for algorithmic “transparency”, 
which seem doomed to fail’ (2016: 11).
The dependency on algorithmic black boxes has been addressed as a 
problem for research practices by Bernhard Rieder and Theo Röhle (2012). 
They have called ‘black-boxing’ one of the major challenges for digital 
methods, and continue their pursuit for a solution along the same lines 
in this volume. They delineate this technical black-boxing as a matter of 
accessibility (such as in the case of ‘the’ Google algorithm or countless 
other proprietary algorithms) and code literacy (cf. ibid.: 76), but also as 
not-understandable on a ‘more abstract’ level, as ‘the results they produce 
cannot be easily mapped back to the algorithms and the data they process’ 
(ibid.). Still, Rieder and Röhle propose this should not keep us from using 
them, as there is a workaround to this, which is ‘to use different tools from 
the same category whenever possible in order to avoid limiting ourselves to 
a specif ic perspective’ (ibid.: 77). Different algorithms would bring different 
aspects of a data set to the fore when one experiments with them, switches 
between different ones, etc.. Thus what Rieder and Röhle have proposed 
– and continue to seek for in this volume with their focus on the ‘bizarre 
amount of knowledge we have stuffed into our tools’ (Rieder & Röhle in 
this book) – are ways to minimise the size of black boxes by enlightening 
formerly black parts.
With this article however, we would like to draw attention to an ap-
proach from a different direction. Instead of focusing on how to gain positive 
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knowledge in order to make these black boxes ‘more transparent’, we would 
like to outline a concept of transparency that is not so much concerned 
with positive knowledge, but that deals with skills which help dealing with 
those parts of an artefact that one still does not know. In that sense our 
proposal comes in after Rieder and Röhle have left the scene successfully: 
we ask how to behave towards what remains black after all. We consider this 
important, as we assume that the minimising strategy will be decreasingly 
helpful in the future. The conjuncture of algorithmic black boxes is so 
huge and encompassing that questions of how to minimise the unknown 
will increasingly be replaced by questions of how to behave towards the 
unknowable. What appears debatable may thus be not how to make a given 
black box more transparent so much as the concept of transparency itself.
What we found is that different authors have given signif icantly dif-
ferent meanings to the term transparency. We would like to differentiate 
between two notions here. On the one hand, there is what we call formalized 
transparency, which largely tries to obtain ‘more positive knowledge’ on ‘the 
content’ of a black box. On the other hand, we see practical transparency, 
which does not try to open black boxes, but to develop skills without raising 
the issue of openability. These two concepts of transparency do not exclude 
each other. Rather, they outline two different sets of practices dealing with 
black boxes which can complement each other.
Don’t Open Every Black Box!
When Sociology of Science and the movement that was later termed 
Laboratory Studies adopted the term black box in the 1970s, its function 
was somewhat different from today. Richard D. Whitley stated at the time: 
‘The view of scientif ic knowledge maintained by much of the sociology of 
science had led to an ideology of “black boxism” which restricts research 
to the study of currently observable inputs to, and outputs from, a system. 
Any study of the internal processes, which may be unobservable at the 
moment, is declared taboo.’ (1972: 63)
The problem that he points out here is not that in research practice 
there are too many intransparent material black boxes, but that the ‘site 
of scientif ic action offers a unique opportunity to investigate the process 
of knowledge production, which continues to be a “black box” to social 
studies of science’, as Karin Knorr Cetina put it ten years later (1982: 102).
Latour and Woolgar also talk critically about black boxing, stating that 
with the help of ‘money, authority, confidence’ certain kinds of knowledge 
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are prevented from being questioned, making it almost improbable to raise 
alternatives (1979: 242). This is quite similar to the concept of black boxing 
that Gregory Bateson uses some years earlier:
A ‘black box’ is a conventional agreement between scientists to stop 
trying to explain things at a certain point [...] It’s a word that comes from 
the engineers. When they draw a diagram of a complicated machine, 
they use a sort of shorthand. Instead of drawing all the details they put 
a box to stand for a whole bunch of parts and label the box with what 
that bunch of parts is supposed to do. (Bateson 1972: 39)
What all these black boxes (Whitley; Knorr Cetina; Latour & Woolgar; 
Bateson) have in common is the normative implication that they should 
actually be opened. In her later work, however, Knorr Cetina stresses that 
certain black boxes in scientif ic research processes cannot and should not 
be opened. She mentions the example of heart surgeons who want to be 
present when a donor heart is removed from a body, to see and feel the organ 
they will have to transplant later. Nobody can explicitly say what the use 
of this is, or what kind of information the surgeon gets or processes when 
he or she is present at the removal, but everybody agrees this is necessary:
The scientist’s body as an information-processing tool is a black-boxed 
instrument. The absence of discourse concerning embodied behavior cor-
responds to the use of embodied information processing as a substitute 
for conscious reflection and communication. The acting body works best 
when it is a silent part of the empirical machinery of research. (Knorr 
Cetina 1999: 99)
This means that in research practices we f ind black boxes that should not 
be opened. These black boxes remain intransparent in a conventional, 
formalized sense, but that is in no way problematic for the scientist in the 
practice of research. She (and none of her colleagues or the ethnographers 
researching laboratory life) sees, hears, etc. what is happening, but this 
produces no deficit for her. Quite on the contrary, an explication of ‘what 
is actually happening’ may deprive her of these kinds of ‘knowledge’. This 
is quite similar to when somebody starts thinking about their PIN code 
when typing it at the supermarket register: the f ingers ‘know’ the code, 
but as soon as ‘the brain’ tries to think about it explicitly, the f ingers will 
‘forget’ it. This raises the question whether the calls for transparency in 
discourses around algorithms actually have to point to what Knorr Cetina 
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called ‘conscious reflection and communication’ when conscious reflection 
is impossible anyway, or if here transparency may mean to embody the 
functioning and dysfunction of a certain artefact: if we cannot ‘know’ (in 
an explicit sense) what algorithms do and which inaccuracies they have, 
can we at least embody them to such a degree that we know when to rely 
on their results and when to become distrustful? This would mean that 
they become transparent, not insofar as ‘one sees what is happening’, but 
rather in such a way that they withdraw in practice.
Practical Transparency: Knowing When and How to Be Careful
The notion that we call practical transparency has already been applied 
in the realm of digital media research. Susan Star, Geoffrey Bowker and 
Laura Neumann write that at the ‘individual level of scale’, transparency 
means a user ‘does not have to be bothered with the underlying machinery 
or software. In this sense, an automobile is transparent when a driver sits 
down, turns the key, and drives off, all without the foggiest notion of how 
internal combustion works’ (2003: 242). This means, and this is crucial, 
that black boxing is not an obstacle for transparency here, but the primary 
condition for its very possibility.
Applying this notion of transparency to algorithmic black boxes would 
only be half the solution as it does not provide means to position oneself 
critically towards what is inside the black box. This concept however has 
a long tradition in the philosophy of technology, and has actually always 
been an ideal of media and media practices. It is here that we f ind an 
understanding of transparency and its limits that allows for the critical 
position we seek.
Most prominently, we f ind this idea in Marx’s Maschinenfragment. 
Originally however – although Marx does not mention this – the idea comes 
from Hegel. Loosely speaking, Hegel differentiates Maschine (machine) and 
Werkzeug (almost translatable as tool). The tool follows the hand, whereas 
the hand has to follow the machine. The tool mediates between man and the 
environment, as an inert but still rather passive thing in the producer’s hand 
– the German word Werkzeug expresses this hierarchical relation, Zeug is 
the stuff, the unimportant, the heteronomous. That the tool is inert means 
that it forces its user to discipline himself, as Axel Honneth comments, 
with the result that on the one hand, the user ‘transforms himself into a 
thing’. But at the same time he experiences that in this self-disciplining, 
the subjective Geist acquires the ability to realize itself in the product of 
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tool-using work (cf. Honneth 2014 [1994]: 61). This would mean that for the 
ideally disciplined Hegelian tool-user the tool is practically transparent.
The machine on the other hand requires a different type of disciplining. 
At f irst it seems that the ‘user’ lets the machine work for himself, ‘but his 
own activity thereby becomes more formalised. His dull work constricts 
him to a single point [...] shrinking [his] skills’1 (Hegel 1983 [1805/6]: 139). 
At the end of this process, even this formal work is aufgehoben (sublated, 
abolished, suspended, superseded, but also preserved). The machine work-
ing for you ultimately inverts your relation to it: you work for the machine, 
doing only machine work. Hegel considers machine usage as a fraud against 
nature, which in turn takes revenge: the more man subjugates nature using 
machines, the lower he himself sinks (cf. Hegel 1974 [1803/4]: 332). The tool 
thus appears in that respect as the opposite of the machine, as it follows 
the intentional activity of its users and can be made transparent as they 
learn to master it with certain skills, whereas the machine on the other 
hand makes its users transparent by mastering them.
Our differentiation between Hegel’s concepts of Maschine and Werkzeug 
is, as mentioned, relatively rough. The German philosopher Hans-Christoph 
Schmidt am Busch is a bit more precise here; he differentiates between 
tool as a means of labour (‘Werkzeug als Arbeitsmittel’) and tool as a thing 
(‘Werkzeug als Ding’), and the actual tool is always both (2002: 48ff). 
Similar to the algorithm that allows you to make certain parts practically 
transparent (one can ‘know’ what they do) and others not (one can ‘know’ 
their inaccuracies), the Hegelian tool also has a dual character as means 
and thing at the same time. The ideal however is a practical transparency 
that can be achieved through acquisition of skills.
This process of appropriating a technical artefact in such a way that 
it becomes transparent through acquired skills may actually be one of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s most prominent considerations. Certain artefacts 
can become transparent in such a way that they become part of one’s body 
schema, they are incorporated or, as he writes, embodied. Merleau-Ponty 
names several examples of embodiment, one of them being the blind man’s 
stick, which withdraws when used. At the end of a learning process, for its 
user, the stick is no longer an object, as he does not perceive it as anything 
distinct from his body: the stick’s ending is the beginning of its user’s 
perceptual f ield, and the stick’s measurable length no longer matters (1962 
1 This quote is from Leo Rauch’s translation and refers to Jenaer Realphilosophie (1805-06), 
chapter II ‘Wirklicher Geist’, subchapter b ‘Vertrag’.
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[1945]: 167)2. The world of tactually perceived objects then does not begin 
with his skin, but with his stick’s ending. Thus he does not interpret the 
pressures the stick makes towards the hand. On the contrary, embodiment 
means that explicit interpretation is no longer necessary, just like it is not 
necessary to interpret contact with one’s skin (cf. ibid.: 178).
For Merleau-Ponty, the same principle works for other artefacts like 
typewriters and pipe organs. Two examples that he gives are particularly 
interesting for us. The f irst is a woman with a plume hat, who can keep a 
safe distance between the feather in her hat and everything that may break 
it off without calculating the distance between the top of her feather and 
the respective objects. The same goes for the second example, a car that 
one wants to drive through a tunnel. Car and hat do not function as objects 
with measurable volumes, but have become demands for a certain amount 
of free space (ibid.: 167)3.
The feather and the stick are both ‘extensions of man’, but they bring 
quite different aspects of these extensions to the fore. The stick appears as a 
transparent mediator to perceive and act upon the environment. The feather 
on the other hand does not appear as a mediator here (which does not mean 
it could not be used as such, but it’s just not as suited for that kind of task as 
the stick is). It does not so much produce practical transparency, but forces 
you to learn when and how to be careful. As already mentioned, for practices 
involving algorithmic black boxes, both appear important: to embody what 
they can do, that is Merleau-Ponty’s stick (which corresponds to Hegel’s 
notion of Werkzeug als Arbeitsmittel) and to embody its inaccuracies as 
well, which is represented by Merleau-Ponty’s feather (and corresponds to 
Hegel’s notion of Werkzeug als Ding).
Thus the feather highlights the known unknown that you need to 
embody in a particular way if you want to produce knowledge with al-
gorithms, whereas the blind man’s stick highlights the embodied known 
or not explicitly known known. When both kinds of knowledge about 
algorithms, the positive ‘stick knowledge’ and the negative ‘feather knowl-
edge’, are taken together, it appears possible to act towards unopenable 
black boxes.
2 ‘Le bâton de l’aveugle a cessé d’être un objet pour lui, il n’est plus perçu pour lui-même, son 
extrémité s’est transformée en zone sensible.’
3 ‘Le chapeau et l’automobile ont cessé d’être des objets dont la grandeur et le volume se 
détermineraient par comparaison avec les autres objets. Ils sont devenus des puissances 
volumineuses, l’exigence d’un certain espace libre.’
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In one of our earlier articles, a case was presented where two researchers 
used Gephi algorithms to visualize Twitter data (Paßmann 2013). There, 
exactly, this difference became apparent: the researchers differentiated 
between certain activities of an algorithm that they would undoubtedly 
consider solid results and for which they would take responsibility – this 
was for example the case when the distance between two nodes in a network 
visualization was 20 cm. On the other hand, there were results on the map 
which they did not ‘dare to say anything about’ (ibid.) – in this case when 
the distance between two nodes was only two cm. The latter would be this 
‘feather knowledge’ telling its users when and how to be careful (demanding 
a certain amount of free space, i.e. the known unknown), whereas the 20 cm, 
after suff icient experience, would be in the realm of the ‘stick knowledge’. 
When approached through the lens of formalized transparency, the whole 
algorithm would appear as a black box here, which with the help of Rieder 
and Röhle can be cut down to a significantly smaller size. In terms of practi-
cal transparency, the remaining part that we formally cannot know can be 
practically transparent either through embodiment, as with the stick, or 
through a carefully paced out unknowing, as with the feather.
One result of such ‘feather knowledge’ would then be to realize which 
other sources, external to software and database, are necessary to work 
around the known unknowns, like ethnographic data for example. Regularly 
these other sources will be some kind of everyday knowledge, which has not 
been optimized as much as, for example, knowledge about software and 
databases. That means that, at best, practical transparency turns unknown 
unknowns in to known unknowns. Finding ways to deal with these new 
known unknowns needs more attention, we would argue, than the inner 
workings of black boxes. We know they will be increasingly unopenable.
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10. Social Data APIs
Origin, Types, Issues
Cornelius Puschmann & Julian Ausserhofer
Introduction
Application programming interfaces (APIs) represent an increasingly relevant 
form of data access in both academic research and beyond. Many popular 
social media services provide APIs to developers, which can also be used to 
collect information relevant to social scientists, industry researchers and 
journalists, as do some more traditional data providers, such as archives 
and databases. In science and scholarship, f ields that study digital media, 
and some which are concerned with other areas of inquiry (economics, 
climatology, medicine), have taken up the use of APIs. As more and more 
information becomes available online, providing access in a standardized 
way is a convenient and eff icient way for turning data that is generated 
by users (Facebook, Twitter), routinely collected by organizations (public 
research institutes, national statistics offices), and generated and enriched by 
cultural institutions (GLAM: galleries, libraries, archives, museums) and news 
organizations into information that can be used in a number of ways both for 
academic and applied research, as well as for tackling real-world problems.
In this chapter, we discuss different aspects of APIs from the perspectives 
of social scientists who use APIs for data collection. We describe (1) the 
origin of APIs in software development, (2) conduct a survey of popular Web 
APIs by type, and (3) discuss issues with regard to the reliability, validity 
and representativeness of data retrieved from APIs. We close by pointing 
to future developments in this area.
API Origins
The Oxford English Dictionary defines an API as ‘the interface between the 
operating system and an application program; the protocol to be observed 
by the writer of an application program designed to run under a particular 
operating system’. Beal (2016) similarly speaks of ‘a set of routines, proto-
cols, and tools for building software applications’ and goes on to say that 
it ‘specif ies how software components should interact’. APIs have a long 
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history in computer programming. They stand in contrast to application 
binary interfaces (ABIs) which are based on binary, rather than interpreted, 
code. An API can make it easier to extend existing applications with new 
features by providing a framework that relies on pre-established functions. 
APIs also facilitate access to data, usually in order to provide new functions, 
which translates into greater utility of the service or application. Data access 
through Web APIs, in contrast to the broader understanding of an API as a 
programming framework that implements a set of standard behaviours (for 
languages such as C or Java), will be our focus in this chapter. APIs are often 
provided in the form of a package or library that includes specifications for 
data structures, functions and object classes. In the case of Web-based SOAP 
and REST services which underpin many popular social media services, a 
Web API is simply a specification of remote calls available to users of the API. 
SOAP and REST are the two most widely used exchange standards for doing 
this on the Web, with REST much more popular. REST is able to return results 
in different formats, most notably JSON, while SOAP supports only XML. 
JSON has proven particularly popular, being both able to represent complex 
data structures and being (relatively) readable to humans, while XML is 
comparatively less easy to learn. Web APIs based on SOAP or REST afford 
essential CRUD operations (create, read, update and delete) that underpin 
most data interactions. In other words, they are much narrower in their abil-
ity but also in their complexity, than are general purpose programming APIs.
Popular Web APIs
Web APIs are a fairly recent innovation in comparison to programming 
APIs in a broader sense. Still more recent is their adoption in social science 
research. The number of REST-based Web APIs listed by ProgrammableWeb, 
a global directory for APIs, surpassed 14,000 in 2015. The list of APIs tracked 
by ProgrammableWeb includes areas such as f inance, science, education, 
mapping, games and messaging.
In addition to private companies, public institutions such as cultural 
heritage organizations and statistics offices increasingly offer APIs. In these 
organizations, APIs are usually part of larger open data strategies. Important 
providers include the UN1, the WHO and the World Bank. Also, many federal 
1 http://data.un.org/Host.aspx?Content=API. The other APIs mentioned below can be found 
through ProgrammableWeb’s directory or the search engine of your choice, using ‘API’ and the 
organization’s name as search terms. 
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and regional governments have implemented Web APIs. Many of these 
can be accessed through open data portals that have been implemented 
in the past years (e.g. data.gov, data.gov.uk, open-data.europa.eu, etc.). 
CKAN, the open-source system behind many open data portals, provides 
the framework for most of these APIs.
A handful of inf luential global news organizations such as the BBC, 
The New York Times, The Guardian, NPR, USA Today and ZEIT Online 
have also started to offer parts of their content through APIs. The biggest 
beneficiaries of this step seem to be the organizations themselves though, 
since the offerings of APIs make internal R&D efforts more eff icient, help 
to further commercialize the news content, and facilitate external networks 
of open innovation (Aitamurto & Lewis 2013). Nevertheless, some content 
and (meta)data can also be used fruitfully for research.
Areas with high volumes of data creation, such as the (life) sciences, 
are particularly open to APIs to facilitate data exchange and enable new 
forms of information reuse. The rOpenSci collection offers a number of API 
libraries for the R programming language. Platforms for publishing and 
storing research data such as Dryad or f igshare can be queried, as can be 
archives of scientif ic articles such as arXiv and PLoS. Countless sources of 
scientif ic data, but also cultural heritage material from Europeana, count-
less museums and the Internet Archive are available.
In addition to the above-mentioned APIs provided in different sectors, 
the APIs of large social media companies have been of great importance 
for the social sciences and humanities in the past years. Some of the most 
popular services, not only for research, include the APIs offered by Facebook, 
Twitter, Reddit and Instagram in the social network category, Google Maps 
and Yelp in the geolocation category, and Spotify and Soundcloud in the 
music category (Brennan 2015).
While these APIs ‘provide new ways of sharing and participating, they 
also provide a means […] to achieve market dominance, as well as undermine 
privacy, data security, contextual integrity, user autonomy and freedom’ 
(Bodle 2011: 320). Therefore, Web APIs cannot be seen solely as support 
software systems. Because they shape the organizations that provide them 
and format the rules under which external software developers can make 
use of them, APIs can be seen as powerful mediators in a dataf ied society 
(Ausserhofer [forthcoming]; Bucher 2013).
Through the establishment of social data APIs, social media companies 
seek to set up an open innovation ecosystem that draws application developers 
to the platform. The companies invest considerable resources to keep external 
programmers engaged with the API because they believe that this improves 
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their internal innovation capacity. Some companies even argue that by giving 
third parties such as researchers access to social trace data, they contribute 
to the public good. While this may be true for some cases, often this can be 
seen as measures for PR purposes, a form of ‘open washing’ (Villum 2014).
Social media platforms process billions of API requests annually. The 
central function of such requests is to provide derivative services or 
functionalities that increase the usefulness of the social media platform. 
However, as company policies change, a company’s data management 
regime may become stricter. Twitter is an example of this approach. Initially 
offering broad access to data in the f irst years of its operation in order to 
encourage development of derivate services, such as software clients for 
unsupported platforms, the company reasserted its control by making 
access to data more restrictive in several successive steps over recent years 
(Puschmann & Burgess 2014). This shift took place alongside acquisitions 
(Tweetdeck, Gnip) and a number of derivate service providers going out of 
business, merging or changing their business model.
Strategic reasons are not the only motivators behind such changes. 
Facebook has greatly restricted access to user data through the API out of 
privacy concerns, as have other platforms. When dubious actors acquire large 
amounts of data that are clearly not used for the API’s intended purpose, 
this often leads to a tightening of policies by the API’s operators, if only 
because providing and sustaining the performance of an API is not trivial 
computationally. When Twitter greatly enhanced the ability of its search API, 
it was largely because the engineering feat of making historical Twitter data 
indexable was very diff icult to resolve (Zhuang 2014). APIs, in other words, 
incur significant costs to businesses which may be invisible to users, who may 
be under the impression that data sits in the company archive like books on a 
shelf, ready to be picked up. Social media data, in addition to being available 
directly from platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, are also 
stored, indexed and repackaged by dedicated social analytics providers such 
as Gnip (owned by Twitter) or Datasift (partnered with Facebook).
Reliability, Validity and Representativeness of API Data
We have so far argued that APIs are a useful data source for scientif ic 
research. There is, however, also reason for scepticism. Commercial plat-
forms such as Facebook and Twitter do not provide their APIs as a service 
to researchers, but have other uses which inhibit reproducible sampling 
and frequently render data sets incomplete (González-Bailón et al. 2014; 
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Gerlitz & Rieder 2013). Capturing data from such platforms is also compu-
tationally resource-intensive, imposing limitations on research. Below, we 
pose a list of questions for scholars who engage in research that is based 
on data from an API. These questions are intended to highlight issues that 
typically arise in research designs that draw upon digital data sources. While 
these are very similar to standard social science tenants of research design, 
it is worthwhile to reiterate some of these issues in the context of data API.
‘How purposeful is the sampling strategy?’
By purposeful we mean, ‘What is the impact of technical constraints on 
sampling?’ How do language implementations of the API, content f ields 
for data and metadata, rate limitations and the availability of APIs for 
certain types of content all shape the sampling strategy? Consider this in 
the context of Twitter. The streaming and search APIs are well-supported 
in different languages. Content is provided in the form of tweets which are 
the preferred unit of analysis over discussion turns, topical frames or other, 
more conceptually-grounded units of analysis. Rate limitations for Twitter 
have become stricter over time, but are still quite lenient. Extracting and 
analysing Twitter data is easier and more popular than Facebook data, even 
though Facebook is far more popular than Twitter (Tufekci 2014).
‘How clear is the sampling procedure?’
By clarity we mean, ‘How clear is it what steps were undertaken to arrive at 
the sample?’ Random stratif ied sampling is traditionally a pillar of empiri-
cal analysis, but this fails in many instances when sampling from social 
media sources. As Ruths and Pfeffer (2014) have pointed out, random Twitter 
samples are non-random in the sense that the server collecting the data and 
fluctuations in message volume both have an impact on the randomness of 
a sample. Since randomness is diff icult to achieve for Twitter researchers 
who do not have access to a large volume (or ideally the entirety) of tweets, 
much sampling relies on snowball sampling or other convenience strategies. 
This is both bad for the reliability of results and raises complexity issues.
‘How reliable is the sampling?’
By this we mean, ‘Would the same query to the API at different times or from 
different people return similar results?’ This is much more straightforward 
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in some APIs than in others, depending on the overall volume of content. 
APIs for archives, online news or public records will be much more reliable 
than commercial APIs for social media content.
‘How valid is the operationalization undertaken in the research?’
By this we mean, ‘Is it analytically sound to operationalize a data variable in 
a particular way?’ Examples would be to characterize the number of follow-
ers a Twitter user has as a measure of her influence or the number of reads 
that an article receives as a measure of its popularity. The issue hardly ends 
there, but research that is based on digital data faces particularly complex 
questions of operationalization because in contrast to data sources such as 
surveys or interviews, the data comes in a highly suggestive pre-packaged 
form. Many social media metrics lead a dual life of meaning for users and 
platform providers with both parties inf luencing them deliberately or 
unintentionally.
‘How representative is the sample of the population?’
By this we mean both, ‘How well does the sample represent that platform 
from which it was drawn?’ and, ‘How well does the platform represent 
other platforms, users or sources of information?’ In the case of Twitter and 
Facebook, it is a nontrivial problem to draw samples that are representative 
of either platform. Secondly, it is equally challenging to formulate valid 
assumptions about how well these samples represent groups of people 
more broadly.
‘How reproducible is the research in total?’
By this we mean, ‘How hard would it be to conduct similar research that 
tests the f indings of the study?’ In the case of exclusively big data samples, 
it is quite hard, just as it would be with smaller but historical samples of 
social media data. APIs as such do much to greatly improve reproducibility, 
by providing a common source of access to researchers. Proprietary data 
sets on CD-ROM or with strict access protection do much to effectively 
limit access, even when there is a general agreement that those who want 
to can gain access. On the other hand, hurdles exist both in relation to 
the computational feasibility of such research and to the technical skills 
required to make use of APIs.
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APIs in the Future
We have sought to show that APIs are an increasingly relevant form of data 
access, both in academic and applied research, and for civil society more 
broadly. In addition to the Web APIs provided by large internet companies 
such as Facebook, Google and Twitter, APIs also proliferate among govern-
ments, scientif ic organizations and NGOs. They are likely to become a more 
widely used channel, assuming that more people are able to access them. 
Competency is the key issue here: Web APIs require basic programming 
knowledge to enable access. This requirement represents a signif icant 
hurdle, and one that cannot be overcome easily. The use of a programming 
language is what makes data access through an API eff icient, and alterna-
tive, more intuitive forms of access incur costs to the data providers and are 
unlikely to scale eff iciently. A second hurdle is the ability of data suppliers 
to control access and the ability to distinguish and, if needed, discriminate 
between users. As society becomes increasingly ‘dataf ied’, the relatively 
informal relationship between API providers and API users will need to be 
codif ied in a way that resembles the relationship between providers and 
users of other (public) services. Public services, such as libraries, and private 
utilities such as the telephone network point into the direction that this 
codif ied relationship may take. As APIs become more and more mundane 
outside of software development, and our reliance on them increases, the 
issue of their reliability too will become ever more important.
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11. How to Tell Stories with Networks
Exploring the Narrative Affordances of Graphs with the Iliad
Tommaso Venturini, Liliana Bounegru, Mathieu Jacomy & 
Jonathan Gray
No doubt, networks have become indispensable mathematical tools in 
many aspects of life in the twenty-f irst century. They allow us to cal-
culate all kinds of relational metrics and to quantify the properties of 
their nodes, clusters and global structures. These modes of calculation 
are increasingly prevalent in an age of digital data. But networks are 
more than formal analytical tools. They are also powerful metaphors of 
our collective life, with all of its complexity and its many dependencies. 
This is why, among the various strategies of data visualization, networks 
seem to have assumed a paradigmatic position, spreading to the most 
different disciplines and colonizing a growing number of digital and 
non-digital objects, sometimes as mere decoration. Contemplating the 
visual representation of a network, we don’t (always) need to compute 
its mathematical properties to appreciate its heuristic value – as anyone 
who has ever used a transit plan knows well. Networks are extraordinary 
calculating devices, but they are also maps, instruments of navigation and 
representation. Not only do they guide our steps through the territories 
that they represent, they invite our imagination to see and explore the 
world in different ways.
Over the past few decades, this visual representation of networks has 
seen a ‘renaissance’ thanks to the development of graphical user interfaces 
and network spatialisation algorithms. The analytical capabilities of graph 
mathematics have been written into software programs that multiply the 
visual representation and exploration of graph properties and extend them 
outside of expert circles (Pousman, Stasko & Mateas 2007). This proliferation 
of visual representations of networks through digital media shifts focus 
from the analytic capabilities of networks and raises questions about how 
such networks may be read narratively (Bounegru, Venturini, Gray & Jacomy 
2016).
Can we think of the visual representations of networks as forms of 
digital storytelling (Couldry 2008; Seegel & Heer 2010)? Can we think 
of network analysis and visualization software packages such as Gephi, 
NodeXL and Pajek, as ‘authoring systems’ (Ryan 2005: 515), that hold 
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specif ic affordances for the production of narratives and the construc-
tion of narrative meaning? And how might the narrative affordances 
of networks be relevant for those conducting research in an ‘age of big 
data’? It is this storytelling potential of networks that will be the focus of 
this chapter, not because this narrative potential is more important than 
the mathematical affordances of networks, but because the latter have a 
long tradition while the former have only recently become the subject of 
academic reflection.
A scan of recent literature reveals – perhaps somewhat surprisingly – that 
‘networks’ and ‘narratives’ have been brought together in recent research 
in information and communication technology and organization studies. 
Concepts such as ‘narrative networks’ and ‘narrative network analysis’ 
have been used to describe organizational forms, processes and routines 
that emerge around information technologies (Pentland & Feldman, 2007; 
Weeks 2014). Other recent literature that is closer to our line of enquiry in 
this chapter uses these concepts to describe the application of network 
analysis to the study of narrative texts. Such work typically aims to bring 
quantitative methodological approaches to bear on and contribute to nar-
rative and social theory by applying network models and social network 
analysis to narrative texts (See e.g. Moretti 2011; Bearman & Stovel 2000; 
Sudhahar, De Fazio, Franzosi & Cristianini 2013).
However, a closer look at these latter studies shows that even when 
network analysis is applied to the study of narrative forms such as novels 
or f ilms, the focus of such studies is on the mathematical properties of 
networks and how they can contribute to the formal or structural analysis 
of texts rather than on the narrative affordances of networks.
A good illustration of this point is provided by a series of papers that, 
in the last few years, have analysed the characters’ networks in classic 
epics and, in particular, the Iliad (Rydberg-Cox 2011; Mac Carron & Kenna 
2012; Miranda, Baptista & Pinto 2013; Kydros, Notopoulos & Exarchos 2015). 
While offering interesting insights into the formal characteristics of the epic 
genre, these papers seem to overlook the fact that, beside the structures of 
the societies they describe, these networks may also be read narratively. 
However, this privileging of particular styles of analysis of networks is not 
without good reason. While the mathematical analysis of networks has 
strong disciplinary roots (such as in graph theory or sociometry), to date the 
conceptualization of the network visual properties remains comparatively 
underdeveloped.
It is for this reason that, in this chapter, we will take a different ap-
proach. We will temporarily bracket the mathematical properties of 
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networks and instead illustrate the narrative and storytelling potential of 
networks. We will do so through an examination of the Iliad’s network of 
characters. Much like the way in which a f ilm or game adaptation of the 
Iliad would reconf igure or reassemble the story in accordance with the 
affordances and constraints specif ic to the medium, we are interested in 
exploring how network analysis as an authoring device organizes stories; 
how it reconf igures and reassembles basic elements of a narrative such 
as characters, plot, events, setting, temporality and causality; and by 
doing so how it mediates and structures the phenomena it represents. 
By this we do not claim network graphs to be narratives per se, but to 
have the potential of ‘possessing narrativity’. The distinction between 
being a narrative and possessing narrativity is aptly described as follows: 
‘The property of “being” a narrative can be predicated on any semiotic 
object produced with the intent of evoking a narrative script in the mind 
of the audience. “Having narrativity,” on the other hand, means being 
able to evoke such a script. In addition to life itself, pictures, music, or 
dance can have narrativity without being narratives in a literal sense’ 
(Ryan 2004: 9).
Even though we illustrate our analysis on a literary text, our objective 
is not to use networks as analytical devices for the study of structural or 
formal properties of narrative texts. Rather, by taking inspiration from 
studies of the storytelling potential of data visualizations more generally 
(as for example in Segel & Heer 2010), we aim to explore the narrative af-
fordances of visual representations of networks. Elsewhere we develop 
the link between the mathematical properties of networks and the stories 
they evoke through an analysis of the use of network graphs in a series of 
journalism projects (Bounegru, Venturini, Gray & Jacomy 2016).
We chose to illustrate the narrative affordances of networks through the 
Iliad because it is a well-known text, allowing the reader to intuitively grasp 
the stories told by the network, albeit different types of stories – which is 
partly the point of this chapter. The typology of ‘network stories’ that we 
illustrate, however, can be applied to the reading of (almost) any network. 
As we will try to show, these stories are rooted in the same local and global 
properties revealed by graph mathematics, only instead of calculating them 
with numbers, we will visualize them and tell them with words.
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Three Perspectives on Networks and Six ‘Network Stories’
In this section, we will examine three different ways to narrate a network, 
corresponding to three different perspectives that can be taken on them. 
Consider the case of a railway map, a kind of network that we are familiar 
with using, reading and dealing with. When looking at it, one can observe:
– The overall shape of the network – exploring, for example, which zones 
are denser in connections (indicating regional agglomerations) and 
which are sparser (indicating rural regions with few urban centres) and 
whether the transportation system is more developed in the north or 
the south, the east or the west.
– The specif ic situation of a given station – examining, for example, how 
some cities (the capitals maybe?) are better connected both in terms 
of the clusters of neighbourhoods around them and routes to further 
regions of the map.
– The connections between two stations or areas – trying, for example, 
to f ind the quickest route from the city where you are to the city that 
you would like to visit or, conversely, contemplating the possibility of 
going on a grand tour of the country.
In the next pages, we will exemplify these three perspectives – each trans-
lating into two different types of ‘network stories’ – in the case of the Iliad’s 
network of characters. Before we introduce our six types of ‘network stories’, 
however, we need to provide some information about the way in which our 
example network has been built. The protocol we used for the def inition of 
the nodes and edges of the Iliad character graph is not particularly strict. 
This is because the focus of this chapter is not to contribute to the study 
of Homer epics, but to illustrate a series of techniques that can be used 
to narrate a network. Therefore, we contented ourselves with creating a 
node for all the entities performing one or more actions that influence the 
development of the story. We have been deliberately liberal in our definition 
of actors, in accordance with insights from Actor-Network Theory (see e.g. 
Latour 2005). Thus we have allowed the nodes of our network to represent 
not only mortals (e.g. Achilles) and divinities (e.g. Zeus), but also groups 
(e.g. the Myrmidons) and objects (e.g. the Golden Apple). Our def inition 
of edges was equally supple: we connected two entities when the action of 
one influenced the action of another (e.g. Odysseus is connected to Achilles 
because if he had not unmasked him from his feminine disguise, the latter 
would have not joined the war).
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To visualize the network data thus obtained, we performed a number 
of operations that we will detail below using the network visualization 
software Gephi1 (for more details, cf. Venturini, Jacomy and Carvalho Pereira 
2015). The most important is the force-vector spatialisation. To place our 
nodes in the space, we used an algorithm that simulates a system of physical 
forces: nodes repulse each other, while edges act as springs attracting the 
nodes that they connect (on the specif ic algorithm we used, cf. Jacomy et al. 
2014). Once the algorithm is launched it changes the distribution of nodes 
until reaching a balance of forces. Force-vector spatialisation minimises 
edge crossing and, most importantly, confers a meaning to the distribution 
of nodes in the space of the graph. At equilibrium, the geometrical distance 
between nodes becomes a proxy for their structural similarity: two nodes 
being closer the more directly or indirectly they are connected. Once the 
network was spatialised we gave nodes a size proportional to their degree, 
i.e. the number of edges adjacent to each node, and a colour corresponding 
to their nature (pink for humans, blue for gods and green for inanimate 
entities).
Knowing Iliad’s storyline, you can look at this network and recognize 
familiar elements in the graph (Figure 11.1). You may even discover things 
you ignored about the relations between characters. However, unless you 
are a network expert, you may not know the conditions under which your 
1 Available at https://gephi.org.
Fig. 11.1:  Graph depicting the network of characters in the Iliad.
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observations are valid. This is not a problem in our case since our goal is 
to explore new narrative scenarios which may be used in the service of 
new modes of interpretation and inquiry. We would use different meth-
ods – such as statistical methods – to test and validate our hypotheses 
(cf. Tukey 1977). In this case our challenge is less to consolidate evidence, 
and more to organize disparate insights into a relevant whole. The six 
narrative views or reading paths we propose are strategies to achieve 
this coherence.
The Panorama > The Camps
The f irst family of narrative readings is called ‘panorama’ as it is meant 
to capture the global distribution of connectivity in the graph. In the two 
‘network stories’ associated with it, ‘the camps’ and ‘the (im-)balance of 
forces’, we will not look at any individual nodes, but rather at the varying 
density of connections in the network. The f irst reading path, in particular, 
is intended to narrate the clusters of the network as camps of nodes that 
gather together in (relatively) tight communities. This view captures two 
opposing camps of characters, represented through two sets of node clusters 
separated by a structural hole (Burt 1995). Taking a bird’s eye view, one notes 
the existence of two main regions in the Iliad graph, which unsurprisingly 
correspond to the two main armies deployed in the f ield (Figure 11.2). 
Network and cluster properties such as density, position and sub-clustering 
Fig. 11.2:  The Panorama > The Camps. Narrative reading of network clusters as 
camps in Iliad’s network of characters.
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also evoke some of the qualities of these two groups of characters and their 
protagonists. The right side of the map is occupied by the Trojans mobilized 
around Prince Hector, King Priam and the city of Troy itself. It is a densely 
connected cluster showing no interior separations. On the other side of the 
graph, the Achaeans are, on the contrary, divided in two main sub-clusters: 
one gathering the main Greek warriors (Odysseus, Agamemnon, Diomedes, 
Nestor and Ajax) and the other occupied by Achilles and his cohort. As 
everyone knows, the Iliad narration begins by describing the rise of just such 
a division over a f ight between Agamemnon and Achilles for the beautiful 
slave Briseis (notably positioned between the two factions) and its sore 
consequences for the Achaeans.
Two other smaller clusters are visible. They both correspond to characters 
that are relatively marginal in the narration of the Iliad itself, but that play 
a crucial role either before or after it. The f irst is located above the Greek 
heroes cluster and notably contains Aphrodite, Helen and the Golden Apple. 
This cluster is the principal cause of the war of Troy. Eris, goddess of Discord, 
offended for not having being invited to the wedding of Thetis and Peleus, 
throws a golden apple inscribed ‘to the fairest’ between Aphrodite, Athena 
and Hera. The three goddesses immediately start to quarrel over the apple 
and soon involve Paris (Prince of Troy and most handsome of the mortals) 
to judge their beauty. Paris gives the Apple to Aphrodite in exchange for 
the love of the prettiest woman in the world, the Spartan queen Helen. The 
Trojan War breaks out over the kidnapping of Helen and the will of Menelaus 
(Helen’s husband) to defend his marriage. The other small cluster (on the 
top left) contains Odysseus’ wife Penelope and son Telemachus who will 
play a crucial role in the narration of the Odyssey.
The Panorama > The Balance of Forces
The second type of ‘panoramic’ narrative reading addresses the balance 
(or imbalance) of the forces expressed in the network (Figure 11.3). To the 
description of the distribution of nodes and edges in clusters, it adds the 
discussion of the consequences that such distribution has on the phenom-
enon described by the graph, reading the nodes as weights and the edges 
as lines of force. The focus is less on how the network is and more on how 
it may evolve.
In our example, despite its duration and its convolution, the outcome 
of the war is never doubted in Homer’s narration. Several prophecies have 
predicted the destruction of the city of Troy, as characters of both camps 
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are often reminded. In Book 8, Zeus weighs the fate of the Trojans and the 
Achaeans on a divine scale and is forced to recognize that (despite his best 
wishes) Troy is bound to fall.
A similar imbalance of forces is clearly visible in the graph, as the size 
of the clusters corresponding to the two camps and their volume of nodes 
shows the Acheans are stronger and more numerous and it is only their 
division that prevents them from winning the struggle. The bigger size 
of the nodes of both the mortals and the gods playing in the Greek camp 
(confronted only by the greatness of Hector) indicates their higher degree 
of mobilization, suggesting that by uniting forces the Achaeans will have 
all the means to prevail.
The Vantage > The Crossroads
The second set of narrative views reads the location and size of nodes in order 
to highlight actors that occupy a vantage position in the network. The first such 
position is that of central nodes that, being highly connected, find themselves 
at the ‘crossroads’ of one or several regions of the graph (Figure 11.4).
In the Greek camp, the most central position is occupied by Odysseus, 
king of Ithaca. The importance of this character in the Iliad is well-known. 
Fig. 11.3:  The Panorama > The Balance of Forces. Narrative reading of cluster 
size and volume of nodes as imbalance of forces in Iliad’s network of 
characters.
how To Tell STorieS wiTh neT worKS 163
Though ruling over a small and not particularly rich island, Odysseus is by 
far the most ingenious of the Achaeans. His presence is felt in almost all 
books of the Iliad, not only f ighting at the side of most other Greek heroes, 
but also through his constant work to keep the Greek army united. He 
repeatedly sermonizes the Greeks to renew their courage; he is the one who 
enrols Achilles in the war (with the ruse of the gift sword), the one who 
brings back Chryseis to her father and appeases the anger of Apollo, the 
preferred referent for Athena interventions; and, of course, the inventor of 
the stratagem of the wooden Horse which eventually wins Troy.
A similar role is played by Nestor, king of Pylos. Nestor is too old to f ight 
directly, but, being the wisest of the Greeks, he counsels the other heroes. In 
particular, he is the one who persuades Patroclus to wear Achilles’ armour 
to frighten the Trojans and push them back from the Achaeans’ ships.
The Vantage > The Bridge
The second type of vantage position is subtler and characterizes nodes 
that, although located in a (relatively) marginal position, f ind themselves 
between two important and separated regions of the graph. Often located 
in one of the structural holes of the network, such nodes work as bridges 
Fig. 11.4:  The Vantage > The Crossroads. Narrative reading of the location and size 
of nodes to identify characters at the crossroads of multiple regions of 
the lliad’s network of characters.
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connecting two or more clusters (and sometime serve as the point of passage 
between them).
In our example, this position is notably occupied by Paris (Figure 11.5). 
Paris is not nearly as central to the Trojan camp as Odysseus is to the Greeks. 
In fact, he is located outside that cluster, somewhere in between the cluster 
of the Trojans and the cluster of Aphrodite and Helen. This position cor-
responds perfectly to the role of the young prince who fails repeatedly to 
support the cause of his city – most notoriously in Book 3 when he loses 
the duel with Menelaus and is saved only by the intervention of Aphrodite 
who teleports him into Helen’s bed. This does not mean, however, that Paris 
does not have a crucial role in the Iliad. On the contrary: by separating 
Helen from Sparta and associating her with Troy he sets the story into 
motion by connecting the otherwise separated peoples of the Achaeans 
and the Trojans.
It is interesting to notice that this capacity to connect different regions 
of the narration is represented by Paris’ ability in archery. The only real 
feat accomplished by the Trojan prince is to put an arrow (which is the 
closest node to him) through Achilles’s vulnerable heel, thereby depriving 
the Greeks of their champion.
Fig. 11.5:  The Vantage > The Bridge. Narrative reading of the location and size of 
nodes to identify characters that occupy ‘bridge’ positions in the Iliad’s 
network of characters.
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The Journey > The Shortcut
The third and f inal set of network views pertains to the paths between 
nodes. Conceptualized as journeys through the graph, these narrative read-
ing paths do not describe the structure of the network but the movements 
that can be made through it. The f irst story of this kind is directly related to 
the peculiar topology of graphs. Although networks can be read to a certain 
extent as geographic charts, their topology is utterly different. Because of 
force-vector spatialisation, the spatial distance separating two nodes is 
not correlated to the length of the travel from one to the other but rather 
to the number of neighbours that they have in common. This means that 
distant regions of the network may sometime be connected by unexpected 
shortcuts. This phenomenon is the source of many surprising f indings in 
graph topologies. The best example of such ‘short paths’ is provided by one 
of the most famous paintings by network artist Mark Lombardi, ‘George 
W. Bush, Harken Energy, Jackson Stephens. c. 1979-1990’, where the painter 
shows how unexpectedly connected the Bush and Bin Laden families are 
due to the entanglement of their respective economic interests.
In our example, we can observe that while occupying two of the fur-
thest and most distanced positions in the graph, Achilles and Hector are 
more directly connected than one would expect (Figure 11.6). Although 
Fig. 11.6:  The Journey > The Shortcut. Narrative reading of paths that cut across 
the network as relationships between otherwise distant characters in 
Iliad’s network of characters.
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the opposition between them configures the Iliad graph digging a large 
structural hole between them, the two protagonists of the story are also 
connected by two two-step paths passing through Achilles’ armour and 
Hector’s corpse. Both these nodes have an important role in the ecology of 
the story: it is because Hector wears the spoils of Achilles that the Greek 
knows through which weak point to stab the Trojan and the Iliad’s last two 
books revolve around the diff iculty of persuading Achilles to release Hec-
tor’s body for proper burial. The symbolic symmetry of these two paths is 
also remarkable as both the armour and the corpse represent the separation 
between the heroes’ spirit and their mortal remains.
The Journey > The Grand Tour
A second type of graph journey can be construed by following the sequence 
of creation of the edges between nodes and thereby reconstructing the 
chronological plot of the network. In this case, the focus is not on the edges 
that can cut across the network and shorten its diameter, but on patiently 
following the largest tour of its perimeter.
Reading our example graph (Figure 11.7) from top to bottom (and colour-
ing the nodes with an increasingly saturated shade of red), we set off from 
Eris’ Golden Apple arousing Aphrodite’s yearning. Aphrodite persuades 
Fig. 11.7:  The Journey > The Grand Tour. Narrative reading of the story timeline by 
‘taking a tour’ of the perimeter of Iliad’s network of characters.
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Paris to call her ‘the fairest of goddesses’ (over Athena and Hera) and in 
exchange helps the young prince to abduct the queen of Sparta and bring 
her to Troy.
The kidnapping of Helen pushes her husband Menelaus to ask his brother 
Agamemnon, king of Argos, for help. Agamemnon calls upon the other kings 
of Greece and convinces them to bring war upon Troy. Nine years after 
the beginning of the siege, the Greeks ransack Chryse (a town allied with 
Troy) and enslave its residents who implore Apollo to send a plague on the 
Achaeans. To appease Apollo, Agamemnon agrees to return Chryses but 
in exchange takes Briseis, one of Achilles’ slaves. Insulted by this action, 
Achilles withdraws from the f ight and retires to his tent.
After several reversals, the war seems to turn in the Trojans’ favour 
and Achilles is implored by his friend Patroclus to lend him his armour. 
Disguised as Achilles, Patroclus enters the f ight and succeeds in pushing 
the Achaeans back. He is, however, killed by Hector, prince and champion of 
the Trojans, who then takes Achilles’ armour. Mad with grief for the loss of 
his friends, Achilles re-enters the f ight and ends up killing Hector, thereby 
def initively tipping the scale against the Trojans.
Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated how narrative meaning can be construed from 
visual properties of network graphs such as topology, density of connec-
tions, absence of connections, size, position and colour of nodes. While the 
narration of networks is as old as social network analysis (cf. Moreno 1934 
for some beautiful examples), such techniques have so far been taken for 
granted. By exploring six narrative readings evoked by the visual proper-
ties of the Iliad’s network of characters, we hope to have made a modest 
contribution towards explicating and formalizing them. The six network 
narrative views we introduced (‘The Camps’, ‘The Balance of Forces’, ‘The 
Crossroads’, ‘The Bridge’, ‘The Shortcut’, and ‘The Grand Tour’) should not 
be considered exclusive or exhaustive. They can be mixed and matched at 
one’s pleasure, and can be complemented by other narrative strategies that 
we have not yet acknowledged.
Why should the narrative affordances of networks be of interest to media 
scholars? As powerful and indispensable as they are, we do not believe 
that the mathematical uses of networks exemplif ied by graph theory are 
in themselves suff icient for describing relational phenomena, nor do they 
fully account for the ways in which networks can be used to organize human 
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attention by bringing certain elements into the foreground and allowing 
others to recede into the background. No matter how many metrics they 
compute, network analysts will always have to provide some description 
of their objects. And this is all the more true for the humanities and social 
sciences, for which textual narration remains the main argumentative tool.
For this reason, the approaches that we outline above do not attempt 
to produce new knowledge about the literary text and advance the under-
standing of Homer’s epic, nor to innovate the methods of graph analysis. In 
reading the graph of the Iliad’s characters, we restricted ourselves to using 
our lay knowledge of the Iliad’s plot, deliberately restraining from original 
interpretations or innovative f indings. We leave the task of using networks 
to investigate narration to another equally interesting but somewhat sym-
metric area of research (cf. Franzosi 2004; Moretti 2015).
Our interest in this chapter was in how narration can help to convey 
f indings about networks. In doing so we have, more modestly, tried to f ill 
a gap in the toolkit for scholars working with networks, a gap that does not 
concern the analytical capacities of networks, but rather the construction 
of meaning from the results of such analyses. Common metaphors that 
compare network visualizations to ‘hairballs’ or ‘bowls of spaghetti’ may 
be considered to point to this gap. Over the many years in which statistics 
has been employed in journalism, sociology, policy and advocacy, we have 
developed a literacy around its visual representations (such as charts and 
tables) and an ability to read them narratively. Similarly, in order for net-
works to become powerful knowledge instruments, we now need to advance 
not just their formal analytical and computational affordances but also 
their narrative ones. It is the latter that this paper has tried to contribute 
to through the development of six narrative views or readings of networks.
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12. Towards a Reflexive Digital Data 
Analysis
Karin van Es, Nicolás López Coombs & Thomas Boeschoten
Introduction
As mentioned in the introduction to this book, in April 2010 flights across 
Europe were grounded due to the prospect of an enormous spreading ash 
cloud caused by the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjaf jallajökull. 
Computer simulations depicted how the volcanic ash would likely dis-
perse. The mathematical models used in these simulations, however, were 
not supplemented with actual samples of the ash concentrations in the 
region. The EU administration received widespread criticism for their blind 
trust in the images produced by the simulations, which not only lacked 
empirical validation but were based on controversial mathematical models 
( Gelernter 2010; Schäfer & Kessler 2013).
Although data analysis is hardly a novel practice, the amount of data 
available to us has drastically increased in recent years. This explosion of 
data has provided researchers with exciting resources to explore social 
practices and relationships and has made new approaches to cultural 
analysis possible (Berry 2011: 1). The current wealth of data can tempt the 
humanities researcher to adopt new forms of empiricism. However, data are 
not natural phenomena, but always exist within a particular social context. 
It is all too easy to lose sight of the fact that ‘all data provide oligoptic views 
of the world: views from certain vantage points, using particular tools, 
rather than an all-seeing, infallible God’s eye view’ (Kitchin 2014b: 4). When 
it comes to sifting and analysing this data, a critical attitude is therefore 
necessary. Scholars, indeed required by our datafied society to develop new 
literacies and competencies (see Uricchio in this volume; Rieder & Röhle 
in this volume and Montfort 2016), can also rely on the skills they already 
possess. Trained in critical inquiry, they are particularly well equipped, we 
would suggest, to consider the ways that data are ‘cooked’ (Bowker 2013). By 
raising questions at the various stages of digital data research, this chapter 
brings into focus how researchers and their tools shape data. In so doing it 
advocates for a reflexive form of data analysis and data visualization that 
can serve as a critical intervention to dispel the blind optimism and faith 
in the objective quantif ication of human behaviour and sociality through 
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Big Data (Van Dijck 2014). We seek to expose the limitations and biases of 
contemporary data analysis, which can result in rash, consequential and 
regrettable decision-making, as was the case with the Eyjaf jallajökull ash 
cloud.
We begin with a brief review of two misconceptions concerning Big 
Data research that need to be addressed, since they conceal implicit 
choices made prior to starting research. We then consider questions that 
correspond to each phase of data analysis. These by no means exhaustive 
explorations represent an initial attempt to outline a ref lexive, trans-
parent procedure to guide digital data research. We recognize that the 
publication space for documenting methodologies is limited (Bruns 2013) 
and that choices need to be made in what to communicate to others. This 
does not, however, alleviate scholars from the obligation to consider and 
document their decision-making process. Although we draw primarily 
from our own experience of working with social media data, the ref lec-
tions provoked by these questions are fruitful for data analysis more 
generally.
Two main misconceptions
Among the many misconceptions about Big Data (see, for example, boyd & 
Crawford 2013), there are two widespread assumptions that are arguably the 
most crucial to correct before embarking on data-driven research, as their 
implicit choices have serious consequences for the subsequent research 
process.
First, Big Data is presumed to have the inherent ‘authority’ to speak 
for itself – as when Chris Anderson (2008) notoriously declared that the 
current deluge of data has rendered the scientif ic method obsolete. Schol-
ars such as Rob Kitchin (2014b) and Nick Couldry (2016) have criticized 
the idea that knowledge production is free from theory or human bias 
and interpretation. Kate Crawford concurs: ‘Data and data sets are not 
objective; they are creations of human design. We give numbers their 
voice, draw inferences from them, and def ine their meaning through our 
interpretations. Hidden biases in both the collection and analysis stages 
present considerable risks’ (2013: para. 2). We can add that algorithmic 
tools are, by nature, opaque to most researchers (see Paßmann & Boersma 
in this volume).
Because data are not natural resources existing a priori to be extracted, 
but rather cultural entities that are co-produced (Vis 2013), both Johanna 
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Drucker (2011) and Kitchin (2014a) make the distinction between data 
(‘given’ in Latin) and capta (‘taken’), each preferring the latter term. Which-
ever term is used, data/capta are selected and shaped by humans and their 
technologies. We intend to reflect on this process through the questions 
we raise in this chapter.
Second, there is the common misconception that digital data analysis 
involves amassing large amounts of data and using calculations to detect 
underlying patterns. This view ties in with, or derives from, two other 
mistaken assumptions: that all data analysis is quantitative, and that 
any analysis involving calculations seeks solely to establish patterns. 
As in other academic f ields, scholars within media studies use differ-
ent methods to answer different types of research questions. Such an 
approach also applies (or should apply) when data are involved. Some 
researchers aim simply to ascertain how often something has happened 
(e.g. how often certain words are used); others, however, seek to discover 
how or why it has happened – requiring, in the latter case, a qualitative 
approach (Crawford 2013: para. 7). This observation is particularly relevant 
for the humanities. As Kitchin argues, quantitative approaches, while 
useful ‘in regards to explaining and modelling instrumental systems’, are 
limited when it comes to trying to understand human life (2014a: 145).
In the humanities, data analysis often combines quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. For example, Lev Manovich (2012), referring to 
Franco Moretti’s notion of ‘distant reading’,1 sees more benefit in an oscil-
lation between the two than in simply sticking to one of these orientations. 
Likewise, Burdick et al. (2012) propose a digital humanities practice in 
which ‘toggling’ between both perspectives (and their attendant methods) 
would become the norm (30). However, we should not forget that even 
research that relies heavily on computational tools for the calculation 
of large amounts of data and the visualization of patterns still requires 
the researcher to interpret these patterns. As Manovich observes, ‘[w]hile 
computer-assisted examination of massive cultural data sets typically 
reveals new patterns in this data […] a human is still needed to make 
sense of these patterns’ (2012: 468–69). Making sense of such patterns, 
Kitchin stresses, ‘requires social [or, we might add, cultural] theory and 
deep contextual knowledge’ (2014: 144).
1 The identif ication of large-scale trends, patterns and relationships in large numbers of 
literary texts, as opposed to the ‘close reading’ of individual texts, a common endeavour in 
literary studies.
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Doing Digital Data Analysis
Because digital data analysis involves many possible methods, each of 
which functions best in conjunction with a theoretical framework that 
invests the collected data with meaning, one must carefully reflect on the 
procedures for working with data. The following section discusses how to 
work with data in a reflexive fashion – that is, in which researchers consider 
their own role in the construction of the data. Moreover, this approach 
entails that researchers take responsibility to discern how the given tools 
work with and shape the data. To fully adopt such a reflexive approach, 
researchers must consider important questions that relate to each of the 
three stages of digital data analysis: acquiring, cleaning and analysing. 
These phases, inspired by the seven stages of visualization (acquiring, 
parsing, f iltering, mining, representing, ref ining and interacting) that 
Ben Fry (2007) explores in Visualizing Data, are meant to elicit a critical 
review of the data-making process. The researcher should be able to answer 
each of the questions and consider which ones to highlight in the analysis; 
communicating these questions to others helps keep the research process 
transparent. The answers need not necessarily be addressed at length 
in the f inal research product; they can often be referenced as footnotes, 
summarized in an attachment or, in the case of visualizations, supplied 
via explanatory captions.
1. Acquiring: Selecting Sources and Obtaining Data
No matter what the goal of the analysis, the researcher must identify and 
gather the relevant data at an early stage in the process in order to answer 
the research question. In digital data analysis there are four principal 
ways to acquire such data sets. First, researchers can create their own 
data – through surveys and interviews, the counting of phenomena, or 
the tracking of uses and practices (for example, by using A/B testing or 
analytics software). Second, they can download (open) data made available 
by governments or institutions such as WikiLeaks or the Pew Research 
Center. Third, they can extract data from the application programming 
interfaces (APIs) of popular platforms such as Google Maps, Twitter and 
Flickr through the writing of code or the use of readymade data extraction 
applications that enable researchers to retrieve data from the company’s 
database in standard f ile formats. Finally, they can purchase access to data 
through social media API aggregation companies such as Gnip, Topsy and 
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DataSift. However, researchers should be aware that the existence of such 
commercial resellers limits free access to social media data (Manovich 
2012). Indeed, each form of data gathering carries its own limitations and 
biases. APIs, for instance, not only provide data but are themselves ‘data 
makers’ as well: they construct and provide access to certain (meta)data 
(Vis 2013). This raises further questions about the reliability and validity of 
the data, as well as how representative it is (see Cornelius Puschmann and 
Julian Ausserhofer in this volume). Moreover, biases already exist in data 
sets in that data collection privileges certain social groups (see Leurs and 
Shepherd in this volume).
Although online data are readily available, such accessibility does not 
necessarily mean that it is ethical for researchers to use them (boyd & 
Crawford 2013; Zimmer 2010). Despite such data being ‘public’, people have 
expectations as to how this information will be presented and employed 
(see Markham & Buchanan 2012). Undertaking large-scale online research 
thus prompts a series of ethical questions. As a result of the signif icant 
changes in the scale and scope of data, traditional ethical guidelines 
relating to ‘informed consent’ and privacy, as well as the def inition of 
‘human subjects’ and the concept of ‘harm’ in relation to participants, 
need to be revisited (see Van Schie, Westra & Schäfer in this volume). 
Prior to embarking on any research project, one must consider research 
ethics (Markham & Buchanan discuss guidelines in their contribution to 
this volume) and assess who is doing the asking – and how that shapes 
research outcomes.
The researcher’s f irst challenge is to def ine the research data. This 
process should be guided by theory, a research question or preliminary 
explorations. Note here that not all research requires ‘big’ data, and in 
some cases ‘small data’ (e.g. a focus on a single individual) can be more 
productive (boyd & Crawford 2013: 670). Small data afford different kinds 
of questions and methods than Big Data, and therefore yield different kinds 
of knowledge. The type of data collected depends on the research question 
(although the f irst analysis of a data set can also lead to the formulation 
of a research question). When acquiring data for research, whether big or 
small, the following questions should be considered:
– What ethical considerations have been taken into account when col-
lecting the research data?
– What kind of data is being used?
– How was the data collected? Which tools or software were used, or who 
supplied the data?
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– Which criteria were used to select the data set? Who is included or 
excluded from the data set?
– What are the limitations of these data-gathering methods? How reliable 
is the method of data collection?
– What metadata does the data set contain (for example, location, time, 
date of a tweet)?
– When combining data sets, what biases might result from the different 
contexts in which the data originated?
2. Cleaning: Parsing and Filtering Data
After reflecting on how the data was retrieved, the researcher needs to 
explain the decisions made to prepare for subsequent analysis, which also 
involves removing certain data from the data set. This part of the process 
concerns how the data has been organized into categories and which data 
has been retained. Researchers may f ind that a single data set is not suf-
f icient to realize their objectives. This problem can often be addressed by 
combining data sets or enriching the data. One may include answers to the 
following questions in the analysis:
– What categories are used to organize the data?
– What do the categories assume about the meaning of the data to be 
measured and/or calculated?
– How has irrelevant data (that is, spam or ‘noise’) been dealt with?
– What is the ‘quality’ of the data (for example, were some data wrongly 
formatted and did they have to be restored)?
– How has the data(set) been enriched? For what purposes?
Here, it is important to recognize that when we organize data into categories 
(according to population, gender, nation, etc.), these categories tend to be 
treated as if they were discrete and f ixed, when in fact they are interpretive 
expressions (Drucker 2011).
3. Analysing: Mining, Representing and Refining Data
To understand the data and discern underlying patterns, researchers 
will often use statistical and data-mining methods (Fry 2007: 5). Digital 
data analysis requires a basic knowledge of math and statistics (that is, 
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sampling and calculating mode/mean/median), so that researchers can 
assess whether patterns in the data are the result of chance and determine 
what biases are at play. Moreover, when studying social networks, one 
should also be aware that ‘the degree distribution typically follows a power 
law distribution, i.e. most people have a few friends, while few people have 
[a great] many friends’ (Tang et al. 2012: 5). In such instances it is futile to 
discuss averages.
Prior to f inding correlations and making statistical claims, researchers 
should provide for the reader an assessment of the value and meaning 
of the metrics they are using. For example, in working with information 
gleaned from social media, it is generally taken for granted that ‘shares’, 
‘likes’, ‘follows’ and ‘retweets’ are salient research material, although the 
meaning of each online gesture is not self-evident. Although it is easy to 
f igure out which users have been retweeted most often, it is not clear what 
this means (why people have retweeted others’ tweets); to discover the 
answer requires different, qualitative methods. The prestructured actions 
one f inds on social media are not always similar and comparable (see the 
interview with Carolin Gerlitz in this volume). To put it simply, not all ‘likes’ 
are created equal.
Although large data sets are useful for detecting patterns and connections, 
Big Data research risks having its practitioners see correlations everywhere 
(Marcus & Davis 2014). The opposite of abductive reasoning, this tendency 
is called ‘apophenia’, def ined by Dan Dixon as ‘pattern recognition gone 
wrong, seeing only the pattern expected, no matter what data leads to it’ 
(2012: 202). It is a particular pitfall in Big Data research since not all patterns 
and relationships found in the data are meaningful or truthful (Kitchin 2014: 
13). We should recall here the commonplace of statistics that ‘correlation 
does not imply causation’ and the fallacy that data is self-evident.
In addition to statistical methods, there are numerous ways to visualize 
data and many tools for doing so. Visualizations ‘may be used as analytical 
and interpretive tools – to reveal patterns or anomalies or concurrences – or 
they may be produced to illustrate f indings or serve as the distillation of an 
argument’ (Burdick et al. 2012: 43). They can also be used to tell stories in 
new ways, emphasizing different relations (see Venturini et al. in this vol-
ume). Instruments of visualization range from easy-to-use tools that provide 
WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get) interfaces for data taken directly 
from cloud services, databases, APIs (social-media-metrics providers such 
as Buzzcapture, Salesforce, OBI4wan, etc.) or imported spreadsheets such as 
Tableau and Gephi, to more sophisticated means that require programming 
(for example, R and D3) or designing in programs such as Illustrator.
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Although each tool raises its own specif ic questions, the following will 
apply in most instances:
– How was the data prepared and combined for visualization (by filtering, 
transforming, calculating and enriching)?
– What purpose does the visualization serve?
– Why has this type of visualization been selected?
– How have the colours, sizes and shapes in the visualization been 
determined?
– What software has been used and why? What computational methods 
does the research employ?
– Which settings and algorithms were applied?
– How have the decisions related to the above-mentioned questions 
highlighted or downplayed aspects of the underlying data set?
Each graph and illustration should be provided with a number and a descrip-
tion, and in the analysis itself, it is important to differentiate between 
description (for example, an explanation of the content, type of graph, 
sample size, etc.) and the interpretation of what is shown.
Conclusions
The Icelandic ash cloud debacle caused cancellations of some 100,000 flights, 
stranded 10 million people and collectively cost airlines and airports over 2 
billion dollars (The Telegraph 2011). For many EU citizens, it was also their 
most memorable exposure to data research, understandably triggering 
academic criticism over the objective appearance of the visuals (Schäfer & 
Kessler 2013). To overcome this signif icant blot on the f ield of digital data 
analysis, we need to engage critically and transparently with data. It is 
crucial for researchers to reveal how they and the tools they use have shaped 
their research, and how the data they employ has been influenced by the 
platforms they originated on. When undertaking data analysis, therefore, 
the researcher must reflect on the following considerations:
– where the data came from;
– who produced the data and for what purposes;
– what data are selected and how they relate to the larger data set;
– which tools were used for collection and analysis;
– why certain data and metrics were used for the research.
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These considerations are mirrored in the more detailed questions relating 
to the phases of the research process; they can help create awareness of 
the choices made by researchers during their research and debunk the 
common misconception that data and data visualizations are neutral and 
objective. They represent a f irst attempt to cast light on the inner workings 
of Big Data research and join the plea that we as researchers have to be 
more transparent in our procedures in working with data. For consumers 
of data, these efforts will hopefully contribute to an increased awareness of 
the stages involved in the production of data and the adoption of a critical 
stance towards the data they interpret and make sense of. As we come to live 
in an increasingly datafied society, these aims seem more relevant than ever.
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13. Get Your Hands Dirty
Emerging Data Practices as Challenge for Research Integrity
Gerwin van Schie, Irene Westra & Mirko Tobias Schäfer
Introduction
In November 2014 two interns (the f irst two authors of this chapter listed 
above) at the Utrecht Data School started investigating an online discussion 
forum for patients under the supervision of Mirko Tobias Schäfer (this es-
say’s third author). Without his knowledge and without any prior knowledge 
of scraping websites, the two students downloaded 150,000 patient profiles 
(which included, amongst other information, age, location, diagnoses and 
treatments related to these patients), using a (90-euro) off-the-shelf scraper 
tool1, without informing these patients or requesting consent from them 
or the platform providers. The plan to f irst explore the data (taking the 
necessary precautions to keep the data confidential) and later, after for-
mulating a research question and hypothesis, to ask permission to conduct 
in-depth analysis of data relevant for our research, was never realized. 
After a few days of acting like ‘information f lâneurs’ (Dörk et al. 2011), 
browsing through the data without specif ic questions or goals in mind, 
we were notif ied that our department’s supervisors had terminated the 
project due to concerns about research ethics.2 Their decision prompted 
us to rethink our actions and to question our research practices as well as 
existing research standards. Assuming that the rather novel data sources 
and practices of analysis were disrupting the traditional research process 
and contradicting established guidelines in research ethics, we found that 
these events provided the inspiration to revisit research ethics concerning 
big data research.
1 Outwit Hub, www.outwit.com/products/hub/.
2 After learning about the data scraping, the project supervisor (Mirko Tobias Schäfer) im-
mediately reported the project to the director of the research school who informed the vice dean 
of research and the ethics committee. While the decision was pending all data were stored in a 
secured environment and access was limited to the investigators and documented accordingly. 
After the board’s decision to terminate the project the data were securely deleted. It must be 
emphasized that the students’ activities – despite being disputable – were considered legal as 
the information was openly available.
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Although the forum we investigated was not technically a social network 
site (SNS), we think that the issues we will discuss in this chapter are very 
similar to the ethical issues relevant to the investigation of SNSs. The 
characteristics of available (big) data sets and emerging data practices 
do not always afford a practice that complies with traditional standards 
of research integrity. Such standards were very much informed by events 
marked by severe human rights violations and scholarly misconduct. They 
responded to incidents in which the lives of ‘human subjects’ were harmed. 
Although current research practices do not necessarily cause physical pain, 
they may violate personal integrity and fail to meet privacy standards by 
accidentally revealing someone’s personal identity or sensitive information 
about individuals who are part of the sample. When investigating a Web 
forum for patients aff licted with a specif ic disease, the authors of this 
chapter experienced the various promises and pitfalls of digital methods. 
Drawing from this experience, we reviewed existing standards of scholarly 
research practice, focusing particularly on media studies. This chapter 
revisits the formative guidelines that provided the historical basis for cur-
rent ethical research guidelines, including the Nuremberg Code (1947), the 
Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association 2013) and the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO 2006). We will argue 
that the existing ethical guidelines are relics of discourses and eras that 
have very little to do with Big data research as it is now conducted. In 
addition, referring to a case study that describes our own experiences, we 
will explain how big data research on social networking sites makes the 
concept of informed consent, a basic principle of all current guidelines, 
practically infeasible. Building on the guidelines that have been written for 
internet researchers (Markham & Buchanan 2012), we will conclude with 
a proposal for a research structure consisting of three stages, each with its 
own ethical considerations: design, safe data exploration and data analysis.
Big Data and the Humanities
Under the label ‘digital humanities’, several novel research practices have 
been developed within social research and media and cultural studies 
(e.g. Berry 2012; Burdick et al. 2012). For a long time these domains have 
been strongholds of qualitative research, participatory observation and 
hermeneutic approaches to textual analysis. Now, new data-driven and 
computer-aided methods have stirred up dust within departments that 
had seldom been compelled to question their professional standards of 
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conduct. The rapidly changing situation is now marked by unprecedented 
access to vast data resources and innovative tools to collect and connect 
large numbers of data points. As a result, some of these digital humanities 
projects require skilful interdisciplinary cooperation. Researchers even 
seek out collaborations with programmers, entrepreneurs, corporations 
and organizations who contribute technology support, data collection, data 
hosting or other services. On the other hand, as in our case study, there are 
now tools that allow researchers with relatively limited technical skills 
to adopt some of the new practices. Additionally, researchers and their 
academic institutions have become concerned with the data samples and 
the practices of investigating the data (Rieder & Röhle 2012). The so-called 
T3 study (Lewis et al. 2008) and the more recent Facebook study (Bond et al. 
2012) have come to the attention of institutional review boards and scholars 
alike, who point to the need to consider privacy concerns and informed 
consent when using (big) data from social media platforms (Zimmer 2010).
However, scholars cannot neglect the unprecedented access to new 
data resources. Historians, literature scholars and information and library 
scientists quickly recognized that digitized texts provide rich data with 
which to address novel research questions. Within media studies, the added 
value of ‘natively digital’ elements was quickly recognized and used for 
research (Rogers 2009). Pioneered by media scholar Richard Rogers, it led 
to the emergence of a set of practices and tools to systematically collect 
and analyse these data from Web platforms (Rogers 2013). Using digitized 
cultural artefacts from films to graphic novels to the metadata of Instagram 
photos, Lev Manovich (2012) applied his approach of ‘Cultural Analytics’ to 
use analysis software to detect patterns of cultural production and media 
use. These new practices are rapidly changing the f ield of media studies in 
general and new media studies in particular, as knowledge of these tools 
and practices is increasingly a requirement in academic hiring. In the f ield 
of sociology, the emergence of newly accessible data sources and novel 
analysis tools has led to a debate that revisits the notion of the ‘empirical’. 
It became clear that the sheer size and variety of the data problematize 
‘stock-in-trade analytic methods’ (Abbott 2000: 298) and that the existing 
methods of explanation were not suited to the ‘increasing availability of 
a wide range of data that previously was not easily accessible, but is now 
routinely collected as part of information and communication techniques’ 
(Adkins & Lury 2009: 15).
In this article, we consider how these recent changes in tools and prac-
tices affect research methods and ethics. Informed consent – the principle 
value of research ethics in the social sciences – is under pressure due to two 
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technological advances: the rise of the internet and big data technologies. 
In the following paragraphs we will explain the origins of informed consent 
and the way it should be dealt with in the f ield of big data research on SNSs.
Finding Suitable Guidelines
As early as 2002, Michelle White discussed the limitations of the use of 
one single guideline to govern the spectrum of possible ways of conducting 
research on the internet:
It seems unlikely that any single guideline for Internet research ethics 
can resolve conflicts between the disciplines. For instance, the ‘Protec-
tion of Human Subjects’ document requires that ‘risks to subjects are 
reasonable in relation to anticipated benef its, if any, to subjects, and 
the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to 
result’ and MLA mandates that ‘whether a line of inquiry is ultimately 
useful to society, colleagues, or students should not be used to limit the 
freedom of the scholar pursuing it’ (Code of Federal Regulations. 2001, 
Title 45, Part 46). Obviously, a more careful articulation of both ‘subject’ 
and ‘representation’ would aid in these considerations. At the moment, 
guidelines for Internet research have not addressed such disciplinary 
conflicts and have instead almost completely ignored the conventions 
in a number of Humanities disciplines. (White 2002: 255-256)
As an emerging digital humanities discipline, big data research has exactly 
these problems. First, because it takes a hypothesis-generating approach 
to data, often the usefulness of a line of inquiry is not known beforehand. 
On an institutional level this is problematic, since requesting funds or 
grants for research often requires that research objectives be described 
in advance. In other instances, ethical guidelines can complicate the ap-
plication, as many issues are ambiguous and unclear, such as the extent to 
which public profiles and publicly posted information are subject to privacy 
regulations. Other cases have sparked criticism after publication for the 
supposed disregard of ethical guidelines. Frequently mentioned in this 
regard is the so-called Facebook study, which received wide media coverage 
(Bond et al. 2012). A massive outcry about the researchers’ supposedly reck-
less behaviour arose when it was revealed that user timelines were being 
manipulated to investigate the emotional impact of Facebook’s news feed 
on users (Puschmann & Bozdag 2014; Schroeder 2014). Informed consent 
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was construed as being given through the user’s acceptance of Facebook’s 
terms of use at sign-up. This act was conveniently interpreted to signify the 
user’s agreement to their data being used for research. The data for the study 
was generated by manipulating the timelines of a large group of Facebook 
users, in total 60,055,176 prof iles. Facebook employees anonymized the 
data before handing it over to the researchers. Because the researchers were 
not dealing with data that could be connected to identif iable individuals, 
they did not classify the research as human subject research and assumed 
they did not have to comply with regulations regarding such practices 
(Carberry 2014, in a press release by Cornell University Media Relations). 
In countries not making use of IRBs, the solution to the problem of possible 
ethical breaches has to be sought in more general guidelines governing the 
conduct of individual researchers. Michelle White makes a good start by 
proposing the use of ethical principles stemming from other disciplines. 
Regarding informed consent in internet research, she offers an argument 
based on the relation and difference between human subjects and their 
online representations in the form of prof iles and accounts (2002: 249).
Informed Consent
Informed consent has been an integral part of all guidelines concerning 
human subject research in the medical, sociological and psychological 
f ields. How this principle should be used in the f ield of internet research on 
SNSs is still heavily debated. Psychologist Ilka Gleibs (2014) has discussed 
ethics in large-scale online studies on social network sites. She argues that 
informed consent of participants is needed when one wants to use data 
from these sites:
The use of informed consent is important because it allows participants 
to make a choice and signals their willing participation. As researchers 
we show respect for the individuals’ autonomy, which is a fundamental 
ethical principle. (Gleibs 2014: 5)
Referring to the controversial T3 study (Lewis et al. 2008), Michael Zimmer 
(2010) emphasizes the need to hold on to existing research standards, argu-
ing that one cannot be ethically lax simply because these data are freely 
available via Facebook. The recent controversy about the Facebook study 
(Bond et al. 2012) mentioned above, which manipulated Facebook timelines 
without users’ consent, indicates that certain research practices conflict 
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with the traditional understanding of research integrity. Indeed, for many 
SNS research projects, informed consent represents the underlying pact 
between researcher and the subjects in the ‘f ield’:
[I]n order to represent and analyse pertinent social phenomena, some 
researchers collect data from social media without considering that the 
lack of informed consent would in any other form of research (think of 
psychological or medical research) constitute a major breach of research 
ethics. (Zwitter 2014: 5)
To understand the conflicting visions of how to investigate social phenom-
ena on Web platforms, we recall how ethical standards for research includ-
ing human subjects came into being. The Nuremberg Code, the Declaration 
of Helsinki and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
are three regulatory guidelines that are often cited in academic discourse 
on human subject research (White 2002; Buchanan & Ess 2008; Markham & 
Buchanan 2012; Gleibs 2014; Dumas et al. 2014: 375). The Nuremberg Code3 
is one of the f irst documents on human rights that characterizes voluntary 
informed consent as a fundamental ethical principle (Grodin 1994). But 
one of its problems, according to physician researchers, is that it did not 
take clinical research on children, patients or mentally impaired persons 
into account (Annas 1992: 122) The Declaration of Helsinki can be seen as a 
more elaborate and more easily applicable document than the Nuremberg 
Code (ibid.). One big difference concerns the expertise of the writers who 
wrote the documents: the Nuremberg Code was issued by judges (who 
adopted and expanded ethical principles initially provided by psychiatrist 
and neurologist Leo Alexander), whereas the Declaration of Helsinki was 
written by physicians. Another difference is that the latter has been revised 
regularly: six revisions have been made since the f irst version appeared in 
1964. After all these years, the Declaration is even referred to as ‘the most 
widely accepted guidance worldwide on medical research involving human 
subjects’ (Christie 2000: 913). Ethical guidelines should not be static, and 
the Declaration of Helsinki proves to be a good model of a set of protocols 
that has been adapted to meet evolving needs and situations.4 The Universal 
3 ‘Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council 
Law 10’ (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Print 
Off ice, 1950). Military Tribunal 1, Case 1, United States v. Karl Brandt et al., October 1946 – April 
1949, Vol. I, pp. 1-1004; Vol. II, pp. 1-352 (1949).
4 For more substantive information, the article ‘The Revision of the Declaration: the past, present 
and the future’ by Robert V. Carlson, Kenneth M. Boyd and David J. Webb (2004), is recommended.
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Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is the first document that binds 
UNESCO member states – 195 countries – to one declaration (Berlinguer & 
De Castro 2003). As its title indicates, its purpose is to provide guidelines for 
ethical issues ‘related to medicine, life sciences and associated technologies 
as applied to human beings, taking into account their social, legal and 
environmental dimensions’ (UNESCO 2006).
Ethical Decision-making in Internet Research
The Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki and the Universal Decla-
ration on Bioethics and Human Rights were all binding (to varying degrees), 
but each was written under different circumstances, employed different 
discourses, and was conceived with different kinds of research in mind. 
According to Dumas et al. (2014: 375) there are, in general, two features 
evident in most research regulations around the world: f irst, regulations 
are often written in reaction to unacceptable research practices (as with, 
for example, the origins of the Nuremberg Code, which was formulated in 
the wake of Nazi atrocities); second, these regulations often do not take 
into account evolving forms of technology (such as possibilities for data 
gathering). Writers who have accounted for the current state of technology, 
such as Zwitter (2014: 375) and boyd & Crawford (2012), have been vague. The 
closest attempt to a set of guidelines for internet research has been written 
by the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR), an academic association 
focused on the cross-disciplinary f ield of internet studies. This association 
promotes critical and scholarly internet research. It drafted a f irst version 
of the AoIR Ethical Decision Making document in 2002. A second version 
appeared in 2012, as the association had decided that a revision was in order 
because the scope and context of internet research had changed rapidly. 
The AoIR encourages internet research independent of traditional academic 
borders (AoIR 2015); its basic ethical principles rely on, amongst others, the 
Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki: ‘We accept them as basic 
to any research endeavour’ (Markham & Buchanan 2012: 4). The problem 
of internet research that has to be faced, according to AoIR, is caused by 
the dynamic evolution of the f ield of research:
This dynamism is reflected in the fact that as of the time of this writing, 
no off icial guidance or ‘answers’ regarding internet research ethics have 
been adopted at any national or international level. (ibid.: 2)
190 Gerwin van Schie, irene weSTra & MirKo TobiaS Schäfer 
The association has no intention of providing ‘definitive’ regulations that 
would foreclose further discussion about how to do internet research in an 
appropriate way: ‘We emphasize that no set of guidelines or rules is static; 
the f ields of internet research are dynamic and heterogeneous’ (ibid.: 2). 
Thus the Ethical Decision Making document – and this is ultimately a short-
coming – proposes an extensive list of ‘Internet Specif ic Ethical Questions’ 
to ‘prompt reflection about ethical decision making within the specif ic 
conf ines of one’s study’ (ibid.: 8): it is up to the researcher to determine 
which questions are relevant for the research being conducted, and which 
ones are not. The f ield of big data has not yet been discussed extensively; 
however, in earlier work, Markham has discussed certain characteristics of 
qualitative research ethics that have interesting similarities with the way 
big data research is being done:
Ethics is considered an a priori stance, often regulated more than felt 
by the researcher. Research design is often considered a procedural 
or logistic matter, mostly followed, not questioned, particularly if the 
researcher is within junior ranks of the profession or working within a 
discipline that values adherence to particular approaches. The considera-
tion of research design as a given is founded in epistemologies that value 
precision, replicability, validity, and objectivity, all of which require a 
priori determination of activities. Any interference in the procedures or 
disruption of pre-determined standards is discouraged because it may 
invalidate the study. This is antithetical to the idea of context sensitivity 
and reflexivity. (Markham 2006: 43)
Several problems need to be addressed to ensure that in the future, 
researchers focusing on big social data can do their research in an ethi-
cal way. Markham & Buchanan (2015) notice the different fundamental 
values expressed in the European and American guidelines. Whereas the 
UNESCO code takes a de-ontological approach (some boundaries should 
never be crossed), the American Belmont Report has a utilitarian basis 
(benef its can outweigh downsides). In the following paragraph we will 
explain how one need not be forced into a choice between a utilitarian 
and a de-ontological approach if one adopts a stance of ethical pluralism 
(Ess 2006; 2007). The underlying question here concerns the possibility of 
research interest trumping research ethics. This matter can entail harsh 
consequences when one is dealing with, for example, found (or stolen) data 
sets. One well-known case is the Ashley Madison data leak, in which user 
prof iles on a popular adulterous dating site were made public. The leak of 
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hacked data revealed not only subscribers’ personal information but also 
the site’s heavy use of bots so that it would appear to have far more female 
users than it actually did and to encourage communication on the site 
(Newitz 2015). Also well known is the so-called Cablegate case. At the end 
of 2010, WikiLeaks publicized internal communications of the American 
diplomatic corps (The Guardian 2010). As these cables have still not been 
declassif ied by the American government, several US-based journals of 
political science have been declining papers that use the cables as sources of 
information, effectively preventing scholars from using crucial information 
for research (Michael 2015).
Another important issue is the possibility of using new tools for data 
gathering or scraping. With these tools, websites and online communi-
ties can be studied even if they would not like to participate in research. 
Software like Import.io and Outwit Hub make it incredibly easy to scrape 
databases from public websites and make them searchable and usable for 
research. Additional tools can be used to anonymize individuals in the data 
sets. Platform providers prevent automatic scraping through the block-
ing of suspicious IP addresses, but such measures can be circumscribed 
through the use of VPNs or proxies. Marketeers, spammers and researchers 
routinely employ such tools to gather information. Often neither the tools 
nor the collection of data are illegal, even if the terms of use of a platform 
state otherwise. Researchers therefore f ind themselves in a dilemma. Their 
fair use guidelines and the widely shared imperative of informed consent 
require them to inform populations on platforms and platform providers 
about what they are doing. Michael Zimmer emphasizes that the frequent 
excuse that the data is being made publicly available is unacceptable (2010). 
However, as we will point out below, it is not always feasible or desirable to 
comply with the consent requirement.
Case Study: Big Data Research Without Informed Consent
In November 2014, we started to conduct a big data research project on a 
discussion board of patients afflicted with the same illness. After logging 
in, the profiles of all members were open for inspection. This included all 
the information they chose to share with the community. To explore this 
information we used a scraping tool to scrape all information from all 
prof iles. We found out that about 15 percent of the community had f illed 
in quite detailed information about their specif ic condition. Similar to 
what happens quite often in a big data research project, we focused on the 
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information that seemed most valuable at f irst, only to f ind ourselves at 
a dead end after about a week. The medical information could be of value 
only if we could connect it to specif ic behaviour on the forum itself. Since 
we gathered only profiles, and not the conversations in the fora and topics 
sections of the discussion board, we considered this direction of study to be 
a dead end. In the following few days, two dates quickly became important 
in our research: the date the profiles were created and the date a prof ile 
was last active. We could measure the forum’s growth over time by adding 
up all the dates of prof ile creation (see Figure 13.1).
We thought that to understand the function of this forum in this 
particular community of patients we had to gather qualitative data, too. 
Therefore, we tried to f ind a representative sample of people that looked 
most promising for providing information about their use and media 
practices: namely, the long-time forum users who were still active. To do 
so we created two graphs: one with all the profiles sorted by the date of last 
activity (see Figure 13.2), and one with all the profiles sorted by length of 
activity (see Figure 13.3). We measured the length of membership activity by 
subtracting the date of creation from the ‘last seen’ date. When the groups 
that were active for more than two years (8 percent of the profiles) and had 
visited the site within one month before the research began (4 percent of 
the profiles) were combined, we were left with a sample of 1.2 percent of 
the total population for further qualitative research. As a by-product we 
found out that 59 percent of all members had been active only for one day. 
These ‘one-day flies’ had either only made an account and never logged in, 
Fig. 13.1:  New members of Forum X over time.
GeT your hanDS DirT y 193
or had logged in the next day and never returned. In addition, we found 
that about 70 percent of the profiles had not visited in the last two years. 
As can be expected, there is a big overlap of almost f ifty percent between 
these groups of people.
The inactive group and the ‘one-day flies’ make visible the problem of 
informed consent for this forum. The 70 percent of inactive users would 
probably never reply to a request for consent, simply because these users 
were no longer active on the forum. We also expected that a big part of 
the group of one-day flies represented people who would never respond to 
a request for informed consent – for two reasons. First, amongst the one-
day flies there were a certain number of fake profiles (used, for example, 
for spamming), since there were a lot of homepage URLs that referred to 
websites concerned with porn, cosmetics, real estate and other subjects not 
related to the specif ic disease or the forum’s other conversations. Second, 
we expected that a large part of the one-day flies also represented inactive 
users, even if their accounts had been made within the previous two years. 
In reality, the amount of non-responding accounts, accounting for overlap 
between the two inactive groups, will be close to 80 percent of the total 
population. Adding to that, we would like to state that, since we were taking a 
different direction in our research, these accounts were not of any interest to 
us and would never have been part of the f inal sample. Still, existing ethical 
guidelines would have demanded informed consent from all of these users.
The approach of this case-study can be seen as exemplary for big data 
research with data generated through user activities on an SNS. As we 
Figs. 13.2 and 13.3:  Length of activity and ‘last seen’ date
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showed, it is highly impractical and maybe even impossible to get informed 
consent from the entire community or network. A second observation is 
that the use of the term ‘human subjects’ is debatable in the context of big 
social data as not all prof iles represent actual users. We strongly believe 
that big data research can be performed in an ethical fashion without get-
ting informed consent from the whole population of an online service. We 
therefore propose an alternative way of dealing with these subjects in big 
data research on SNSs.
Proposal for a Three-step Research Process
Drawing from practical experience, we developed a concept for integrating 
ethical decision-making into the research design process. With reference 
to Markham and Buchanan, we also argue for guidelines rather than strict 
codes. It is necessary to adapt the research design to the need for ethical 
decision-making. The degree of the potential privacy breach or damage that 
can result from research will have a signif icant effect on ethical decision-
making: when a scholar investigates an SNS, a user forum or an online 
community, the vulnerability of the target demographic is relevant to the 
decision-making.
The research that initiated this paper dealt with an online discussion 
forum for patients aff licted with a certain illness. The website advertised 
that it had more than 100,000 members. When two interns with limited 
technical abilities started to investigate the forum we, naively, thought 
that the ethical framework could be formed simultaneously with the 
design of the scraping process. We never expected to be able to acquire 
the complete database in less than two days. Requesting informed consent 
would have meant that a vast number of inactive prof iles would never 
have been found. Fake, deceased or inactive members are not able to give 
consent.
Only after discussion with our supervisors did we understand the 
magnitude of the actions we had undertaken. It was decided that we 
should immediately terminate the research and destroy all the data we 
had acquired. The argument that we had only gathered data that was 
publicly available could not cancel out the fact that we had not asked for 
consent. We have the strong conviction that researchers should be able 
to carry out this type of research in the future. A lack of consent from 
the users of public fora or platform owners or administrators themselves 
does not have to be an obstacle to an ethically sound research design. To 
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support this hypothesis, we point to Richards & King (2014), who recognize 
a difference between privacy and conf identiality: ‘With the power of 
big data to make secondary uses of the private information we share in 
confidence, restoration of trust in the institutions we share with, rests not 
only with privacy but in the recognition that shared private information 
can remain “confidential”.’ (ibid.: 413) To test the boundaries, they advocate 
experimentation:
A central part of this experimentation, if we are to have privacy, con-
f identiality, transparency, and protect identity in a big data economy, 
must involve informed, principled, and collaborative experimentation 
with privacy subjects. (ibid.: 431)
With this in mind, we propose a research design that starts with explora-
tion, making sure that we provide the necessary precautions regarding 
the four points Richards and King bring forward: privacy, confidentiality, 
transparency and identity protection. Ess (2006) advocates a practical view 
of doing research ethics. Researchers are perfectly capable of making ethical 
decisions within their own f ields, assessing a variety of ethical considera-
tions depending on the context. We therefore choose a perspective of ethical 
pluralism over dogmatism.
Reviewing the research process, we made an attempt to propose a way of 
implementing ethical reasoning as well as risk limitation and the safeguard-
ing of personal data confidentiality. It must be emphasized that we want to 
ensure a maximum degree of academic freedom while identifying possible 
risks and limiting them.
Stage 1: Design
In this stage an idea will be turned into a research design. This process 
might start with a ‘found data set’ or a platform that triggers the researchers’ 
interest and provides a starting point for possible research questions to 
be developed. The three elements listed in this stage in Figure 13.4 are 
therefore exchangeable and do not have to follow one upon the other. A 
topic will be combined with a possible forum or database. An inventory 
of the stakeholders regarding the information will be made. It lists the 
amount of personal information, the degree of vulnerability and possible 
risks such as confidentiality breaches. As a result, a decision will be made 
about which data will be scraped and how this will be done. This will raise 
issues concerning the terms of use of the data source, the quality of the 
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gathered information, the legal status and the feasibility of data collection. 
Researchers must argue why they are collecting data in a specif ic way. 
The process of data collection will be developed and data will be scraped 
accordingly. The risks of the next phase will be def ined and limited as 
much as possible.
Stage 2: Safe Data Exploration
The second stage is an exploratory inquiry into the data set. It leads to the 
identif ication of patterns and samples and the formulation of a hypothesis. 
By exploring the data, researchers f ind out what the data is about and how it 
can be used. Several conceptual research questions and possible hypotheses 
are proposed. To conclude this stage, a definitive hypothesis is chosen with 
its corresponding sample. In this phase the data will be protected physically 
by using a stand-alone ‘air gapped’ computer. Prabhu (2015: 165) emphasizes 
that data usage needs to be governed tightly. Access to the data will be 
documented carefully, and only the necessary people will be allowed to 
work with the data. The data will be explored and f iltered. Special attention 
will be given to patterns that might occur in the data. Research questions 
will be formed and a sample will be selected. At the end of this stage a 
decision will be made about whether a part of the data will be carefully 
anonymized and used in the third stage. Anonymization has to be processed 
carefully and must take into consideration the possibility of the existence 
of another data set consisting of partly similar data. The combination of 
two data sets has proved to be an effective method of de-anonymization 
(Narayana & Shmatikov 2006; Sweeney 2002). Completely wiping the data 
is also a possibility.
Stage 3: Research Process
The third stage involves testing the hypotheses which are formulated during 
the f irst stage. The use of the data now shifts from an exploratory environ-
ment to a research environment. The research should comply with the 
rules and ethical guidelines that are part of its specif ic scientif ic tradition 
and institution. If informed consent is stipulated by required guidelines, it 
should be requested. An opt-in or opt-out can be provided to people so they 
can actively make a choice about their data (Gleibs 2014; Prahbu 2015). Before 
possible publication, special attention will be given to the anonymization 
of sensitive data.
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Conclusion
Emerging new branches of humanities research dealing with the use of 
digital methods are raising questions about methods and ethics. Informed 
consent as the principle value aff iliated with research ethics in the social 
sciences is under pressure due to two technological advancements: the 
rise of the internet and big data technologies. Informed consent has been 
an integral part of all guidelines concerning human subject research in 
the medical f ield and the social sciences. First, we demonstrated that the 
basis of these ethical guidelines in the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of 
Helsinki and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights are 
from eras and discourses that have very little to do with big data research 
as it is currently being done. Although these guidelines can be very useful 
or even necessary in the f inal stage of a big data research project studying 
an SNS, in the second stage they would only limit the researcher.
Second, we showed that online user accounts and profiles are not equal 
to human subjects. Online profiles can better be seen as representations 
of people, not the people themselves, and, depending on the SNS being 
investigated, many users may provide fake or false information. Receiving 
Fig. 13.4:  Research process with safe data exploration.
198 Gerwin van Schie, irene weSTra & MirKo TobiaS Schäfer 
informed consent from the whole population of a social network or service 
is therefore unrealistic. And those who positively respond to a request might 
constitute a biased and unrepresentative sample. Another practical problem 
are the numerous inactive profiles online: a request for informed consent 
will not be answered by those who are no longer members of the community. 
We showed that in our own research this group would have amounted to 
close to 80 percent of the profiles. Again, expecting informed consent as 
a requirement for research to be ethical is unrealistic. This does not mean 
that researchers must not take all possible precautions to safeguard the 
confidentiality of the data collected.
To deal with the problems we described above we propose using a system 
of three stages in big data research on SNSs. Rather than favouring one 
ethical framework over another, we adopt a view of ethical pluralism, 
leaving it to the researcher to choose which to use, making appropriate 
reflections within their context. In the f irst stage a research design will 
be made, taking into consideration the stakeholders, type of data and a 
general direction of inquiry. After the gathering of data, in the second, 
exploratory stage hypotheses and samples are generated. Informed consent 
is not necessary in this stage, but since the nature of the data can still be 
very delicate, protection of the data is of the utmost importance. In the 
third stage, researchers have to adhere to the rules and guidelines that 
are mandatory in their specif ic f ield of research. In most social sciences 
informed consent is part of these guidelines and will therefore have to be 
respected. With this proposal we expect to catalyse both the philosophical 
and practical discussions about informed consent. To ensure that future 
research with new tools can be carried out in an ethical way, we need to 
experiment not only with methods but also with ethical frameworks. In 
order for us to f ind practices to protect research integrity we need to get 
our hands dirty.
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14. Research Ethics in Context
Decision-Making in Digital Research
Annette Markham & Elizabeth Buchanan
Introduction
In 2012, we published Ethical Decision-making and Internet Research, which 
consolidated the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) Ethics Working 
Committee’s recommendations into a comprehensive document. In 2015, we 
revisited the subject with Internet Research: Ethical Concerns, which took a 
practical approach to internet research ethics by reviewing the work of other 
researchers in the f ield. With the article you are reading now, we attempt 
to reconcile the abstract and the practice-based methods of our previous 
two articles by unpacking ethical decision-making in view of principles.
Digital media’s fast development, expansion and increasing integration 
into our day-to-day lives does not just mean opportunity but also new 
ethical challenges for internet researchers. Each new data set entails its 
own potential quandaries and insights. By placing other researchers’ work 
within AoIR guidelines, we seek to create a more cohesive framework to 
assist internet researchers, review boards, students and ethicists in ethically 
navigating the murky waters of internet research.
Recent evolutions in our field, especially surrounding big data, have evolved 
quickly and still need to be addressed. The task ahead is to expand the more 
developed concepts and incorporate these new issues into the discussion. We 
do, however, feel confident that the core issue remains the same: understand-
ing how and to what extent basic principles affect ethical decision-making.
Ethical Fundamentals
A discussion of ethics in any research f ield must be rooted in the wide 
array of policy documents, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights, 
the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, and the Belmont Report. 
Given the extent to which these documents have been discussed elsewhere, 
we will limit our focus to issues of digital methodology and encourage 
readers to see the resources mentioned above and in the appendix for more 
on those fundamental issues.
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Flexibility
As seen throughout our publications, our stance supports a f lexible set of 
guidelines over stricter codes of practice. This allows researchers to respond 
and adapt to the ever-evolving nature of their f ield. In the end, it is their 
responsibility to conduct ethical research according to their individual 
judgements and values, in addition to their disciplinary norms. The core 
principles of such an ethical approach are dialogic, inductive, case-based 
and process-focused.
Privacy Concepts
The manner with which humans engage in public spaces continues to 
evolve as the spectrum of public-private spaces becomes less discernible. 
Researchers may f ind themselves vexed by the practical and methodologi-
cal diff iculties of tackling such a nebulous issue, one with little historical 
precedent to offer guidance. Expectations of privacy increasingly hinge on 
specif ic contextual factors as to how information is presented and used, as 
opposed to the antiquated binary conception of public/private.
Rather than attempting to place information in one box or the other, 
researchers such as Sveningsson (2003) offer new ways of perceiving this 
idea. Her grid expands the binary public/private spectrum to include an 
additional axis of informational sensitivity, so that researchers might better 
predict users’ expectations for how their data may be used.
This diagram is still built around a conception of public and private as 
two opposite spaces. Attempting to identify within this binary is the wrong 
Fig. 14.1:  Sveningsson’s (2003) model of internet privacy.
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tack, since digital research means dealing with constant and open data 
flows between always connected parties in an environment where editing, 
sharing and other mashup practices are carried out within complex global 
networks.
McKee and Porter’s (2009) diagram focuses on the necessity of consent 
by attempting to balance competing factors. It, too, presents public/private 
as a binary, but it is a useful tool for approaching ethical dilemmas in 
research.
Users are often unaware of the extent to which their data may be picked 
up and used by data aggregators. Nissenbaum’s insight remains signif icant, 
pointing out that in media contexts ‘what people care most about is not 
simply restricting the flow of information but ensuring that it f lows ap-
propriately’ (2010: 2). Many internet users do not want their information 
to be private so much as they want it to only be used publicly in ways they 
f ind acceptable. Given the complications of such a stance, we encourage 
researchers to focus on a person’s relationship to their information in a 
given context when making ethical considerations.
Fig. 14.2:  McKee and Porter’s (2009) dimensions for informed consent.
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Identifiability
The ubiquity of freely available information on individuals has shifted the 
internet research ethics discussion from the Sisyphean task of preserving 
the privacy and anonymity of online parties to a discussion around the 
sheer quantity of data we both generate and access. The flood of personal 
data being created by individuals’ devices (e.g. geolocation, physical data, 
online trackers) combined with big data collection tools creates increasingly 
complicated criteria for ethically conducting internet research. As of yet, 
there is no consensus on the best way to interact with personally identifiable 
information. For an in-depth exploration of the topic, see the chapter by 
Schäfer, Van Schie and Westra.
Informed Consent
The long-standing principle of informed consent becomes problematic when 
applied to internet or digital research. The ethical, as opposed to regulatory, 
question, ‘when is consent needed?’, becomes tricky to answer when applied 
to anonymous chatrooms and online forums. Moreover, consent may be 
diff icult or impossible to obtain, since one’s data may include outdated 
profiles or contact information. Ikonomidis Svedmark and Nyberg (2009) 
make a strong argument for making informed consent optional and leaving 
it to the researcher’s discretion. Svedmark (2012) suggests that informed 
consent be a secondary priority to avoiding harm.
The AoIR ethics document advocates a case-based approach that 
acknowledges and considers ethical tensions, such as conflicts with le-
gal, disciplinary, institutional and cultural considerations, even when a 
resolution is not easily found. By consistently posing ethical questions and 
reflecting on the research process, researchers will better balance their 
different obligations. In terms of consent, this means deciding whether and 
how to go about obtaining consent on a case-by-case basis.
Diagram on Internet Specific Ethical Questions
This diagram should function as a guide to forming ethical questions 
for internet research. It outlines considerations researchers should have 
in mind when forming these questions. We encourage students to form 
example questions following this form.
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Table 14.1.  Internet Specific Ethical Questions
Defining and  conceptualizing 
context
– Definitions from owners, users, members, etc.
– contextual norms, regulatory frameworks
– ethical expectations of user individuals and 
community
Accessing context – contextual situation of participants and researcher
– how researcher approaches participants
– participants’ perception of privacy
– accommodating participants’ feelings on appropri-
ate flow of information
Involved parties – ethical expectations of community, participants, 
authors and commercial or corporate parties
– future implications of stored data for individuals and 
communities
Primary object of study – ethical expectations associated with particular types 
of data
– range of persons and texts affected (in)directly by 
study
– Treatment of potentially identifying information
– public availability of data acquired for research
Management, storage and 
representation of data
– Methods for securing and managing potentially 
sensitive data
– risks of storing research data for future use
– unanticipated breaches in stored data
– ensuring adequate anonymity of data
– ethical consequences of anonymizing data
– potential distortions of data from removal of selected 
information
– possible future risks to anonymity from technological 
advances
Potential harms and risks 
associated with study
– for individuals, online communities, researchers, 
research, etc.
– risk assessment in advance and throughout study
– Definitions and operationalization of ‘vulnerability’ 
and ‘harm’
– Determination of vulnerability in ambiguous 
contexts
– potential privacy-related harms
– harms to participants from parties besides researcher
– unknown identity, age or ability of participants
Verifiability – relation between profiles and individuals
– representativeness of data sets
– potential for verification of results by later 
researchers
– influence of data providers/platform
– influence of data analysis and collection tools
Publication – ways data visualization shapes/supports argument
– context of research audience
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Human Subjects and Personhood
A lively debate continues over how to treat data created by humans and 
collected through digital means. While the concept of ‘human subjects’ 
has historically been very important for preventing harmful treatment, 
traditional ideas of what that entails become harder to apply when 
dealing with online prof iles and large, semi-anonymous data sets. For 
a deeper exploration of this topic, see the chapter by Van Schie, Westra 
and Schäfer.
Deeper, more constant crossover between our internet lives and our 
physical lives problematize definitions of personhood. This includes avatars 
and online prof iles. Inconsistencies abound, as researchers’ perception 
of their research subjects as persons is often based on the directness of 
contact, which we described through ‘the distance principle’ in 2015. This 
principle states that an increase in experiential or conceptual proximity 
between researchers and participants prompts the former to identify more 
closely with the latter. They are then more prone to perceive the latter as 
‘humans’ and to better consider the ethical implications and liability which 
that implies.
Seeing a photo on a prof ile may humanize the subject in a way that 
reading their metadata may not. Yet the consideration of a research object 
as a human subject should not be reduced to whether information is 
apparently linkable to an individual. There is a body of evidence suggest-
ing that data sets that have been ‘anonymized’ often leave individuals 
identif iable. The question becomes: ‘Does the connection between one’s 
online data and one’s physical person enable psychological, economic or 
physical, harm?’ By recalling the distance principle, researchers might 
be more able to keep in mind the hidden ethical issues at play that may 
become visible later on.
Harm and Vulnerability
Despite understanding and conducting ethical research, researchers must 
be prepared to respond to harms. The recontextualization of information 
can produce unplanned outcomes, as innocent beginnings may lead to 
true harm down the road. The same information found within various 
contexts may require different privacy judgements. A user may feel com-
fortable broadcasting tweets to a public audience, following the norms of 
the Twitter community. Yet knowing that these ‘public’ tweets had been 
reSearch eThicS in conTex T 207
collected within a data set and combed over by a researcher could quite 
possibly feel like an encroachment on their privacy. In spite of what a 
simplif ied concept of public/private might offer, there is no categorical 
way to discern all eventual harm. The notion of ‘downstream’ harms must 
be considered.
Harm is a f lexible and subjective concept. A researcher could feasibly 
take the ‘public’ nature of tweets or Facebook posts to indicate that a user 
has given tacit consent. However, without considering the conceivable harm 
to a subject, that researcher has not taken proper precautions. In such a 
context, guidelines for decision-making can be applied using our diagram 
on forming Internet Specif ic Ethical Questions.
Conclusions
To contextualize, we urge researchers to begin thinking about the ethical 
issues we have outlined herein before starting research, during research 
and after it has concluded. In our 2012 Ethical Decision-making and Internet 
Research, we developed key guiding principles we believe remain crucial 
in relation to the ethical considerations of digital research:
The greater the vulnerability of the community/author/participant, the 
greater the obligation of the researcher to protect the community/author/
participant.
Because ‘harm’ is defined contextually, ethical principles are more likely 
to be understood inductively rather than applied universally. That is, 
rather than one-size-f its-all pronouncements, ethical decision-making is 
best approached through the application of practical judgement attentive 
to the specif ic context.
Because all digital information at some point involves individual persons, 
consideration of principles related to research on human subjects may be 
necessary even if it is not immediately apparent how and where persons 
are involved in the research data.
When making ethical decisions, researchers must balance the rights of 
subjects (as authors, as research participants, as people) with the social 
benefits of research and researchers’ rights to conduct research. In differ-
ent contexts the rights of subjects may outweigh the benefits of research.
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Ethical issues may arise and need to be addressed during all steps of the 
research process, from planning, research conduct, publication, and 
dissemination.
Ethical decision-making is a deliberative process, and researchers should 
consult as many people and resources as possible in this process, includ-
ing fellow researchers, people participating in or familiar with contexts/
sites being studied, research review boards, ethics guidelines, published 
scholarship (within one’s discipline but also in other disciplines), and, 
where applicable, legal precedent.
These basic guidelines help to address the challenges a digital researcher 
might face, though the conversation does and must continue. Research 
practices are diverse; while the United States and the United Kingdom have 
institutional review boards to monitor researchers’ ethical decisions, many 
countries do not. Research ethics conferences are increasingly common 
as researchers grapple with challenges presented by the emergence of big 
data and found data; discussions, too, are ongoing around the differences 
between performing research for professional or commercial parties. We 
need academic associations to continually expand the ways in which we 
address these areas.
For the moment, consider that no single ethical or methodological ap-
proach can fit every situation. Yet we hope that by considering ethical issues 
throughout the research process, researchers will be able to confidently 
and conscientiously develop ethical practices that are appropriate for their 
individual situations.
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15. Datafication & Discrimination
Koen Leurs & Tamara Shepherd
Introduction: Why Datafication and Discrimination?
Popular accounts of datafied ways of knowing implied in the ascendance of 
big data posit that the increasingly massive volume of information collected 
immanently to digital technologies affords new means of understanding 
complex social processes. The development of novel insights is attributed 
precisely to big data’s unprecedented scale, a scale that enables what Viktor 
Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier note is a shift away from causal 
inferences to modes of analysis based rather on ‘the benefits of correlation’ 
(2013: 18). Indicating the vast implications of this shift, Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier’s influential framing of big data describes a revolutionary change 
in the ways ‘we live, work and think’, as phrased by the book’s subtitle. But 
the ‘we’ in this proclamation tends to go unspecif ied. Who exactly benefits 
from a shift toward correlative data analysis techniques in an age of big 
data? And by corollary, who suffers?
Our claim is that big data, given its origins in a Western military-
industrial context for the development of technology and concomitant 
mobilization within asymmetrical power structures, inherently discrimi-
nates against already marginalized subjects. This point has been raised 
in a number of critiques of the big data moment, for example in danah 
boyd and Kate Crawford’s (2012) cautionary account of the mythologies 
of big data that obscure the ways it engenders new divides in data access, 
interpretation, representation and ethics. Frank Pasquale (2015) has further 
illustrated the perils of ‘runaway data’ that asymmetrically order our social 
and f inancial institutions through hidden algorithmic practices that tend 
to further entrench inequality by seeking to predict risk. An overview of 
the social inequalities perpetuated across various applications of big data 
can be found in the Open Technology Institute’s series of primers on data 
and discrimination (Gangadharan 2014). And yet, as the present collection 
attests, there may be ways of approaching big data with a critical lens in 
order for researchers to also benefit from new methods (see also Elmer et 
al. 2015). In the present collection, many authors make efforts to trouble 
the politics of big data by admonishing researchers to take alternative 
perspectives on data-based methods for social research: Nick Couldry, 
in line with his previous work on media’s ontological implications (e.g. 
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2012), asserts that researchers should strive to demistify big data (p. 238); 
Carolin Gerlitz describes measurement as valuation that needs to be de-
naturalized (p. 243); and Lev Manovich develops Cultural Analytics to 
get past demographic generalizations through a process of ‘estrangement’ 
that prompts researchers to question their cultural assumptions (p. 67). 
Such actions – demystifying, denaturalizing, estranging – seem to offer 
important directives for highlighting the often invisible discriminatory 
functions of big data, but how exactly do they work? Who and where are 
the actual people implicated in big data discrimination?
These kinds of questions seek to elaborate on Evgeny Morozov’s conten-
tion, also in the present collection, that ‘social biases exist regardless of 
whether algorithms or computers are doing the job’, and thus, ‘plenty of 
discrimination happens with regard to race, class, gender and so forth’ 
(p. 247). One concrete example of this sort of discrimination is offered by 
Richard Rogers’s explanation of query design, which describes how keyword 
searches illuminate the discursive operations of language within power 
dynamics (p. 81). His chief examples of keywords being used in this way, as 
part of ‘efforts at neutrality’ between politically charged actors, include the 
BBC’s use of the term ‘barrier’ rather than ‘security fence’ or ‘apartheid wall’ 
to describe the Israeli-Palestinian border structure, and the preference for 
using the term ‘conflict’ diamonds or minerals above ‘blood’ diamonds or 
minerals on the part of industries attempting to inhabit a corporate social 
responsibility. These examples usefully point toward modes of political 
obfuscation that lie at the heart of data sets, as they are constituted from 
what are seen as legitimate sources of information to query. Even in these 
cases, however, what is getting queried are certain privileged accounts 
of political struggle, such as BBC coverage or industry discourse. Clearly, 
determining what counts in the f irst place as a legitimate object for big data 
analysis is a process that implicates deep-seated social biases at a number 
of levels, not only on the part of programmers and researchers but more 
fundamentally at the level of the organization of knowledge.
As a rejoinder to existing modes of talking about big data and what 
it means for social research, this chapter suggests an epistemological 
intervention from a critical, anti-oppressive stance that seeks to reinstate 
people within datafied social life. Rather than taking as its premise that big 
data can offer insights into social processes, this approach starts from the 
perspective of the people caught up in programmes of social sorting, carried 
out by computational algorithms, particularly as they occupy marginalized 
positions within regimes of power-knowledge (to use Foucault’s term). As a 
specif ically situated case study, we examine the ways data are mobilized in 
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European border control and how this phenomenon can be studied, framed 
through the Eurocentric legacies of population measurement in colonial 
disciplinary surveillance. The connection between power and knowledge 
here is meant to implore researchers to consider how their deployments of 
big data, even from critical perspectives, may serve to replicate structures 
of discrimination by denying less ‘data-ready’ ways of knowing. To that end, 
the conclusion of the chapter suggests some alternative methodological 
avenues for reinstating people – specifying who the ‘we’ permits – in light 
of big data supremacy.
Datafied Migration Management and Border Control
Consider the following anecdote, placed here to illustrate a contemporary 
case example of the discriminatory workings of algorithmic sorting that 
separates the privileged from the unprivileged. Flashback to spring 2001. 
The f irst author, Koen, found himself sitting in an off ice cubicle on the 7th 
floor of a leading mobile phone provider in the Netherlands. Working as 
an activation and security & compliance off icer in a life before academia, 
every once in a while he would get requests from local mobile phone shop 
managers to look into activation requests which were ‘rejected’: ‘Why can’t 
you activate this mobile phone contract?’ Upon receiving a fax with signed 
contracts, passport copies and bank statements, Koen and his fellow team 
of about f ifteen would assess applications in two ways. First, they would 
manually check for the applicant’s f inancial history in the national credit 
registry. Second, the application would undergo an automated algorithmic 
risk assessment. The second process was opaque because the employees did 
not know exactly which variables were evaluated. Frequently, applicants 
who had a clean credit report were denied a contract after the algorithmic 
risk assessment. Over time, Koen discerned a pattern: those denied a con-
tract were usually young men of non-Dutch descent who held temporary 
resident permits rather than Dutch passports and who were living in certain 
low-income areas. After asking his f loor manager about this process, he 
received confirmation that the mal-payment prediction system targeted 
specif ic subgroups: ‘especially those Somalis, they never pay’.
Many years later, algorithmic security assessments have become even 
more commonplace in the corporate world and have also gained promi-
nence in various forms of state governance and surveillance. These systems 
are typically put in place to ensure greater predictive accuracy, according 
to a widespread faith in the insights generated through large data sets and 
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statistical calculations since the development of statistical methods in 
the 1880s, when ‘the unflappable stance of quantitative method acquired 
a prestige that is still in force and whose power derives from the long 
valorization of impersonality’ (Peters 2001: 442). But what the anecdote 
illustrates is that, far from the imagined objectivity of social sorting through 
computation, people are still making the decisions at every step of the 
process (Gillespie 2016).
Moreover, on a wider scale, the story of young male Somalis whose digital 
data traces algorithmically rendered them as undesired consumers f inds 
parallels in the current moment of ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. Automated 
social sorting at state borders has become commonplace practice as part 
of governments’ efforts to control f lows of undesired migrants. For those 
privileged subjects carrying desirable passports, e-borders and iris scans 
sustain liquid f low across borders and planetary nomadic mobility as 
an effortless normality. By contrast, undesired subjects have to provide 
f ingerprints – a genre of biometric data with a long history of criminal 
connotations – to be cross-referenced among a host of other identif iers 
in data-based risk calculations. Border control across the Global North 
and South is increasingly augmented by data collection and processing 
techniques developed by industry and ported to government applications. 
This digital policing of unwanted movement has been explored in previous 
studies on the Australian (Ajana 2013) and Indian (Arora 2016) contexts. 
In Europe, the division between desired and undesired migration plays 
out with its own specif ic contours, where although the internal Schengen 
Area is borderless, it controls against undesired external populations in the 
capacity of Fortress Europe.
Fortress Europe presents a particularly relevant context to study data-
f ied discrimination because its contemporary practices of social sorting 
at the border show lingering traces of colonial-era human classif ication, 
measurement and ordering, which were pioneered and mastered on ‘subject 
populations’ in its peripheral territories throughout the last centuries. In 
recent years, continental Europe has prided itself on the premise of ‘unity 
in diversity’ but as a ‘postcolonial location’, it operates at its centre ac-
cording to a mostly hidden logic of ‘European apartheid’ (Balibar 2004: 
121; Ponzanesi 2016). Also spurred by the IS attacks in Paris in November 
2015 and Brussels in March 2016, once again it mobilizes the colonial ‘idea 
of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-
European peoples and cultures’ (Said 2014: 7). Through various discursive, 
symbolic, material and datafied processes, it decides who rightfully belongs 
to Europe by distinguishing between the West and the rest, or ‘the Orient’ 
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and the ‘Occident’ (ibid.). Through this process the EU justif ies who it 
retains, detains or relocates, thereby distinguishing between lives worth 
living and ‘bare life’: those non-citizens stripped of status who become 
unprotected by the law (Agamben 2005).
Residual colonialism can be located in contemporary border policing. 
EU member states together manage nearly 2,000 off icial entry ports and 
60,000 kilometres of land and sea borders (Broeders & Dijstelbloem 2016: 
247). In 2015, Europe welcomed a record of 611 million international tourist 
arrivals across these borders (UNWTO 2016), while it sought to control over 
one million refugees who reached Europe across the Mediterranean sea, 
half of whom were fleeing war in Syria (UNHCR 2016). This human sorting 
process of differentiating desired from undesired migrants is increasingly 
dataf ied through proliferating, non-linear and non-geographically-bound 
electronic border governance processes, as a result of economic incentives, 
opportunistic political motives and the expansion of the security industry. 
Alongside the other centralized databases of the Schengen Information 
System and the Visa Information System, the European Dactyloscopy 
(EURODAC) biometric database, which holds f ingerprints of asylum seekers 
and so-called ‘third-country nationals’, is the most prominent dataf ied 
border control mechanism against unwanted others. EU counterterror-
ism measures have developed toward increased securitization and an 
outspoken desire to connect ‘data fragments’ on non-Europeans through 
achieving higher ‘interoperability’ between these and other architectures 
and databases (European Commission 2016:3).
According to EURODAC regulations, ‘individuals from 14 years on 
should be f ingerprinted, whether they are asylum seekers, aliens appre-
hended in relation with the irregular crossing of an external border or 
aliens found illegally present in a Member State’ (EDPS 2009: 15). 28 EU 
countries and four associated states have access to the f ingerprint data 
in EURODAC. EURODAC is managed by the European Agency for the 
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, 
security and justice. Its data are stored at the headquarters in Tallinn 
(Estonia), its operational management is housed in Strasbourg (France), 
and backup systems are in place in Sankt Johann im Pongau (Austria). In 
EURODAC jargon, ‘asylum applicants’ and ‘aliens’ become ‘data subjects’ 
as their f ingerprints are processed through three categorizations: 1) data 
of asylum applications; 2) data of ‘aliens’ apprehended in connection with 
irregular border crossings; and 3) data related to ‘aliens’ ‘illegally present’ in 
member states (euLISA 2015: 13-14). Through algorithmic social sorting, the 
‘Automated Fingerprint Identif ication System’ classif ies some data subjects 
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as undesired, resulting in ‘digital deportability’ (Tsianos & Kuster 2013). 
Digitally sanctioned deportation may happen when a ‘hit’ occurs: when 
a searched individual appears in the database, cross-referenced between 
the categories listed above.
The Central Database held over two million entries as of 2012 (Jones 2014: 3), 
but evidencing the growing stream of Syrian refugees, it processed a total 
of 750,000 transaction requests in 2014, an 84% increase compared to 2012. 
Observing migration management in practice in Germany, researchers 
witnessed how the EURODAC system automatically played a James Bond 
melody whenever it ‘produced a hit’ (Tsianos & Kuster 2013: 10). This example 
of smart border gamification blurs the boundaries between fact and f iction 
and exemplif ies risks of dehumanization and depersonalization inherent 
to dataf ied social sorting. Individual people, faces, stories and motives 
are not of interest to ‘smart’ border processes. Furthermore, this echo of 
the popular culture version of espionage contrasts the automated, com-
putational process of categorizing data subjects as undesirable, where the 
political struggle inherent in classif ication becomes naturalized through its 
bureaucratic manifestation (Bowker & Star 1999: 196). Seemingly without 
human intervention, EURODAC operates as a disciplinary truth machine, 
making data-driven decisions. In 2014, 24% of EURODAC entries produced 
a hit proving a ‘data subject applied for asylum on two or more occasions’, 
which means 121,358 people could be internally deported to a European 
member state where their f ingerprints were previously taken. For 72,120 
hits, data confirmed a data subject’s ‘illegal’ presence in Europe (euLISA 
2015: 4, 15), which rationalizes and normalizes deportation to countries of 
origin, where individual deportees may experience persecution, torture or 
worse (Bloch & Schuster 2005: 496-497).
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
rightly criticized EURODAC for breaching the human right to privacy and 
family life – placing data subjects at signif icant risk, as data may be shared 
with countries of origin – and for stigmatizing groups, as f ingerprints are 
associated with criminal activity and can result in latent f ingerprint errors 
that cannot be eliminated (UNHCR 2012). Although commonly presented 
as the perfect migrant management solution, such errors abound. In 2014, 
for example, from one million data entries, over one hundred thousand 
were rejected, largely due to data validation issues, f ingerprint errors or 
insuff icient data quality (euLISA 2015: 18). These errors are typically at-
tributed to tactics used to contest machine readability, including migrants’ 
attempts to purposefully damage their f ingertips with glue for this purpose 
(European Commission 2015: 5). However, aging and heavy manual labour 
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such as farming and construction work can also wear out f ingerprints, 
causing insuff icient image quality (Storisteanu et al. 2015: 137; see also 
Tsianos & Kuster 2013: 33-35). Despite these problems, the EU has since made 
fingerprinting mandatory in response to the trend in 2014-15 for Syrians and 
Eritreans refusing to be f ingerprinted: ‘In cases where a EURODAC data-
subject does not initially cooperate in the process of being f ingerprinted […] 
it is suggested that all reasonable and proportionate steps should be taken 
to compel such cooperation,’ including steps like detention and coercion by 
force (European Commission 2015: 4-5). And fingerprints are only one subset 
of potential biometric data collection. If EURODAC off icials encounter 
diff iculties establishing the age of data subjects as over 14, they corroborate 
f ingerprints with medical examinations that can include visual, dental, 
bone X-rays, blood tests and sexual development tests, cross-referenced 
with connected data sets including census records.
The actions of EURODAC show how data subjects come to be constituted 
through a mixture of invasive and institutional strategies. The agency’s own 
use of the term ‘data subjects’ implies that people have a say over how their 
data is compiled across diverse sources. And in fact, according to article 18(2) 
of the EURODAC regulation, migrants as data subjects have the right to ac-
cess their data. But there is a huge gap between theory and practice. In 2014, 
data subjects lodged only 26 such requests, a number that has decreased 
from 49 in 2013 and 111 in 2012 (euLISA 2015: 18). These f indings show that 
concerns previously voiced by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) over the lack of information available about consequences of being 
f ingerprinted, the transmission of data, and rights of access, rectif ication 
and deletion have not been addressed and so ‘the information provided to 
data subjects should be highly improved’ (EDPS 2009: 14). But rather than 
data offering such subjectivity, dataf ied migration management evidences 
how migrants are subjected by data, with digital immobility and deport-
ability – a dehumanized form of ‘exclusion through registration’ (Broeders 
2011: 59) – as plausible social sorting outcomes.
Alongside database-led migrant management, the EU’s ‘smart’ border 
control processes demand scrutiny. Europe’s securitization of its external 
land, sea and aerial borders has resulted in the establishment of Frontex, the 
pan-European border agency, in 2004. In addition, in 2013, the European Bor-
der Surveillance System (Eurosur) was established to support the exchange 
of information between agencies ‘for the purpose of detecting, preventing 
and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime’ at the ‘external 
borders’ (Frontex 2016a). The agency lists ‘intelligence’, ‘risk analysis’ and 
‘situational awareness’ among its key missions, alongside its claim to operate 
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in line with the EU fundamental rights charter. Providing lucrative business 
opportunities for a conglomerate of technology and arms manufacturers, this 
datafied surveillance arsenal combines radars, offshore sensors, on-shore 
olfactory sensors such as ‘sniffer’ and ‘snoopy’ satellite tracking systems, 
border patrol robots such as ‘Talos’ on land and ‘Uncoss’ at sea. Dronification 
is the latest step in this process, and a ‘common pre-frontier intelligence 
picture’ is established through unmanned aerial vehicles, Remote Piloted 
Aircraft Systems and Optionally Piloted Aircraft (ibid.).
In addition to internal migration management which operates mainly 
out of the public eye, Frontex also maintains detailed statistics on various 
border movements such as interceptions, and routinely uses infographics 
to make such data available to the public. These data visualizations further 
reify distinctions between insiders and outsiders, the Occident and Orient. 
Figure 15.1 is an exemplary Frontex data visualization depicting continental 
Europe and representations of various f lows of incoming migrants. The 
orange arrow on the far right visualizes that between January and March 
2016, over 150,000 people, mostly Syrian, Afghani and Iraqi nationals, at-
tempted to illegally cross the border, taking the Eastern Mediterranean 
route (Frontex 2016b).
Fig. 15.1:  Migratory Routes Map (Frontex 2016b)
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These kinds of data visualizations should be questioned, given emerging 
representational conventions such as mapping that serve to imbue data 
with ‘objectivity’ based on ideological notions of ‘transparency, scientif ic-
ness and facticity’ (Kennedy et al. 2016: 716). Accordingly, the numerical 
and symbolic politics of this visualization can be unpacked: the choice to 
represent people with arrowheads taps into the symbolisms of weaponry, 
threat and massive contagion, while the proportional size of the arrows does 
not consistently reflect actual f igures of interceptions (blue arrow equals 
yellow in size, but only visualizes 675 crossings). Frontex’s provision of data 
visualizations is thus illustrative for its appeals to transparency and ac-
countability but also for its ideological thrust. EU bordering is characterized 
by a paradoxical situation of painful ‘exclusion from registration’ (Broeders 
2011: 59): a signif icant gap remains between what is recorded and what 
remains untracked. It is striking, for example, that the agency does not 
systematically gather data on deaths at the borders (Migrants’ Files 2015). 
Prioritizing one ‘smart’ border statistic over another reflects a poignant 
decision, given that Europe has become the ‘deadliest migration destiny 
of the world’, with 3771 deaths in 2015 and 3521 deaths in 2016 in the f irst 
three quarters of the year alone the Mediterranean is becoming an ‘open 
air cemetery’ (Wolff 2015; UNHCR 2016). These crucial representational 
decisions lie at the heart of discriminatory data practices, which seem to 
maintain a longstanding appeal to quantitative objectivity despite the 
historical precedent for ‘people in the algorithm’ (Gillespie 2016).
From Statistical Subjects to Datafied Society
Contemporary cases around migration and border security offer a salient 
entry point into the discriminatory implications of a dataf ied society. 
But the current faith in big data as a font for accurate representations of 
and predictions about social groups has a much longer history. In terms 
of predicting risk, for example, the insurance industry was the site of 
key innovations that exemplify discriminatory practices at all levels of 
statistical calculation. Precedents for the cases of predictive discrimina-
tion in insurance redlining examined by Pasquale might be found in Dan 
Bouk’s (2015) history of the American insurance industry’s expansion in 
the late nineteenth century. By this time, insurance companies sought 
to expand beyond their traditional clientele of middle-class white men 
in the Northeastern states. Bouk charts the development of data-based 
metrics that asymmetrically created (not simply calculated) the higher 
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risk factor of groups such as women, children, Southerners and African-
Americans, which served not only to inform differential insurance policies 
but also to simultaneously construct vast swathes of the US population as 
differentially valued ‘statistical subjects’, the precursors to contemporary 
‘data subjects’.
One key story in this process was how Prudential’s insurance policies 
were developed in the 1890s based on statistician Frederick Hoffman’s meas-
urements and calculations, including data gleaned from the tombstones of 
pre-Civil War segregated cemeteries and contemporaneous eugenic science 
(Bouk 2015: 113-120). Hoffman ‘created the largest compilation of data about 
the American Negro then available in print’, in support of Prudential’s 
categorization of Southern African-American clients as higher risk (Wolff 
2006: 85). While African-American activists mobilizing against this fram-
ing successfully pressured lawmakers to introduce anti-discrimination 
legislation, race-based discrimination in the insurance industry persists 
to this day:
Race-based pricing classif ications and coverage restrictions proved dif-
f icult to dislodge not only because of the structure and legal regulation of 
private commercial insurance markets, but also because of the strength 
of the underlying ideologies of racial difference, race separation, and 
the rhetorical power of actuarial language. Legislation and litigation, 
despite some progress, proved ineffective in changing industry practice. 
(Heen 2009: 362)
The historical precedent set by discriminatory insurance practices offers 
an origin narrative that captures a number of crucial dimensions to the 
modes of discrimination underlying the faith in big data today. Despite the 
seeming robustness of large data sets, as the European migration case il-
lustrates, structural biases at every moment of ‘calculation’ – data gathering, 
organization, aggregation, algorithmic design, interpretation, prediction 
and visualization – serve to construct legitimized difference by reproducing 
existing inequalities across individuals as data subjects.
Despite their conceit to objectivity, data-based calculations reinforce 
inequalities specif ic to historical conjuncture. In the story of insurance 
redlining, it was post-Civil War race relations and the eugenics movement 
that informed data gathering and organization. In the story of today’s 
‘refugee crisis’, dataf ication is shaped by EU economic policy along with 
racial and ethnic stereotypes dating back to the colonial era. Whatever 
the historical moment, social context is key for understanding the specif ic 
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modes of inequality embedded in quantitative operations. In turn, the 
application of data-driven insights to perceived social problems – typically 
framed around mitigating risk – performs a doubling of discriminatory 
frameworks through the asymmetrical representation of particular social 
problems that constructs them precisely as ‘problems’. Representations of 
contemporary European migration, as discussed above, draw on dispro-
portionately dataf ied renderings of certain groups of refugees, replicating 
fears of the other that stem from the colonial era. These representations 
show how the social thus becomes an effect of data as a resource to be 
appropriated (Couldry & Van Dijck 2015). The cycle of discriminatory 
measurement being used to inform discriminatory representations is one 
important point of continuity between the early uses of statistics and the 
current fashion for big data.
Another salient point of historical comparison concerns the role of the 
military-industrial complex in leading the way with the development and 
implementation of data-based ‘solutions’ to what are construed as social 
problems. Indeed, data-based discrimination as a military-industrial pro-
cess seems not to be effectively contained by public governance or law; 
this goes for insurance as well as other sectors working to construct the 
statistical or data subject. The dataf ication of credit, medicine, marketing, 
human resources, policing, urban planning, transportation and security 
industries over the course of the twentieth century laid the groundwork 
for the ascendance of big data according to developments in information 
processing (Danna & Gandy 2002). The exponentially increasing capacity for 
collecting and tabulating social dynamics as information has been framed 
in James Beniger’s (1989) classic text as a ‘control revolution’ coalescing 
around Big Science in the 1950s and 60s. At this time in the US, funding for 
the development of tools designed to gather, process and store increasingly 
large data sets was allocated according to a Cold War rationale intended 
to strengthen national security and military intelligence operations. The 
internet itself – the meta-network that supports proliferating data – of 
course emerges from within this context, as is evident in vestiges as such 
data ‘caches’ organized according to ‘C3I’ protocols (command, control, 
communication and intelligence) which operate behind the screen (Ricker 
Schulte 2015: 40; see also Gitelman 2006: 114; Norberg & O’Neill 1996). It 
is this Eurocentric and masculinist ideological nexus that informs the 
discriminatory considerations designed into data science technologies and 
techniques that, when combined with the commercialization imperatives 
of industry, form the basis for the networking of statistical subjects together 
within a dataf ied society.
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What changes in the move from a statistical society to a datafied society is 
framed by proponents of big data as economies of scale. Innovative insights 
emerge from networking between unprecedented large data sets, which 
creates value far beyond any one set alone (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 
2013: 135). Yet despite these economies of scale, similar operations that have 
historically encoded discrimination into statistical calculations remain. 
The implication of networking large data sets is that at every level, from 
individual data subjects – and even more finely, ‘dividuals’ or sub-individual 
units (Terranova 2004: 34) – up to entrenched industries and institutions, 
epistemological and ideological contours around what counts and how 
it is measured still serve to produce and reinforce structural inequality. 
Unlike traditional statistical analysis, however, big data methods perform 
these operations in ways that are often automated and invisible. Quintes-
sential examples of contemporary social life being reorganized according 
to discriminatory datafication include Facebook’s profiling of users’ ‘ethnic 
aff inities’ based on their online activities, Amazon’s redlined same-day 
delivery zones, or Google’s culturally and linguistically biased search results 
(Knobel & Bowker 2011; Noble 2016). The invisibility of the algorithmic biases 
underlying such social platforms enable the ‘laundering of past practices of 
discrimination’ so that they become black-boxed, ‘immune from scrutiny’ 
(Pasquale 2015: 41).
Further, the development of social sorting algorithms in commercial 
contexts informs contemporary modes of governance, as seen in the case of 
migration – enabled by a permanent state of exception preserved through 
the ‘war on terrorism’ (Guzik 2009) – where police surreptitiously collect 
data and run predictive calculations that violate the privacy of people 
living in racialized communities (Crawford & Schultz 2014), and the State 
distinguishes citizenship from ‘foreignness’ according to the hidden logic 
of the National Security Agency’s surveillance assemblage (Cheney-Lippold 
2016). The public implication of this shift toward opaque and automated 
datafied discrimination renders justice through transparency and account-
ability ever more elusive for data subjects (Barocas & Selbst 2016).
The fact that dataf ication supports the increasing automation and 
opacity of discriminatory practices not only accords with what Beniger 
foresaw as the centrality of information processing for social control, but 
also points toward immanent surveillance as the crux of domination. The 
military-industrial invention of the datafied individual can be seen as more 
deeply embedded within a colonial legacy of surveillance as the means of 
achieving the dual purpose of value extraction and social control (Mbembe 
1992). While in a datafied society one might think instead of ‘dataveillance’, 
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the continuous monitoring that pervades the social fabric through im-
manent collection of both data and metadata ‘for unstated present purposes’ 
(Van Dijck 2014: 205; see also Zimmer 2008), the ways in which algorithms 
exert discriminatory ‘soft bio-power’ f ind precursors in surveillance as a 
disciplinary gaze (Cheney-Lippold 2011).
In order to collect people’s information, they must be observed, their 
pertinent information discerned, translated into a notation system and 
organized. Each of these steps involves a surveillant gaze whose roots can 
be traced to military-industrial colonial expansion that relied on making 
use of indigenous populations through techniques based on visible measure-
ment (Glissant 1997). This profit-oriented domination was further justif ied 
through European imperial knowledge systems such as medically proven 
‘inferiority’ which rationalized the existence of ‘subject races’ (e.g. non-
whites) that needed to be ruled by white superiors as part of their civilizing 
mission (Said 2014; Wekker 2015). Disproportionate applications of surveil-
lance to othered bodies characterized the slave trade as a network of power 
exercised through a monopoly of knowledge comprised of overseers, paper 
technologies, shipping routes, biometrics, plantations, identif ication cards 
and the census (Browne 2015; Siegert 2006). Parallel to contemporary data 
visualization and the social graph, these various practices of surveillance 
generated data that could be processed, organized and, most importantly, 
mapped onto the expanding territories of empire (Shepherd 2015). More-
over, the ways in which diverse data sources could be networked through 
mapping highlights the Eurocentric conceit of dataf ication; as José Rabasa 
(1993: 180) contends, traces of European expansionism continue to imbue 
measurements and representations of the social world with an underlying 
Eurocentric universality – this is the basis for the ‘we’ who benefit from big 
data in Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier’s account.
An epistemological critique thus subtends a look backward to the histori-
cal precedents for applications of data processing to social organization. 
The ways in which knowledge is produced through measurement invokes 
a culturally specif ic set of baggage inherent in the very language used to 
delimit what counts as ‘data’, as the f irst step in a series of human processes 
that seek to make sense of the social world through measurement and 
organization. Even within a Eurocentric lineage of structuralist and post-
structuralist thought (e.g. Foucault’s Les mots et les choses, 1966), human 
sciences are acknowledged to be governed by an unconscious set of forma-
tive rules as productive of knowledge as power. In this light, the work of 
nineteenth-century anthropometrist Adolphe Quetelet, who believed that 
data sets large enough would produce accurate predictions of criminality 
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(Beirne 1987), might be seen as a formative epistemological touchstone for 
the contemporary faith in the ‘bigness’ of big data. Belief in quantif ication 
is a hallmark of this episteme, embedded in the language, tools, methods 
and data itself used to represent social life. In other words, the software that 
immanently conducts operations of collection, organization and predic-
tion might be seen as the ‘frozen organizational and policy discourse’ that 
circulates as a means of legitimizing inequality (Bowker & Star 1999: 135).
Methodological Interventions and Alternative Cartographies
Therefore, the question arises whether we can repurpose big data approaches 
for anti-oppressive knowledge production, and, if so, how? We explore 
this question by offering some methodological considerations developed 
from the situated case of human mobility. Clearly, the methodological 
debate on big data is polarized. Utopianists celebrate big data as the next 
lucrative frontier (colonial metaphor intended). In line with this optimistic 
rhetoric, quantitative and mathematically oriented scholars have praised 
big data for natural, unmediated, objective, purer and self-explanatory 
access to social processes. Exemplary of this discourse is the recognition of 
the ‘data scientist’ as the ‘sexiest job title of the 21st century’ (cited in Gehl 
2015). On the other end of the spectrum, a dystopian denouncement of big 
data as a form of ‘methodological genocide’ highlights its lack of attention 
to history, culture, context, specif icity, meanings, structure and agency 
(Uprichard 2015).
Realistically, because dataf ication is a pressing contemporary empirical 
geopolitical reality, we cannot simply reject dealing with it, nor should we 
univocally champion it as a silver bullet. Evelyn Ruppert and her colleagues 
suggest that data mining can be of value for socio-cultural research through 
‘specif ic mobilizations’ of certain digital methods ‘in particular locations’ 
(2013: 32). Similarly, the chapter on ref lexive research by Karin van Es, 
Nicolás López Coombs and Thomas Boeschoten in the present collection 
(pp. 171-180) offers a promising starting point for opening up onto more 
critical methodological approaches to the datafied society. However, to date, 
little attention has been given to how to make data mining a people-centred 
process, which accounts for dynamism, complexity, reflexivity, diversity 
and multiplicity (Leurs forthcoming 2017).
The common paradigm of disembodied, impartial knowledge production 
is often conducted on the basis of a utilitarian research ethics. In large-scale 
data-driven research projects, ethical safeguards are commonly geared 
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toward managing risk and reputation on the part of the institution, rather 
than protecting those people involved in the study. This model draws on a 
cost-benefit analysis and abides by expectations held by biomedical-ethi-
cally oriented university Institutional Review Boards. Consider for example 
the painful example of the ‘massive-scale emotional contagion’ experiment, 
where a team of academic and industry researchers manipulated the News 
Feeds of nearly seven hundred thousand unwitting Facebook users. They 
took Facebook’s Terms of Service as a proxy for informed consent, and no 
one could opt out from the study (Kramer, Guillory & Hancock 2014).
By contrast, providing distinctive alternative ethical positions stemming 
from feminist, critical pedagogical, anti-oppressive, community-based and 
Indigenous paradigms and methods offers ways to rethink big data as a 
progressive toolkit. Although they have yet to engage in sustained dialogue 
with data studies, these approaches share a common interest in dialogically 
involving informants as knowledge co-producers or co-researchers who 
share valuable insights. They involve consciously highlighting the human in 
data-based decision-making, where each step in the process of creating and 
manipulating large data sets involves ethical reflexivity (O’Neil 2016). With 
ambitions to decolonize dominant disembodied research methodologies 
that claim positivist objectivity, scholars in alternative paradigms seek 
to establish greater reciprocity for underprivileged, queer, Indigenous or 
otherwise non-mainstream voices (Kovach 2010; Walter & Andersen 2013). 
Rather than neutrally extracting self-explanatory data from an apolitical 
data void, scholars may account for power relations, and prioritize listening, 
relationalities, f luidity, journeying, mutual trust and strategic refusals as a 
way of helping data subjects regain sovereignty over knowledge production. 
When transposed to the digital context, these approaches may prompt 
scholars as activists to take seriously the agency of individuals over their 
own information; this data can be collaboratively repurposed for com-
munity advocacy (Gubrium & Harper 2013).
Alternative cartographies and bottom-up initiatives that reinstate what’s 
missing in big data are exemplary for how data-based initiatives can be 
appropriated for community advocacy, ‘civic action’ (Schäfer 2016), ‘agency’ 
(Kennedy, Poell & Van Dijck 2015) and ‘data activism’ (Milan & Gutiérrez 2015). 
Various digital counters and mapping initiatives maintained by consortia 
of journalists, researchers and activists that combine big and small data 
(individual cases) have made a growing impact. For example, the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism (BIJ) manages wherethedronesstrike.com, visual-
izing 10 years of drone strikes in Pakistan. The Missing Migrant Project 
maintained by the International Organization of Migration tracks ‘deaths 
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along migratory routes worldwide’. The Migrants’ Files similarly maps ‘the 
human and f inancial cost of 15 years of Fortress Europe’, providing ‘data-
driven insights on migration to Europe’.
The BIJ’s recent infographic, ‘Which countries treat children like 
children?’ (Figure 15.2), provides access to voices and accounts of 95,000 
unaccompanied children seeking asylum in Europe in 2015. Besides numeri-
cal overviews, situated individual voices are integrated into the map. For 
example, we can f ind out about Abdul Satar’s story. We see a young man in 
a photograph, a 17-year old Syrian currently living in London. He fled from 
his native country in 2013. In a video, we hear how he narrates his journey 
in Arabic, with English subtitles. This journey is also visualized, alongside 
the complete translated transcript of the interview. His claim, ‘Someone 
must talk about us – because no one is listening to us’, resonates through 
the small-data contextual cues juxtaposed against the larger data set.
Such initiatives commonly combine various sources of people-centred 
information, crowdsourced data gathering and open access databases that 
accommodate non-specialist public audiences for the information. For 
further examples of how alternative data corpora can draw attention to 
marginalized issues, consider the Information Sharing Portal on refugees 
and migrants emergency responses in the Mediterranean (UNHCR 2016), 
the Missing Migrant Project listing cross-referenced deaths of migrants 
at the European borders since 2000 (IOM, 2016), and TMF MoneyTrails an 
open access spreadsheet listing the costs of EU deportations from 2000 
Fig. 15.2:  Abdul Satar’s story (Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2016)
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onwards (2016). While combining large and small data sets and toggling 
between distant and close reading can risk a reif ication of the methods 
themselves (Caplan 2016), the point to emphasize in alternative cartogra-
phies is the reflexive self-positioning of the observer. In this way, small data 
might be reconceptualized as ‘deep data’, information rendered self-aware 
through cultural continuity that acknowledges data’s formative epistemol-
ogical contexts (Brock 2015). These embodied, situated and re-humanized 
examples of doing ‘deep data’ analysis offer incentives to further think 
about ways in which big data might be strategically mobilized as an anti-
oppressive knowledge-power system.
Conclusion: Who Are ‘We’ in the Datafied Society?
Returning to the proclamation that big data affords a revolutionary change 
in the ways ‘we live, work and think’, as phrased by Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier’s subtitle, the ‘we’ might be most fruitfully interrogated from 
the perspective of power and privilege. Their popular account of big data 
may indeed be seen as a continuation of longstanding power structures 
within the mythologies of information processing. Echoing Cisco CEO John 
Chambers’s claim in the 1990s that the internet would ‘change the way we 
work, live, play and learn’ (Fryer & Stewart 2008), the rise of big data extends 
Beniger’s control revolution, which opens with the conceit that ‘understand-
ing ourselves in our own particular moment in history will enable us to 
shape and guide that history’ (1986: 6). If the goal of data-based inquiry is 
to shape and guide history, and if ‘methods are social practices, means of 
forming good communities, not just tools for poking at reality’ (Peters 2011: 
444), then specifying the ‘we’ who are invested with agency and ‘they’ who 
become the excluded others in a dataf ied society is critical. Data analytics 
dashboards seductively promise a complete rendering of reality, but any 
approach to data-based social research must contend with the thorny ques-
tion: who are ‘we’? And how can ‘we’ be critiqued, opened up, accessed 
and delineated? As shown in the contemporary case of migration, situated 
within a colonial history of the statistical measurement of populations, 
data’s inherent discriminatory operations need to be uncovered in order 
to get at the ‘we’. This involves recognizing the politics embedded within 
technological artefacts (e.g. Winner 1980), and particularly recognizing the 
asymmetrical power embedded in a doctrine of objectivity ‘honed to perfec-
tion in the history of science tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism, 
and male supremacy’ (Haraway 1991: 187). Taking this specif ic assemblage 
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of privilege into account, researchers working with data can counter the 
investments in its ‘bigness’ with anti-oppressive tactics drawn from small 
and deep data co-construction in order to lay bare the ethical implications 
of a dataf ied society.
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Section 4
Key Ideas in Big Data Research
In what follows we have asked four scholars several questions pertain-
ing to ideas they have formulated which we f ind are key to researchers 
interested in the dataf ication of society. In the f irst two short interviews 
we tackled fundamental challenges facing online data research. We asked 
Nick Couldry, Professor of Media, Communications and Social Theory at 
the London School of Economics, about the myth of big data. He poses 
concerns about the validity of Web-based data analysis to formulate state-
ments about social interaction and cultural production. Connected hereto 
is the data point critique formulated by Carolin Gerlitz, Professor of Media 
Studies at the University of Siegen. She considers the research problem 
of making data points (e.g. likes and shares) countable and comparable 
despite emerging from different interpretations, practices and actors. We 
subsequently zoom out to discuss the role of algorithms in our society and 
algorithmic exceptionalism with internet critic Evgeny Morozov. He stresses 
the fact that algorithms provide a continuation rather than a break with 
previous practices. Lastly we turn to Mercedes Bunz, Senior Lecturer at 
the University of Westminster, for a discussion on the need for a dialogue 
with technology. She considers how data and algorithms affect the heart 
of our society, in that it reshapes our understanding of media industries 
and public discourses.

16. The Myth of Big Data
Nick Couldry 
Increasingly, institutions in the f ields of research and policymaking, as well 
as the corporate realm, base decision-making and knowledge production 
on metrics calculated from what is metaphorically called ‘big data’. In his 
2013 inaugural lecture ‘A Necessary Disenchantment: Myth, Agency and 
Injustice in a Digital World’, Nick Couldry discusses the mythical claim that 
big data is generating a new and better form of social knowledge.
What does/doesn’t ‘big data’ tell us about the social? Or in other words, 
what type of ‘social’ is being constructed in social media?
No one disputes that data sets in every domain, including those relating 
to the social, are very large, or that, because they are so large, there is 
something to be gained by using automated processing to establish cor-
relations across those data sets; such processing is, of course, beyond the 
capacity of human interpreters. The issue is how we interpret the value of 
the outputs of such processing. Already in the latently metaphorical term 
big data, there is a story being told about human beings’ changing relation 
to the domain we have called social that is highly contestable. Big data, it is 
implied, is the source of a different order of knowledge, a step change in hu-
man self-understanding that precisely bypasses humans’ meagre attempts 
at self-understanding through interpreting the local details of what they 
think, say and do. This way of putting things obviously prejudges positively 
the value of the outputs of ‘big data’ processing. That is the ideological 
work done by the term ‘big’, beyond its obvious descriptive force (and, as 
I said, no one disputes that the data sets involved are very large!). I don’t 
believe we should accept this story, and I will come back later to how we 
could contest it. But if we simply accept it, it has major consequences for 
the type of social domain that is accessible to us as researchers and social 
actors. ‘Big data’ is only possible on two basic conditions (which actually are 
composites of many more detailed conditions): f irst, that data is collected 
continuously about the states of affairs in various domains (including not 
just what individuals do and say, but the state of their bodies); second, 
that data is aggregated and its patterns of correlation computed and ‘in-
terpreted’. Because only information of particular sorts conforms to the 
requirements of data management, and because only processes of particular 
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sorts generates such information, ‘big data’, however expanded its scope 
and however f ine-tuned its workings, must always be a selection from the 
actual world of action and interaction. danah boyd and Kate Crawford (in 
their important 2013 article on the ‘myths’ of big data) brought out the many 
specif ic delusions in relying on ‘big data’ as a source of knowledge, but in 
my work I have tried to focus on the overall delusion that, if you like, frames 
all the specif ic ones: that is, the overall attempt to reorient us towards big 
data processes as ‘the’ new form of social knowledge.
Ideological uses of the term ‘big data’ however forget that general, yet 
highly motivated, selectivity, and so inevitably misread the picture of the 
social obtained through big data processing, but with a constructive force 
that is diff icult to resist, especially when investment in social knowledge 
(by governments, funders, private corporations) is increasingly focused 
on ‘big data’. Over time, this may obscure our possibilities for imagining, 
describing and enacting the social otherwise. Meanwhile, the ideological 
work is going on all around us, whether in Wired magazine editor Chris 
Anderson’s trailblazing article ‘The End of Theory’ (Anderson 2007) or more 
critically in a book such as Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier’s Big 
Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (2013) 
where they predict that, as dataf ication and big data processing grows, ‘we 
will no longer regard our world as a string of happenings that we explain as 
a natural or social phenomenon, but as a universe comprised essentially of 
information’ (2013: 96, emphasis added). Note that opposition: not ‘natural 
or social’ but ‘essentially information’.
Clearly those with skills at interpreting the social ‘need not apply’ in 
this new world of ‘social’ knowledge! The paradox, as with most forms 
of symbolic violence, lies only just below the surface, but it relies for its 
effectiveness on us letting it pass without comment – and on us acting out 
its consequences every day. I will come back to action and resistance in a 
moment. The long-term consequences of this ideological shift towards ‘big 
data’ as the new default source of knowledge about ‘the social’ takes two 
contrasting forms.
First, in how the particular details of data collection and data processing 
recalibrate the possibilities of social existence, the ontology if you like of 
the social. We feel this at work from hour to hour as we monitor our day 
to decide whether it is ‘worth’ a status update on whatever social media 
platform we use. But the detailed workings are much harder to track, and 
require exhaustive analysis of the linked data sets on which, for example, 
automated credit ratings are based. Oscar Gandy was pioneering in seeing 
the socially discriminatory potential of corporate data collection a quarter 
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of a century ago (Gandy 1993), and my LSE colleague Seeta Gangadharan is 
doing great work in this area: www.datacivilrights.org/.
And second – and this was more my focus in my inaugural lecture, at 
LSE (Couldry 2014) – to criticize the overall celebration of social knowledge 
achieved through automated, processing and, by contrast, the devaluing – 
even the attempted decommissioning,– of other forms of social knowledge 
that until fairly recently, were taken seriously. To unpack this, we need ‘a 
hermeneutic of the anti-hermeneutic’; we need to register what Judith Butler 
calls ‘a refusal of discourse’ (2004: 36). If we don’t, we risk losing touch – in 
our languages about the social – with a basic truth: that, as philosopher 
Charles Taylor (1986) put it, the human being is ‘a self-interpreting animal’ 
and so the only possible meaning of our lives together stems from its basis in 
our attempts to interpret what we do to each other. Without a hold on that 
truth, we accept a risk of inhabiting what the 19th-century Russian novelist 
Nikolai Gogol called ‘dead souls’: human entities that have f inancial value 
(in his novel, as mortgageable assets; in our new world, as unwitting data 
producers), but that are not alive, not at least in the sense we have always 
known human beings to be alive.
But why talk about the claims about big data as mythical? Why should 
we care so much about the myth of big data?
That goes back to the question of action. In much of my work I have been 
concerned with how it is that large modern societies have become organized, 
if you like focused, around the productions of particular institutions with 
huge symbolic power, whether traditional media institutions or increasingly 
the organizations that run our digital platforms and also those that generate 
process and own the data that we, largely unwittingly, generate through 
our actions online. I have always argued that such a big social ‘f ix’ requires 
something more than ideology in the traditional sense: it requires us to act 
in ways that conform to it. Here Žižek’s concept of ideology (1990) is more 
helpful than Marx’s, but personally I have preferred to use the term ‘myth’. 
The myth of big data is a f ix of that sort: a society-wide rationalization 
of a certain state of affairs that works not just, or sometimes not even, 
through what we think, but always through what we do: what we go on 
doing, whatever we believe (‘clicking like’ and so on). The myth of big data 
is particularly broad in how it has emerged and is being played out, but is 
also particularly important in that it works to challenge the very idea that 
the social is something we can interpret at all. It works to disable other, older 
(and no doubt newer) forms of social knowledge. That, I believe, will have 
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huge consequences in the longer term for our understandings of democratic 
agency and social justice.
So how then do we achieve a more agent-focused account of big data?
This is a long-term collective battle, and there are many levels to it. First, 
we need to refuse the myth as such: to reject its explicit claims and lan-
guage. The myth of big data is an attempt to appropriate the possibilities of 
producing knowledge about the social domain, which needs to be resisted. 
So specif ic attempts to claim better understanding of the social based on 
automated processing of very large data sets need to be closely interrogated 
as specif ic claims, stripping away the usual rhetoric about ‘how all social 
knowledge is changing’ that often accompanies such specif ic claims.
Second, and as another LSE colleague, Alison Powell, and I argued in an 
article called ‘Big Data from the Bottom Up’, the skills and collaborative 
practices necessary for those outside the large institutions that benefit from 
the myth of big data – including civil society organizations – to work with 
large data sets must be developed and encouraged. It is the case – and this is 
the good element in some big data rhetoric – that cities might be run better 
if citizens gathered different types of data about what goes on in cities, and 
were empowered not only to decide how that data is being analysed to 
citizens’ mutual advantage, but also what sorts of action might flow from 
the knowledge the analysis of that data generates. Part of that process 
of opening up civically the black box of ‘big data’ (but which we would 
do better to simply call very large data sets) means spreading awareness 
of how currently vast data sets are collected, sifted, aggregated and then 
repackaged as sources of truth, but without much, if any, accountability for 
the rules of operation that drive that process.
This practical civic project holds to a basic principle of social science 
research, that it should work towards the ‘de-reif ication’ of social processes 
(Sewell 2005). Never have we needed a project of ‘de-reif ication’ more than 
today, I suspect.
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17. Data Point Critique
Carolin Gerlitz 
There is a plethora of publications emerging in the humanities, especially 
media studies, that use data points from social media platforms in order to 
investigate social interaction and cultural production. Data points taken 
from social media platforms are used for calculating metrics on the most 
diverse aspects of users and use. As Carolin Gerlitz has pointed out, research 
practices tend to treat these data points alike in spite of the fact that they 
take on different functions (Gerlitz & Rieder 2013) and even though they 
are used by different social groups (Bruns & Stieglitz 2013). Drawing on 
Espeland & Stevens (1998), Gerlitz calls this the commensuration of data 
points and formulates a data point critique.
What does your criticism of making data points countable and compa-
rable for analysis consist of exactly? 
Digital media are informed by standardization. What users can do in social 
media or platforms is usually prestructured into specific forms or – to quote 
that Agre (1994) – grammars of action. Friending, following, liking, comment-
ing, sharing or favoriting allows users to act in prestructured form in the front 
end whilst at the same time producing equally prestructured data points in 
the back end. Action and capture are collapsed and happen simultaneously. 
A proliferating array of counters, tickers and notifications interfaces between 
action and capture, presenting users with aggregate counts of grammars 
performed through like or share counters, numbers of comments and other 
metrics. Whilst some platforms offer a rather limited set of grammars, like 
Instagram or Twitter, platforms like Facebook constantly proliferate their 
grammars. But what is it that we are counting when aggregating tweets, likes 
or comments? The combination of standardized action and countability is 
rather suggestive, both to media users and researchers, as it implies that 
the actions that grammars capture are similar if not comparable. But that is 
not necessarily the case. First, because users have different reasons to like, 
share or retweet and deploy the ‘interpretative flexibility’ (Van Dijck 2012) of 
platform grammars by assigning different meanings to them. Secondly, these 
grammars are increasingly being realized outside of the platform through 
social media clients, cross-platform syndication, automating software, apps 
and/or custom scripts (Gerlitz & Rieder 2015), which allow the grammars 
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of one platform to be folded into the grammars of other platforms – whilst 
not necessarily following the same objective or interpretation. Hashtags 
deployed on Instagram are easily transposed to Twitter through cross-
syndication, just as tweets can be automatically created from news articles or 
RSS-feeds, just to name a few examples. The data points of one platform are 
thus informed by the interpretations, grammars and politics of a multiplicity 
of third parties. Espeland and Stevens understand such ‘transformation of 
different qualities into a common metric’ (1998: 314) as commensuration. 
Grammatisation of action and the possibility to build on top of platforms 
through apps, clients and syndication facilitate the commensuration of 
heterogeneous actions into a single data point. Rather than treating the 
data points provided by platforms as unproblematic and straightforwardly 
countable f irst order metrics (Callon 2005), I suggest to treat them as already 
assembled second order metrics, which are composed of heterogeneous 
interpretations, practices and actors. In order to work with social media 
data, researchers need to understand what they are counting in the f irst 
place, before reassembling data points into new metrics.
How can we avoid the commensuration of data points? And what do 
you mean by treating data points as ‘lively metrics’?
Commensuration cannot be avoided; it is a central element of the politics 
of platforms which provide infrastructures that cater to a variety of actors 
and their different objectives. These infrastructures facilitate the relative 
openness of grammars, as well as the possibility to retrieve and input data 
from and to the platform through application programming interfaces 
(APIs) which can be enacted by users and third parties. Commensuration 
is thus not only enacted by the platform itself, but has to be understood as 
a distributed accomplishment – or a happening (Lury & Wakeford 2012) 
– which needs to be realized by multiple actors in local, distributed and 
specific ways. Thinking of commensuration as happening does not reduce it 
to a mere effect of the medium or of grammatisation, but takes the various 
infrastructures, actors, practices and meanings into account that can feed 
into data points. As the happening of commensuration can play out differ-
ently at different times, with different issues, actors and practices involved, 
I suggest we think of social media metrics as ‘lively metrics’ which are 
animated by specif ic and local dynamics of commensuration. I understand 
lively in the sense of Marres & Weltevrede (2013) as internally dynamic, 
animated and variable, pointing to the multiple ways of being on platforms 
(Gerlitz & Rieder 2015).
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Why do you call for a public debate on data points?  
There is a delicate relationship between counting and valuation. ‘What 
counts’, Alain Badiou argues ‘in the sense of what is valued – is that which 
is counted. Conversely, everything that can be numbered must be valued’ 
(2008: 1). Within social media research, data points are being valuated in 
regards to the stories they tell, the practices they explicate and the medium-
specif ic dynamics they point to. Before reaggregating platform data into 
new second order metrics, it is important to understand what is being 
counted in the first places, as 100k tweets have a different value in research if 
issued from political protesters, cross-syndicated from Instagram or issued 
by spam-bot networks. The fact that numbers are easy to be displaced, 
circulated and reaggregated has led to their constant re-evaluation by a 
multiplicity of actors, reassembling them for intelligence, indicators for 
engagement, issue detectors or influence rankings (Gerlitz & Lury 2014), 
to name only a few. Once reassembled into new second order metrics, the 
question of what the original data points are composed of descends into 
the background. However, ‘commensuration changes the terms of what 
can be talked about, how we value, and how we treat what we value. It is 
symbolic, inherently interpretive, deeply political, and too important to be 
left implicit’ (Espaland & Stevens). As soon as social media data points come 
to have effects by determining the value or creditworthiness of consumers, 
or becoming part of governmental intelligence, it is important not to take 
initial data points as a given, but to understand what they are animated by. 
Therefore, a critical engagement with social media data needs to unpack 
and denaturalize especially those data points that appear most naturalized 
and straightforwardly countable. Their similarity is not a property but an 
accomplishment and there is a need for public debate on what is rendered 
equivalent and feeds into public forms of valuation here.
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18. Opposing the Exceptionalism of the 
Algorithm
Evgeny Morozov  
Evgeny Morozov is one of the most outspoken critics of Silicon Valley and 
its techno-opportunism. In his publications, he has challenged the claims 
that social media should be seen as a tool for political emancipation and 
that technological advancement equates to social progress. He recently 
addressed the technocratic expectations for big data and algorithms as 
problem solving machines for public administration and social organization.
It is claimed that algorithms and private companies are better than 
public institutions at solving societal problems. What is your take on this?
The public institutions that we currently have in place have emerged partly 
thanks to the emergence of the developers’ state and are therefore already 
predisposed to algorithmic optimization. Welfare for a poor, disadvantaged 
group presupposes that spending can be optimized by surveillance and 
in the US, for instance, the system has been expansive in monitoring the 
recipients of food stamps and other kinds of aid. This was built into the 
democratic apparatus of the welfare state and public institutions alongside 
a drive towards effectiveness, eff iciency and leanness. The entrance of 
new players to make things faster, cheaper and more expansive is not 
unexpected.  
I would not necessarily worry about the displacement of public institu-
tions by algorithms because these institutions already have some algo-
rithmic background. For example, institutions that you would associate 
with the public realm like taxi companies – publicly regulated in a way 
that Uber is not – have a very rudimentary capacity to match supply and 
demand. Previously, this was done by phone dispatchers and not a digital 
algorithm. In a sense, I would argue, even the phone dispatcher can be seen 
as an algorithm. These dispatchers weren’t particularly eff icient, but they 
matched supply to demand nonetheless. The entrance of companies into 
the market that do this more quickly, cheaply, effectively and eff iciently is 
not necessarily a big departure from that model.  
Within the philosophy of law and within the legal tradition, there is a 
huge debate as to whether judges discover law or whether they apply it. 
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If you stick to the view that they just apply it, then you argue that judges 
work in a very mechanistic, algorithmic manner. They take a set of rules 
and they generate an interpretation of those rules. Where exactly sources of 
that interpretative power come from is a question you can investigate and 
debate. But even that process in itself, depending on which philosophy of 
law you opt for, can be seen from the algorithmic perspective. The process of 
displacing public institutions with private ones is a different matter. It has 
to do with the nature of private companies providing services previously 
provided by the State. In some respects, this displacement is better and in 
some respects, it’s worse. However, I don’t think that algorithms are the 
dividing line between the two. The qualitative difference then would be 
that the new services or new industries are running on cheaply available 
data. Before the State was the primary collector of data and now we have 
those industries collecting data. That enables them to take over certain 
functions in a different way.
Banks, loan companies and Experion, not to mention all the other 
data collectors, were in the business way before technology companies. 
With my work, I consistently try to oppose the exceptionalism of ‘the 
internet’. In this case I don’t think that the collection of data by private 
companies has much to do with the internet. The scale has changed, 
if you look at the aggregation of banks and how they decide whether 
to give you a loan or not. The principle that banks use for generating 
a credit score, which in turn determines whether you are eligible for a 
loan, is not that different from the kind of reputation economy that Uber 
and Airbnb want to develop for determining if you are a trustworthy 
customer. That principle has its origins in banking far more than in the 
technology industry.
Obviously, there is far more data generated about lifestyle by individu-
als. This is in part because we have shifted to a society where devices can 
easily generate data. That data is useful for all sorts of purposes, but I don’t 
think that if an insurance company could have grabbed that data 80 years 
ago, they wouldn’t have grabbed it. Nothing has changed in the epistemic 
assumptions of how capitalism operates that made companies suddenly 
realize that data was valuable. It was always valuable but very hard to 
grab before. I would also challenge the assumption that only governments 
collected it in the past. If you look at the history of regulation of credit 
scores in Europe, you can argue that in Germany there were legal barriers 
as to what kind of data can be legally incorporated and analysed by a bank 
when they are determining whether to give you a loan, but the data was 
collected nonetheless.  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What impact does delegating public services to algorithms have on 
society?
You can answer the question in a highly theoretical mode or an empirical 
mode. I will answer it in the empirical mode, in that I have zero convic-
tion that the decisions that have been taken by humans and institutions 
have been just or fair in most cases. Plenty of discrimination happens with 
regard to race, class, gender and so forth. We should not glorify human 
decision-making just because it is human. Social biases exist regardless of 
whether algorithms or computers are doing the job. With algorithms you 
can actually create an audit trail and see the exact reasoning process that 
led to the decision. The problem is that the corporatization of algorithmic 
decision-making will also result in more opacity within the algorithms. 
Because many of them will be proprietary, we won’t be able to examine 
them and look inside them. There will be certain domains where I would 
like to have human critics, but that has to do with critical thought and 
the experience of quality rather than decision-making. I would like food 
critics to go and think about food as opposed to generating an algorithm 
aggregating Yelp opinions, not because I reject algorithms, but because 
food is something that requires a very different kind of decision-making.
There is no way I would trust institutions to delegate public services 
in a fair and responsible manner. But switching back to the theoretical 
mode, I don’t think this should be impossible. Much depends on how much 
trust and faith you have in the State. In Europe, I see few reasons to trust a 
State which has been dismantling itself. So why would I trust it to enact a 
switch to algorithms? But again, here the distrust doesn’t have to do with 
the algorithms, or even with the corporate nature of people doing the shift; 
it has to do with the nature of the public institutions and the State as it 
exists in Europe.
What can civil society do to preserve their democratic values?
They should develop long term strategies for rethinking ways of political 
representation, engagement and process. To some, representative democ-
racy is overrated. In Europe and America, it has lent itself to capture by 
forces that have more or less deprived it of whatever democratic potential 
it had. I would be happy to experiment with alternative forms of decision-
making and governance beyond representative democracy. Perhaps direct 
democracy would not be a bad alternative. The specif ic institutional ar-
rangements can be discussed later, but I think a lot of it would involve not 
248 evGeny Morozov 
getting confused (which much of Europe is now). People are pursuing fake 
and false emancipation strategies (e.g. collaborative economy, peer-to-peer, 
and makerspaces). They f ind ways to accustom themselves to the rather 
dire state of affairs and then think that their particular little project, which 
now involves some kind of technological component, is the way to resolve 
contradictions. I am not convinced of this.  
I am pushing for direct political engagement. I don’t mean voting and 
showing up at elections, but actually analysing questions that we would 
traditionally qualify as political: Who makes decisions? Who owns what? 
Who runs what? How much legitimacy do certain institutions have or 
should they have? These questions are much more relevant for thinking 
about our future than questions about certain technological aspects. It 
might not be so useful for your book, but I just can’t fake it anymore.
19. The Need for a Dialogue with 
Technology
Mercedes Bunz
In her book, The Silent Revolution, Mercedes Bunz describes a relentless 
transformation that unfolds silently. Algorithms and data merge in au-
tomatized processes of intellectual labour: algorithms produce journalistic 
articles, stock reports, and sports news. This slippery slope into an algorith-
mic society unfolds relatively unnoticed and without the occasional hypes 
that usually mark milestones of technological progress. However, it has 
effects on the heart of our society in that it reshapes our understanding of 
media industries and public discourses. With this, it questions our identity 
as zoon politikon. What once was opinion forming has now been taken 
over by decision-making machines that have become an inherent part of 
our social organization. Bunz shows the need to consciously interact and 
understand technology.
Why do you describe the digital revolution as a silent one?
What we socially want from digital technology is rarely discussed. It is 
apparent that we understand digital technology and its ‘disruption’ foremost 
as an economic sensation. If there is a political promise at all, it is one 
that can be described with Christopher Kelty (2015) as a ‘Fog of Freedom’. 
Interestingly, this is very different from the role technology played in our 
past, when the transformative powers that technologies offer our socie-
ties were understood as political; here Elizabeth Eisenstein’s The Printing 
Press as an Agent of Change but also Donna Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto 
(1987) are prominent examples for research addressing the political side of 
technology. Following their approaches, my book addresses our approach 
towards algorithms as a missed chance as much as a problem. I agree with 
Wendy Chun, who points out in her forthcoming Habitual New Media (2016) 
that media matter most when they seem not to matter at all. Thus, I am 
interested in the fact that we don’t debate what we want from technology. 
Instead of understanding it as something that can be shaped and turn 
towards it, we approach it in a rather stereotypical manner: we are either 
for or against technology, as my critical discourse analysis looking into how 
we talk about technology shows.
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What do you mean by ‘turning towards technology’? Why is criticality 
not enough?
Of course, we need to critically analyse technology, but criticizing algo-
rithms must go beyond pointing out its negative aspects. Technology studies 
(Fuller 2003; Parisi 2012; Brunton 2013) have shown again and again that 
when it comes to technology, effective critique needs to be followed up with 
action. The overwhelmingly negative view of Google and its dealing with 
data we f ind in Germany is a good example of this: while being highly criti-
cal of Google, the market position of its search engine just in that country 
for 2015 is 94.84%; in the US Google’s market share is only 64%. This shows 
clearly that a negative critique of technology is in danger to fail when it does 
not actively change anything. 
Following the French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon 
(1958), I understand this change as a dialogue with technology. Simondon 
understood the human as being in an ‘ensemble’ with the machine, instead 
of being the master above it. This is where critique that keeps an objective 
distance to technology goes wrong; apart from the fact that is has not been 
proven as being very effective. In short, ‘turning towards technology’ does 
not mean to become non-critical, but to apply one’s critique in a dialogue 
with technology. Also for political reasons: one cannot leave the detailed 
knowledge of technology and its technical development in the hands of busi-
nesses, simply hoping that hackers like Anonymous or the Chaos Computer 
Club do their best pointing out the fundamental problems; Gabriella Cole-
man (2014) has recently shown their important role. As digital technology 
has become part of our daily environment, as we leave data with every 
usage, we are all asked to make more of an effort of consciously interacting 
with technology, and in understanding it; apart from insisting on having a 
right over our own data, of course.
Your book focuses especially on how the digital revolution is changing 
skilled work. How are algorithms changing the work of experts?
It is obvious that algorithms and big data change the work culture of skilled 
work and expertise. Inspired by Erik Brynjolfsson’s and Andrew McAfee’s 
research (2012), which gave a general picture of how algorithms transform 
our economies in the 21st century, my research digs down in some more 
detail as to what this means for ‘skilled work’. My question here was whether 
the algorithm does to the skilled worker what the machine in the industrial 
age has done to the manual worker.
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That there is change, is clear. Something as simple as the search func-
tion performed by various algorithms has fundamentally changed skilled 
work, which amounts to up to 75% in Western post-industrial societies. 
So far, expertise was exclusive and as such the decisive factor. Now the 
knowledge of teachers, doctors, journalists and even plumbers or engineers 
has become accessible to everyone. Furthermore, skilled work can also 
partly be automated besides being accessible. In the US, lawyers who were 
formerly allocated to do a document review are already being replaced by 
software called ‘e-discovery’. It scans 1.5 million documents for less than 
$100,000. Of course, both developments triggered by algorithms unsettle 
experts.
Case studies in my book, however, show that algorithms will not replace 
the expert. Even though information has become accessible and can be 
automated, the studies show that this information needs contextual knowl-
edge to be judged. This is also the case for the automation of knowledge, 
which needs to be guarded by experts. In a nutshell, one can say that it is 
not that the expert is replaced by algorithms. It is more that their areas of 
work are changing.
What is the role for concerned citizens as knowledge and its 
distribution are partially shaped by algorithms?
As concerned citizens, we have the duty to be more curious about what an 
algorithm can do and what it cannot do. Or why a company knows more 
about me, thanks to analysing data, than I can. I am afraid this concern, 
however, cannot be outsourced – it is not that Google or Facebook publish 
their algorithms, and the problem is solved. As our algorithms play a 
more important part in Western societies, we all need to become more 
digitally literate. This does not necessarily mean to learn programming, 
but to understand what programs can do and what they cannot do. As 
my colleague Luciana Parisi (2013) puts it: when we are interested in what 
knowledge and thinking is today, we need to study ‘algorithmic thought’. 
For this, we need to turn towards it and not away from it – also for political 
reasons: technology is way too important for our societies. Following here 
again Gilbert Simondon, my book tries to understand technological shifts 
in great detail, and tries to explain how digital technology and its cultural 
technique of ‘search’ affects knowledge and with it work as well as the 
public sphere; besides being a researcher, I have worked for several years 
as a journalist.
252 MerceDeS bunz 
With your experience as a journalist, what would you say is happening 
to the public sphere in today’s media environment?
Regarding the public sphere, we can observe two very different aspects: 
On the one hand, the internet has a democratizing effect in the sense that 
it has opened an alternative channel for each single member of the public. 
Due to this, social media has become one important source for journalism, 
which my former employer The Guardian understood early on. Its digital 
director, Emily Bell, now director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism 
at Columbia University, once said: you have to produce journalism with 
the internet, not on the internet. Buzzfeed, prof itable since 2013, currently 
understands this best with their production of sharable entertaining news 
as well as exciting investigative journalism.
But the digital public is not only a rich source for journalism, it also 
assists where it is helpless or fails as it allows to voice alternative opinions; 
we have seen important adjustments to existing reporting for example 
with the death of teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, one of far too many 
incidents that have led to ‘Black Lives Matter’. But of course, there is a 
f lipside to this much more populated public sphere. That we can engage 
there more easily also means that each one of us can be ‘reached’ more 
easily – mass surveillance and trolling are the ugly outcomes of this. As it 
stands, it must be understood that technology is not simply a solution for 
political problems but also causing some.
Something we also need to be aware of is that the shape of that digital 
public – the long tail – is one of those problems. From a technical perspec-
tive, as long as we have net neutrality, the internet follows an end-to-end-
principle in which application-specif ic functions ought to reside in the end 
hosts. While it is important to f ight for this, we also need to be aware of 
the fact that all ends are not the same. The social functions of those ends 
are far less democratic than the technical functions. Some ends are far 
better connected than others and have more reach: the thick ‘head’ has an 
advantage over its thin long tail. While the technicality of the internet is 
democratic, some get all the attention.
What is the role of the university when it comes to digital technology, 
algorithms and data?
In the future, universities could play an essential role when it comes to 
exploring technology, which they should not only do in their computer 
science departments. Today, algorithms are a cultural technique, so from 
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my perspective, it is the humanities that are concerned with human culture. 
Humanities scholars have been experts of human knowledge storing ever 
since the invention of, f irst, writing, and then books. I believe when being 
open to explore today’s knowledge storing more hands-on, they can very 
productively draw from their past. This is why the humanities scholars 
should establish their very own dialogue with technology. After all, ‘What 
can we know?’ is a classic question posed in the humanities.
How can we make the silent revolution heard?
As things are just about to start babbling with the so-called “Internet 
of Things” (Bunz 2016), I think it will soon be hard to ignore it. But as a 
many of my brilliant colleagues have pointed out (Bratton 2016, Chun 2016, 
Parisi 2015, Pasquinelli 2015, Fuller & Goffey 2012): if we don’t want to live 
with a technology that is a black box, we all need to interact with it more 
attentively.
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We recommend all the programs used in this book and, to help you along, 
they are listed below alongside the chapters they are featured in. Please 
see those chapters for more on how those tools have been used by our 
contributors.
Chapter 2: Cinemetrics, ACTION, Cultural Analytics
Chapter 3: Cultural Analytics
Chapter 4: Cultural Analytics, Gnip
Chapter 5: Google Search, Lippmannian Device (DMI)
Chapter 6: T-CAT tool (DMI)
Chapter 11: Gephi
Chapter 13: Outwit Hub
For a more expansive and updated list, please visit the Utrecht Data School 
website at dataschool.nl/resources using the password ‘udsResources’.

 Notes on Contributors
Julian Ausserhofer (@julauss) is a digital communication researcher from 
Vienna, Austria. He pursues his PhD at the Department of Communication 
at the University of Vienna, and works for the Alexander von Humboldt 
Institute for Internet and Society in Berlin. Academically, Julian’s areas 
of interest include computational methods in the social sciences and in 
journalism, and social media in news and politics. In particular, Julian 
examines practices in data journalism and interactions in the algorithmic 
formation of networked publics. Julian has published in Information, Com-
munication & Society and recently co-edited an open-access book in German 
on digital methods in Communication Science. He blogs at ausserhofer.net.
Dominikus Baur (@dominikus) is an independent researcher based in 
Munich, Germany. His research focuses on touch-based visualizations and 
mobile interaction design. Another of his interests are large-scale data-
based installations with projects such as ‘Self iecity’ and ‘On Broadway’. He 
has published in IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics 
and IEEE Computer Graphics and Applications, among others.
Asher Boersma (@asherboersma) is a PhD researcher in the DFG postgradu-
ate programme ‘Locating Media’, at Siegen University. His research looks at 
technologically mediated work (ethnographically) and its representations 
(media archaeologically). It focuses on the advent of infrastructure control 
rooms from the 1950s to today and how they have developed from manned 
stations towards more algorithmic autonomy.
Thomas Boeschoten (@boeschoten) is the founder of and a researcher at the 
Utrecht Data School (Utrecht University). His current research focuses on 
(new) media and data. His past publications in outlets such as M/C Journal 
and First Monday have explored social TV and Facebook and Twitter as 
spaces for online deliberation. For more info: thomas@dataschool.nl or 
www.boeschoten.eu.
Liliana Bounegru (@bb_liliana) is a PhD candidate at the University of 
Groningen and the University of Ghent and a researcher at the Digital 
Methods Initiative, University of Amsterdam. Her current research focuses 
on data journalism, digital methods and new media studies. She is also a 
visiting researcher at the Sciences Po Paris médialab and research fellow at 
258 The DaTafieD SocieT y
the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University. More about 
her work and publications can be found at lilianabounegru.org.
Elizabeth Buchanan (buchanane@uwstout.edu) is the Endowed Chair 
in Ethics and Director of the Center for Applied Ethics at the University 
of Wisconsin-Stout. Her research focuses on the intersection of research 
regulations and various forms of internet research. Past publications include 
articles in the Journal of Empirical Research and Human Research Ethics, 
Computers and Society, and in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. She 
is currently studying the ethics of university service learning programmes 
as part of a National Science Foundation grant.
Mercedes Bunz (@mrsbunz) is a senior lecturer of journalism and digital 
media at the University of Westminster. She writes about digital media and 
philosophy of technology. She is a co-founder of meson.press, an open-access 
publishing cooperative; her book, The Silent Revolution: How Digitalization 
Transforms Knowledge, Work, Journalism and Politics without Making Too 
Much Noise, was published in 2014.
Nick Couldry (@couldrynick) is Professor of Media, Communications 
and Social Theory in the Department of Media and Communications at 
the London School of Economics. As a sociologist of media and culture, 
he approaches media and communications from the perspective of the 
symbolic power that has been historically concentrated in media institu-
tions. He is interested in how media and communications institutions 
and infrastructures contribute to various types of order (social, political, 
cultural, economic, ethical). He is the author of many books, most recently 
Ethics of Media with Madianou and Pinchevski.
Karin van Es (@kfvanes) is Assistant Professor of Television and New Media 
at Utrecht University and a Senior Researcher at the Utrecht Data School. 
Her current research focuses on how new forms of knowledge production 
through data affects Dutch broadcast television. Her past publications in 
outlets such as Television & New Media, M/C Journal and First Monday have 
explored social TV and online deliberation. Her recent book The Future of Live 
(Polity Press, 2016) tackles the concept of the ‘live’ in the social media era.
Daniel Goddemeyer (@dgoddemeyer) is the founder of the New York City-
based research and design practice Object Form Field Culture (OFFC), 
which creates new relationships with technology through research, 
noTeS on conTribuTorS 259
products, services and experiments. OFFC works with companies such 
as BBVA Innovation Center, Telefonica Digital and Audi to identify new 
product applications for emerging technologies. To continuously inspire 
his work with a unique outlook, he explores – through his own research 
and the MFA class Urban Fictions at the School of Visual Arts – how the 
increasing proliferation of technology in our lives will impact and change 
our future every day. He holds an MFA from the Royal College of Arts. He 
has received several distinctions and awards from the Art Directors Club, 
the Red Dot Award, the German Design Prize and the Industrial Designer 
Society of America. More about his work and publications can be found at 
danielgoddemeyer.com.
Carolin Gerlitz (@cgrltz) is Professor of Media Studies at the University of 
Siegen. She conducts research on digital culture and methods. Her research 
explores the various intersections between new media, methods and eco-
nomic sociology, with a specif ic interest in Web economies, platform and 
software studies, brands, value, topology, measurement, numeracy, social 
media, digital (social) methods and issue mapping online. Together with 
Bernhard Rieder, she coordinates the ‘Media of Calculation’ research group. 
She has published in New Media & Society, Theory Culture & Society and 
Sociological Review, among others.
Jonathan Gray (@jwyg) is Prize Fellow at the Institute for Policy Research, 
University of Bath. His current research focuses on the politics of open data 
and public information. He is also Research Associate at the Digital Methods 
Initiative, University of Amsterdam; Research Associate at the médialab 
at Sciences Po; and Tow Fellow at the Tow Center for Digital Journalism, 
Columbia University. He is a regular contributor to The Guardian and Open 
Democracy. More about his work can be found at jonathangray.org.
Mathieu Jacomy (@jacomyma) is a research engineer who has been at 
the Sciences Po Paris médialab since 2010 and leads the Web instrument 
of Equipex DIME-SHS. His current research focuses on visual network 
analysis, digital methods applied to social sciences and issue mapping. He 
created the Gephi network analysis software and is currently developing 
the Web crawler Hyphe.
Koen Leurs (koenleurs.net) is an Assistant Professor in Gender and Postco-
lonial studies at Utrecht University. He is a feminist internet researcher who 
recently completed the EU-funded Marie Curie study on ‘Urban Politics of 
260 The DaTafieD SocieT y
London Youth analysed Digitally’ at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (2013-15). Currently, he leads the Netherlands Organization 
for Scientif ic Research-funded research project ‘Young connected migrants. 
Comparing digital practices of young asylum seekers and expatriates in the 
Netherlands’ (2016-19). His publications in Crossings: Journal of Migration 
& Culture, Feminist Review, Observatorio OBS* and Social Media + Society 
explore gender, race, class, migration, urbanity and youth culture using 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. He has published Everyday Femi-
nist Research Praxis (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2014) and Digital Passages. 
Diaspora, Gender and Youth Cultural Intersections (Amsterdam University 
Press, 2015).
Nicolás López Coombs is a PhD candidate at the University of Antwerp as 
part of a research project focusing on the mediated urban experience. He 
received his MA in New Media and Digital Culture from Utrecht University 
in 2016, where his thesis took a fan studies approach to citizen journalism 
related to the podcast Serial. This is his f irst academic publication.
Lev Manovich (@manovich) is Professor of Computer Science at The 
Graduate Center, CUNY and a Director of the Software Studies Lab that 
uses methods from computer science, media design and humanities to 
analyse big cultural data such as millions of Instagram images. He is the 
author and editor of eight books including Data Drift (RIXC, 2015), Software 
Takes Command (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), Soft Cinema: Navigating the 
Database (The MIT Press, 2005) and The Language of New Media (The MIT 
Press, 2001) which was described as ‘the most suggestive and broad ranging 
media history since Marshall McLuhan’.
Annette Markham (@annettemarkham) is an itinerant scholar researching 
and teaching in the broad areas of social media, qualitative methodologies 
and ethics. She is an associate professor in the Department of Aesthetics 
& Communication at Aarhus University, Denmark. She has published two 
books, including Internet Inquiry: Conversations about method with Nancy 
Baym (2009), and has published in Digital Ethics, Journal of Qualitative 
Communication Research and the Encyclopedia for Social & Behavioural 
Sciences, among others.
Eef Masson is an Assistant Professor in the Media Studies department of 
the University of Amsterdam. Her publications include the book Watch 
and Learn: Rhetorical Devices in Classroom Films after 1940 (Amsterdam 
noTeS on conTribuTorS 261
University Press, 2012) and articles on historical non-theatrical/utility 
f ilms and archival issues for various journals (e.g. Film History, The Moving 
Image) and essay collections. Currently, she is shifting her attention to 
the contemporary uses of screen-based media in museum contexts, and 
exploring the affordances of data research for f ilm history.
Evgeny Morozov (@evgenymorozov) is a contributing editor at The New 
Republic and the author of To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of 
Technological Solutionism (2014) and The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of 
Internet Freedom (2012). He was a visiting scholar at Stanford University 
and a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation from 2010-12. He 
has written for The New York Times, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, 
Financial Times, London Review of Books, Times Literary Supplement, Slate 
and other publications. His research focuses on the social and political 
implications of technology.
Christian Gosvig Olesen (http://f ilmhistoryinthemaking.com/) is a PhD 
candidate at the University of Amsterdam’s Centre for Cultural Heritage 
and Identity. His research project, provisionally titled Film History in the 
Making, investigates the implications that digitization in f ilm archives 
bears upon f ilm historical research methods in primarily academic set-
tings. He has published articles based on his research in journals such 
as NECSUS – European Journal of Media Studies, Cinema et Cie and The 
Moving Image.
Johannes Paßmann (@j_passmann) is a media scholar and postdoc at 
Siegen University. His PhD thesis, f inished in March 2016, was a media 
ethnography researching popular amateurs on German-speaking Twitter 
both online and offline. This was done over a f ive-year period and combined 
ethnography with digital methods. The research focused on Twitter’s media 
practices, i.e. retweeting, faving (or liking), following etc. These practices 
were differentiated into information organization practices on the one 
hand and recognition practices on the other hand, drawing on German 
recognition theory (especially Hegel and Axel Honneth) and French gift 
theory (especially Marcel Mauss and Marcel Hénaff).
Cornelius Puschmann (@cbpuschmann) is a senior researcher at the 
Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society as part of the 
research group Networks of Outrage, funded by the VolkswagenStiftung 
under its data journalism funding scheme. Additionally, he is a project 
262 The DaTafieD SocieT y
leader and coordinator of the postdoc research group Algorithmed Public 
Spheres (APS) at the Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research at the 
University of Hamburg. In addition to coordinating the APS postdoc 
group, Cornelius is chair of the annual conference of the Association of 
Internet Researchers. Cornelius’s research interests include interpersonal 
communication in digital platforms (particularly hate speech), the role of 
algorithms in the selection of media content, as well as methodological, 
ethical and epistemological aspects of computational social science.
Bernhard Rieder (rieder@uva.nl) is Associate Professor of New Media and 
Digital Culture at the University of Amsterdam and a collaborator with the 
Digital Methods Initiative. His research focuses on the history, theory and 
politics of software and particularly on the role algorithms play in social 
processes and in the production of knowledge and culture. This includes 
work on the analysis, development and application of computational 
research methods as well as investigation into the political and economic 
challenges posed by large online platforms.
Richard Rogers (@richardrogers) is the Department Chair of Media 
Studies and Professor of New Media & Digital Culture at the University of 
Amsterdam. He is director of the Digital Methods Initiative (Amsterdam) 
and author of Information Politics on the Web (MIT Press, 2004), awarded 
the best book of the year by the Association for Information Science and 
Technology, and digital methods (MIT Press, 2013), awarded the outstanding 
book of the year by the International Communication Association (ICA).
Theo Röhle (theo.rohle@kau.se) is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of 
Geography, Media and Communication, Karlstad University. His current 
research focuses on comparative software history and historical intersec-
tions of gaming and control. His past publications in outlets such as New 
Media and Society, First Monday and Computational Culture have focused 
on search engines, surveillance and the mass media aspects of the Open 
Graph protocol.
noTeS on conTribuTorS 263
Mirko Tobias Schäfer (@mirkoschaefer) is Assistant Professor of New 
Media & Digital Culture at Utrecht University and project leader at the 
Utrecht Data School. In 2016, Mirko was a Mercator Research Fellow at the 
NRW School of Governance at University of Duisburg-Essen. His research 
interest revolves around the socio-political impact of media technology. 
His publications cover user participation in cultural production, hacking 
communities, politics of software design and communication in social 
media. He is co-editor and co-author of Digital Material. Tracing New Media 
in Everyday Life and Technology (Amsterdam University Press, 2009) and 
author of Bastard Culture! How User Participation Transforms Cultural 
Production (Amsterdam University Press, 2011).
Gerwin van Schie is a Teaching Assistant in New Media and Digital Culture 
at Utrecht University and a Junior Researcher at the Utrecht Data School. In 
2015, he received his MA with honours in New Media and Digital Culture at 
Utrecht University with a thesis on moral mediation of privacy in the mobile 
messaging applications Whatsapp and Telegram. His current research 
focuses on big data ethics for scientif ic research and policymaking.
Tamara Shepherd (tshepski.com) is an Assistant Professor in the Depart-
ment of Communication, Media and Film at the University of Calgary. She 
studies the feminist political economy of digital culture, looking at labour, 
policy and literacy in social media, mobile technologies and digital games. 
She is an editorial board member of Social Media + Society, and her work has 
been published in Convergence, First Monday, Triple C, and the Canadian 
Journal of Communication.
Moritz Stefaner (http://truth-and-beauty.net) works as a ‘truth and beauty 
operator’ at the crossroads of data visualization, information aesthetics 
and user interface design. With a background in Cognitive Science (BSc, 
University of Osnabrück) and Interface Design (MA, University of Applied 
Sciences Potsdam), his award-winning work beautifully balances analytical 
and aesthetic aspects in mapping abstract and complex phenomena. His 
work has been exhibited at the Venice Biennale of Architecture, SIGGRAPH, 
Ars Electronica and the Max Planck Science Gallery. He also publishes the 
Data Stories podcast with Enrico Bertini (http://datastori.es).
264 The DaTafieD SocieT y
Natalia Sánchez-Querubín is a PhD candidate at the Amsterdam School 
for Cultural Analysis, and Lecturer at the New Media & Digital Culture at 
the University of Amsterdam. Her graduate research is concerned with how 
patients use social media platforms for narrating their experiences of illness 
and with care practices currently being developed online.
William Uricchio is Professor of Comparative Media Studies at MIT, where 
he’s also Principal Investigator of the MIT Open Documentary Lab, and 
Professor of Comparative Media History at Utrecht University. His research 
focuses on the early phases of various media forms both as technologies and 
social practices, tracing the processes by which affordances are embraced, 
forgotten, or deferred to subsequent media forms. He has written extensively 
on 19th Century television, early f ilm, and immersive technologies from the 
panorama to VR to AR and other locative media, and his publications can 
be found at http://williamuricchio.com
Tommaso Venturini is a lecturer at King’s College London (Digital Humani-
ties Dept.). He is also associate researcher at the médialab of Sciences Po 
Paris, which he founded with Bruno Latour and coordinated for six years. 
He was the leading scientist of the projects EMAPS (climaps.eu – EU FP7) 
and MEDEA (projetmedea.hypotheses.org – ANR). His research focuses 
on Digital Methods, STS and Social Modernization. He teaches Contro-
versy Mapping, Data Journalism and Information Design at graduate and 
undergraduate level. He was trained in sociology and media studies at the 
University of Bologna, completed a PhD in Society of Information at the 
University of Milano Bicocca and a postdoc on social modernization at 
the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bologna. He was also a 
visiting student at UCLA and visiting researcher at the CETCOPRA of Paris 
1 Pantheon Sorbonne. During his studies, he founded a Web design agency 
and led several online communication projects.
Irene Westra is a recent graduate of Utrecht University’s undergraduate 
sociology programme where she received an award for best bachelor thesis 
of the Faculty Behavioural and Social Sciences at UU. Her thesis focused 
on how institutions influence organizational performance via the network 
structure. She is currently part of the Utrecht Data School as executive 
secretary. Irene is interested in how the emergence of ‘big data’ changes the 
way (scientif ic) research can be performed. Her research aims to combine 






Akrich, Madeleine 82, 92, 110






algorithms 50, 57, 66, 75, 76, 87, 117-119, 125-137, 
222, 233, 245-252
as black boxes 20, 139-142
Anderson, Chris 14, 172, 236
Anscombe, Francis John 119, 120
Application programming interfaces (APIs) 14, 
20, 61, 112, 147-153, 174, 242
Association of Internet Researchers 189, 201
Beer, David 112
Berry, David 13, 20, 26, 27, 109, 111, 114, 122, 171, 
184




Big data research 19, 21, 172, 177, 179, 183-186, 
190-194, 197, 198, 233
Bordwell, David 41-44
Bourdieu, Pierre 62
Bowker, Geoffrey 142, 171, 216, 222, 224
boyd, danah 15, 172, 175, 189, 211, 236
Bucher, Taina 112, 139, 149
calculation 33, 34, 105, 155, 173, 214, 219, 220, 
222
Casey, Michael 39, 50, 51
Cinemetrics 39-51
close reading 33, 55, 173n, 227
Communication Studies 57, 58
computational methods 15, 17, 30, 33, 35, 52, 58, 
110-113, 115, 122, 178
computational turn 13-16, 19, 91, 109
computer science 56-58, 121, 252
computer simulation 63, 65, 171
constructivist 30
Couldry, Nick 15, 155, 172, 211, 221, 235-238
Crawford, Kate 15, 139, 172-175, 189, 222, 236
crawling 76
Cultural Analytics 29, 39-41, 47-51, 55, 56, 
60-62, 67, 69, 93, 109, 119, 185, 212
cultural production 126, 128, 131, 185, 233, 241, 
263
Daston, Lorraine 18
data 11-21, 31, 172, 175-177, 183-190, 193-198, 
201-208, 211-214, 219-227, 236 
bias and discrimination 21, 172, 175-177, 211-214, 
219-222, 227, 236
ethics 17, 21, 175, 183-190, 193-198, 201-208, 224, 
225
point 21, 61, 66, 72, 130, 185, 233, 241-243
practice 12-21, 31, 183-185, 219
data point critique 233, 241-243
data visualization 30, 39-41, 44, 46, 48-51, 155, 
157, 171, 179, 218, 219, 223
dataf ication 11-16, 220-224
dataveillance 222
De Certeau, Michel 40, 52
Declaration of Helsinki 184, 188, 189, 197, 201
deep data 227, 228
democracy 14, 95, 99, 247
digital Bildung 20, 111, 114, 115, 117, 122
digital data analysis 20, 173-178
digital humanities  15, 16, 19, 26-29, 31-34, 
55-60, 109, 111-114, 121, 122, 173, 18-186
digital methods 20, 27, 30, 75-79, 91-93, 97, 99, 
101, 103, 109-114, 123, 139, 184, 197, 201, 224 
digital rhetoric  238
discourse analysis 83, 249
distant reading  93, 173
Drucker, Johanna  16, 25, 29-32, 34, 45, 51, 112, 
173, 176
empiricism/empiricist 15, 32, 39, 171
fallacies of empiricism 15
epistemic/epistemology 15, 18-20, 25-31, 39, 40, 
76-79, 87, 92, 109, 111-113, 116-119, 122, 125-127, 
190, 212, 222-224, 246
ethical 21, 175, 184, 186-190, 193-198, 201-208, 
225, 228
decision-making 189, 194, 201, 207, 208
guidelines 21, 175, 184, 186, 188, 193, 196, 197
Facebook 14, 63, 128, 147, 149-153, 185-187, 207, 
222, 225, 241, 251




terms of use 187, 225






266 The DaTafieD SocieT y
Gephi 117, 118, 145, 155, 159, 177
Gerlitz, Carolin 21, 100, 102, 151, 177, 212, 233, 
241-243
Gillespie, Tarleton 127, 128, 131, 214, 219 
Google 14, 20, 58, 64, 72, 75-77, 79-81, 83, 87-93, 
127, 128, 139, 149, 174, 222, 250, 251
algorithms 75, 77, 87, 127, 139, 251










hermeneutic(s) 19, 28, 41, 48, 50, 93, 125, 184, 
237
humanists 19, 26-31, 33, 34, 48, 56, 58, 60, 112, 
114, 115, 121
digital 27, 29, 33, 56, 60, 112, 114, 121
Humanities 11-17, 19-21, 25-35, 47, 55-58, 60-63, 
65, 109, 111-114, 122, 136-139, 149, 168, 171, 173, 
184-186, 197, 241, 253




Informed consent 21, 175, 184-188, 191-198, 203, 
204, 225
Instagram 14, 20, 48, 55, 58-61, 63-66, 69, 71, 72, 
149, 150, 185, 241-243
photos 20, 58-61, 72, 185
issue crawler 98
issue networks 20, 95-100, 103, 104
Kitchin, Rob 11, 15, 17, 29, 32, 34n, 171-173, 177
Knorr Cetina, Karin 25n, 46, 140, 141
Kuhn, Thomas 41n, 109
literacy 118, 135, 139, 168
long data 66
machine learning 33, 50, 64, 65n, 113, 127, 133
manga 61, 119, 120
Manovich, Lev 19, 29, 33, 39, 48-51, 59, 61, 69, 
93, 119, 120, 128, 173, 175, 185, 212
Markham, Annette  21, 175, 184, 188-190, 194
Marx, Karl  62, 63, 66, 142, 237
Merleau-Ponty’s, Maurice  143, 144
metadata 49, 76, 99, 100, 151, 176, 185, 206, 223
Methodenstreit  110
methodology 19, 27, 39-41, 47-51, 95, 110-118, 121, 
156, 172, 201, 202, 208, 224, 225
metrics 100, 118, 121, 152, 155, 168, 177, 178, 
214-217, 219, 223, 235, 241-243
bio 214-217, 223
socio 118, 121
Moretti, Franco 50, 156, 168, 173




network analysis 20, 95, 117, 118, 155-157, 167, 
168, 259
network visualization  21, 98, 112, 117, 118, 145, 
155, 159, 168
N-Gram viewer 58
objectivity 13, 18, 25, 30, 63, 112, 127, 131, 172, 178, 
190, 214, 219, 220, 227
On Broadway 20, 61, 66, 69-73
ontology 11, 132, 190, 211
open data 15, 69, 148, 149, 203
Pariser, Eli 77
Pasquale, Frank 15, 211, 219, 222
personalization  77, 80, 127, 132-135
Petric, Vlada  41, 43
Photosynth 134-136
politics of association 95-99, 104
politics of circulation  112





privacy  149, 150, 175, 184-186, 194, 195, 202-207, 
216, 222
programming 16, 48, 111, 114-118, 121, 122, 131, 
148, 149, 153, 177, 212, 251
language 149, 153
skills 115, 121, 122
qualitative  27, 55, 98, 110, 111, 125, 173, 177, 184, 
190, 192, 246
quantitative  16, 25, 27, 30, 39-43, 47, 55, 62, 92, 
109-111, 125, 156, 173, 214, 219, 221, 224








research design 151, 190, 194, 195, 198
Rieder, Bernhard 20, 29, 109-112, 115, 139, 140, 
145, 151, 171, 185, 241, 242
Rogers, Richard 20, 85, 95-98, 185, 212 
Röhle, Theo  20, 29, 109-111, 139, 140, 145, 171, 185
Salt, Barry 41-47, 50
sampling  93, 150, 151, 177
inDex 267
scientif ic 16, 18, 30, 39-43, 46-52, 56, 63, 65, 97, 





scientism 18, 26, 39, 46, 48, 50, 141
scraping  21, 29, 76, 183, 191, 194
search engine 14, 75, 77, 80, 81, 87, 250
Shannon, Claude 119
Simondon, Gilbert 122, 123, 250, 251
social computing  19, 55-62, 65
social graph 223
social media 14, 57, 60, 64, 66, 71, 96, 99, 104, 
105, 112, 131n, 147-152, 172-175, 177, 185, 188, 
235, 236, 241-243, 245, 252
content 57, 96, 104, 152
data 64, 150, 172-175, 241-243
metrics 152, 177, 242
social networks 55-61, 65, 149, 156, 167, 177, 184, 
187, 198
social science 11, 60, 63, 66, 109-116, 148-151, 168, 
185, 197, 198, 238
social sorting 77, 80, 89, 212-217, 222
sociology 14, 60, 62, 110, 140, 185
software studies initiative 29, 48, 55, 59, 71
SPSS 116
statistical subjects 219-221
statistics  29, 45, 62, 64, 110, 116-122, 168, 176, 
177, 218, 221
style analysis 39-44, 47, 48, 52
Sustein, Cass 77 
techno-images 18




transparency 20, 29, 30, 139-145, 178, 195, 219, 
222
practical 140-145
Tukey, John 50, 111, 160
Turow, Joseph 77
Twitter  14, 20, 55-58, 66, 69-72, 100-103, 105, 
145, 147-153, 174, 206, 241, 242
unambiguous queries 87-89, 93 
Underwood, Ted 59
user-generated content  56, 58, 61, 65
Utrecht Data School 9, 17, 183
Van Dijck, José 13, 172, 221, 223, 225, 241
Vis, Farida 172, 175 
Weltbild 133, 135, 136
wide data 66, 67, 69
Wikipedia 75, 76, 80, 89, 92, 134
Williams, Raymond 82, 83, 92
YouTube 14, 55, 57, 59, 80
video 57, 80

